Law Commons^™

The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead

Charles K Whitehead

The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities - in effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past - a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions. Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases, to hedge …

Epic Fail: An Institutional Analysis Of Financial Distress, Jonathan C. Lipson

Jonathan C. Lipson

This paper presents an institutional analysis of financial distress. “Institutional analysis” compares the effectiveness of large-scale processes, such as markets, courts, and governments, at solving social problems. Although financial distress is one of our most acute problems, there has been virtually no effort to analyze it from an institutional perspective. This paper begins to fill that gap.

Institutional analysis shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, financial distress is not a problem that courts, such as bankruptcy courts, usually solve by themselves. Instead, it is increasingly a problem that political organs (whether elected or regulatory) both create and purport to resolve. …

Is The Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model For Breaking Up The Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail?, Roberta S. Karmel

Roberta S. Karmel

ABSTRACT FOR “IS THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT A MODEL FOR BREAKING UP THE BANKS THAT ARE TO-BIG-TO-FAIL?”

BY ROBERTA S. KARMEL

During the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the debates on regulatory reform that followed, there was general agreement that the “too-big-to-fail” principle creates unacceptable moral hazard. Policy makers divided, however, on the solutions to this problem. Some argued that the banking behemoths in the United States should be broken up. Others argued that dismantling the big banks would be bad policy because these banks would not be able to compete with universal banks in the global capital …

Simultaneous Distress Of Residential Developers And Their Secured Lenders: An Analysis Of Bankruptcy & Bank Regulation, Sarah P. Woo

Sarah P Woo

With falling home prices and home foreclosures currently acknowledged as a severe problem in the U.S., more attention needs to be paid to the contributing phenomenon of residential developers undergoing liquidation, which has left behind a trail of partially-completed or abandoned properties. In order to understand this phenomenon, we analyzed 222 residential developers that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions between November 2007 and December 2008. We find that only a very small proportion of these developers, as compared to previous similar large studies, confirmed a reorganization plan. Most cases ended in liquidations. In the sample, 72.5% of the cases showed …