Law Commons^™

Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, And Corporate Law Reform: Employment At Will Versus Job Security, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

None available.

Who Let You Into The House?, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Recent Congressional corporate governance initiatives have reallocated to independent directors the functions of hiring and supervising the work of certain “gatekeepers,” and some have proposed such a reallocation with respect to general counsel, as a means to address cognitive biases and capture by senior management that may prevent inside counsel from identifying and preventing corporate misconduct. That proposal, however, does not sufficiently account for the positive effect on corporate conduct arising from a close relationship of trust and confidence between general counsel and the CEO or other senior managers. Eliminating such a relationship is likely to undermine access to internal …

Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral In The New Era Of Dodd-Frank Act "Bounty Hunting", Matt A. Vega

Matt A Vega

In this article, I examine the SEC's new whistleblower bounty program authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act. Under the program, which went into effect last year, the SEC is required to pay a bounty to whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the agency with "original information" about a potential securities law violation that leads to a successful SEC or "related" enforcement action and that results in monetary sanctions of sufficient size. When the average SEC settlement is over $18.3 million, whistleblowers can expect the average bounty to be well in the range of $2-5 million.

My contention is that this new program is …

Corporate Takeovers And Corporate Law: Who's In Control?, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

No abstract provided.

Revisiting And Re-Evaluating Omnicare 10 Years Later, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Abstract Known as one of the premier business courts in the country, very few decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court have garnered as much criticism as Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. In a court famously known for issuing unanimous decisions, Omnicare led to two separate dissenting opinions. In the dissents and in the years since its issuance, the majority’s decision has been faulted not only for its doctrinal shortcomings, but also for its potentially negative impact on M&A activity and its poor corporate policy implications. This has led many academics and practitioners to ask whether Omnicare was a normatively …

Revisiting And Re-Evaluating Omnicare 10 Years Later, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Abstract Known as one of the premier business courts in the country, very few decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court have garnered as much criticism as Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. Indeed, much of the criticism originated from the court itself; in a court famously known for issuing unanimous decisions, Omnicare led to two separate dissenting opinions. In the dissents and in the years since its issuance, the majority’s decision has been faulted not only for its doctrinal shortcomings, but also for its potentially negative impact on merger and acquisition activity and its poor corporate policy implications. This has …

Revisiting And Re-Evaluating Omnicare 10 Years Later, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Abstract Known as one of the premier business courts in the country, very few decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court have garnered as much criticism as Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. Indeed, much of the criticism originated from the court itself; in a court famously known for issuing unanimous decisions, Omnicare led to two separate dissenting opinions. In the dissents and in the years since its issuance, the majority’s decision has been faulted not only for its doctrinal shortcomings, but also for its potentially negative impact on merger and acquisition activity and its poor corporate policy implications. This has …

The Business Judgment Rule As An Immunity Doctrine, Lori A. Mcmillan

Lori A. McMillan

The business judgment rule is a judicially created doctrine that protects directors from personal civil liability for the decisions they make on behalf of a corporation. In today’s era of corporate scandals, global financial meltdowns, and directorial malfeasance it has become especially important in setting the bar for when directors are appropriately responsible to shareholders for their actions. Traditionally the business judgment rule has been regarded as a standard of liability, although it has never really been explored or enunciated as such. This view determines eligibility for business judgment rule protection of a decision after an examination of certain preconditions. …

Cadbury Twenty Years On, Cally Jordan

Cally Jordan

This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the Cadbury Report, one of the most significant events in modern corporate governance. The Cadbury Report, and its simple two page “best practices”, triggered a global debate on corporate governance. “Cadbury” codes of corporate governance spread like wildfire. The legacy of the Cadbury Report lives on in the UK with no diminution in the appeal of its voluntary code/comply or explain approach to corporate governance. But there are several clouds looming on the horizon. Comply or explain and voluntary codes of corporate governance appear to have run their course elsewhere …

Corporate Tax Risks: A Call For Greater Audit Committee Involvement, Thomas F. Larson

Thomas F Larson

This paper addresses recent turn of the century changes to how the government, the general public, and shareholders view corporate tax risk. The advent of new regulatory regimes necessitates a change in corporate boardroom behavior. This paper advocates a greater and more direct approach to be taken by the audit committee. Specifically, the committee should take control of certain aspects of the evaluation and appropriate levels of tax risk through a number of different ways.

