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Full-Text Articles in Law

Being Informed Does Matter: Fine Tuning Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years After Van Gorkom, Bernard S. Sharfman Oct 2006

Being Informed Does Matter: Fine Tuning Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years After Van Gorkom, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

This article first establishes that there are still a number of reasons why being informed does matter, despite the ability to incorporate an exculpation clause into a Delaware corporation’s certificate of incorporation. This is followed by an explanation of how Delaware’s business judgment rule became transformed from a doctrine of abstention to a standard of review in the context of procedural due care. Throughout this article, it is understood that the business judgment rule exits within a framework of corporate authority and accountability and that it serves as a significant tool for the protection of corporate board authority. The article …


Business Strategists And Election Commissioners: How The Meaning Of Loyalty Varies With The Board’S Distinct Fiduciary Roles, Ethan G. Stone Jul 2006

Business Strategists And Election Commissioners: How The Meaning Of Loyalty Varies With The Board’S Distinct Fiduciary Roles, Ethan G. Stone

Ethan G. Stone

For twenty years, Delaware courts have been developing special standards to review board decisions that interfere with hostile bids for control or the exercise of the shareholder franchise. These “Unocal” and “Blasius” doctrines seem to fit uneasily with theories of the board’s role in corporate governance, constraining board discretion too little for shareholder primacy theories and too much for board autonomy theories. Nor have the Delaware courts succeeded in fitting Unocal and Blasius comfortably with their treatment of board decisions in other contexts. In this article, I propose that these special doctrines reflect the difference between two separate functions of …


Understanding Maryland's Business Judgment Rule, Bernard S. Sharfman Jan 2006

Understanding Maryland's Business Judgment Rule, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

No abstract provided.


Natural Law And Agency Theory, Michael Lp Lower Jan 2006

Natural Law And Agency Theory, Michael Lp Lower

Michael LP Lower

Corporate governance scholarship is awash with theories of the firm: these are "stories" or metaphors that try to shed light on the nature and purpose of the firm as an institution and on one or more of the following questions:

(i) how the institution of the firm "evolved" (or its economic or social purpose); (ii) whether "the firm" is a reality or a rhetorical device; and (iii) the relationship between "the firm" and stakeholders, political society and so on.

Theories of the firm are used both to explain and to help develop law and policy. If the theory is misconceived, …


The Dangers And Drawbacks Of The Disclosure Antidote: Toward A More Substantive Approach To Securities Regulation, Susanna K. Ripken Dec 2005

The Dangers And Drawbacks Of The Disclosure Antidote: Toward A More Substantive Approach To Securities Regulation, Susanna K. Ripken

Susanna K. Ripken

This article analyzes and critiques the federal securities laws' reliance on disclosure as the primary method of protecting investors and regulating the securities markets. Since the inception of the federal securities law seventy years ago, the policy has always been that, as long as corporations disclose all material information about their operations and their stock, public investors can make their own informed investment decisions. The unprecedented number of corporate frauds, scandals, and bankruptcies in recent years has revealed weaknesses in the traditional disclosure strategy of regulation. Disclosure rules did not protect American investors from the damages they suffered when large …


Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, Richard E. Moberly Dec 2005

Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, Richard E. Moberly

Richard E. Moberly

Recent corporate scandals demonstrate that rank-and-file employees often remain silent in the face of significant fraud. This silence is unfortunate because corporate employees have inside knowledge of misconduct that gives them an information advantage over more traditional corporate monitors, such as independent directors and government regulators. To address this problem, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act utilized a new approach that encourages employee whistleblowers to disclose information about corporate wrongdoing. This approach, which Professor Richard Moberly labels the “Structural Model,” requires that corporations provide a standardized channel for employees to report organizational misconduct to official monitors within the corporation. This Article offers an …