Equity Swaps And Implications In Company Law: An Examination Of Singapore Law, Chao-Hung Christopher Chen

Christopher Chao-hung CHEN

This article explores issues from the use of equity swaps by corporate stakeholders under Singapore law. The article accepts that non-disclosure of economic interests might have an impact on market efficiency and corporate governance. To address potential problems, Singapore should consider revising the Takeover Code, while it requires further regulatory impact analysis to decide whether amendments to the Securities and Futures Act and the Companies Act are needed. As an alternative, companies can use their articles of association to impose a duty of disclosure before statutory intervention. In addition, the trading of equity swaps by directors raises issues about fiduciary …

Corporate Governance And The New Trend Of Directors In Company Law In Other Countries, Christopher Chao-Hung Chen, Shuaisheng Huang

Christopher Chao-hung Chen

No abstract provided.

Challenges And Opportunities For The Indonesian Securities Takeover Regulations: General Framework And Analysis From Dutch Law And Theoretical Perspectives, Yozua Makes

Yozua Makes

This article examines question of the extent to which the rules in Indonesia concerning takeover of a public listed company: (1) facilitate efficient exchange of shares in the capital market with fair protection for all stakeholders in a takeover transaction pursuant to Good Corporate Governance (GCG) principles; and (2) accommodate principles and protection provided in the securities laws of more developed jurisdictions. These issues are addressed by analyzing the current Indonesian legal framework from the perspective of fairness and efficiency in the securities regulations and corporate governance principles. A comparative discussion of laws and regulations in Indonesia and the Netherlands …

The End Of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders To Customize Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions In Charters And Bylaws, Paul D. Weitzel

Paul D. Weitzel

Shareholder litigation has been heavily criticized for its inability to compensate harmed shareholders or deter managerial misconduct. While some have suggested abolishing shareholder litigation altogether, this article takes a more moderate approach. I propose allowing shareholders to enforce charter and bylaw provisions that require arbitration of certain disputes. For example, an acquisitive company may require arbitration of merger-related suits, while allowing non-merger suits to proceed in court. Likewise, a company in an industry known for volatile stock prices could require a price drop of three or four standard deviations before the suit could be brought in court, rather than arbitration. …

The End Of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders To Customize Enforcement Through Arbitration Provisions In Charters And Bylaws, Paul D. Weitzel

Paul D. Weitzel

Shareholder litigation has been heavily criticized for its inability to compensate harmed shareholders or deter managerial misconduct. While some have suggested abolishing shareholder litigation altogether, this article takes a more moderate approach. I propose allowing shareholders to enforce charter and bylaw provisions that require arbitration of certain disputes. For example, an acquisitive company may require arbitration of merger-related suits, while allowing non-merger suits to proceed in court. Likewise, a company in an industry known for volatile stock prices could require a price drop of three or four standard deviations before the suit could be brought in court, rather than arbitration. …

What's Wrong With Shareholder Empowerment?, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

In his keynote address at the Journal of Corporation Law spring banquet (March 8, 2012), Mr. Sharfman discusses the negative impact shareholder empowerment has on the efficiency of decision making at public companies. Shareholder empowerment is the shifting of decision making from the board of directors and executive management to shareholders.

Why Proxy Access Is Harmful To Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Historically, the SEC has allowed public companies to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder proposals for the nomination of directors by shareholders. This rule has allowed the nomination of directors to remain under the control of the board of directors and its nominating committee. However, under amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8), shareholders will now be able to include proposals on proxy access in a public company’s proxy materials. Public companies can now expect to receive such proposals for inclusion in their proxy materials for the 2012 proxy season.When voting on proxy access proposals, shareholders need to understand that proxy access is a …

Globalization Of Securities Enforcement: A Shift Toward Enhanced Regulatory Intensity In Brazil’S Capital Market?, Eugenio J. Cárdenas

Eugenio J. Cárdenas

This Paper, written for the “Globalization of the United States Litigation Model” symposium at Brooklyn Law School (October 21, 2011), inquires on whether emerging capital markets are shifting toward enhanced regulatory intensity in the enforcement of their securities laws, under the context of global legal convergence. It ventures into this puzzle of globalization, corporate law enforcement, and financial development, in light of the increasing phenomenon of regulatory convergence and international cooperation among securities regulators, in the realm of capital market surveillance and enforcement.

Focus is placed on the emerging Latin American region, namely Brazil’s securities market. The study explores Brazil’s …

Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, And The Redefinition Of Corporate Purpose Without Law, David Millon

David K. Millon

No abstract provided.