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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Law
"Apple Vs. Samsung: Three Possible Outcomes" (Quotes: Mark Mckenna) Cnn Money, Mark Mckenna
"Apple Vs. Samsung: Three Possible Outcomes" (Quotes: Mark Mckenna) Cnn Money, Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Apple vs. Samsung: Three possible outcomes article by David Goldman quotes: Mark McKenna in CNN Money on Aug 24, 2012.
"I have been surprised that Samsung seems to have been on the defensive so much," said Mark McKenna, a law professor and intellectual property specialist at the University of Notre Dame.
Mark Mckenna Quoted In The Mac News World Article "Apple Breaks Legal Serve In Samsung’S Home Court.", Mark Mckenna
Mark Mckenna Quoted In The Mac News World Article "Apple Breaks Legal Serve In Samsung’S Home Court.", Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Mark McKenna was quoted in the Mac News World article Apple Breaks Legal Serve in Samsung’s Home Court on December 13. "Neither of these companies wants to give an inch because the cumulative effect of these cases is to make it as difficult on each other as possible," Mark McKenna, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, told MacNewsWorld.
Mark Mckenna Quoted In The Guardian Article "Samsung Says $52m, Not $380m, Is Owed For Apple Patent Infringement, Mark Mckenna
Mark Mckenna Quoted In The Guardian Article "Samsung Says $52m, Not $380m, Is Owed For Apple Patent Infringement, Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Mark McKenna quoted in The Guardian article by Charles Arthur "Samsung says $52m, not $380m, is owed for Apple patent infringement. “Most cases with these enormous stakes would have settled by now – particularly once the court ordered a new trial on damages, which could substantially increase or decrease the damage award," McKenna said by email. "But once the court took off the table the possibility of an injunction (which would have taken Samsung products off the market), the risk to Samsung was significantly lower, reducing its incentive to settle. And Apple wants something significant to show for its efforts. …
Mark Mckenna Quoted In Ap Article On Apple, Samsung Trial, Mark Mckenna
Mark Mckenna Quoted In Ap Article On Apple, Samsung Trial, Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Mark McKenna was quoted in the Associated Press article by PAUL ELIAS Apple, Samsung resume court battle over smartphone patents as trial opens in Silicon Valley "Most cases with these enormous stakes would have settled by now — particularly once the court ordered a new trial on damages, which could substantially increase or decrease the damage award," said Notre Dame law school professor Mark McKenna, who specializes in technology. But McKenna said a key incentive for both companies to reach a settlement was removed by U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh when she refused to ban U.S. sales of the Samsung …
Trademark Law's Faux Federalism, Mark Mckenna
Trademark Law's Faux Federalism, Mark Mckenna
Mark P. McKenna
Federal and state trademark laws regulate concurrently: The Lanham Act does not preempt state law, and in fact many states have statutorily and/or judicially developed trademark or unfair competition laws of their own. This state of affairs, which is now well-accepted even if it has not always been uncontroversial, distinguishes trademark law from patent and copyright law, since federal patent and copyright statutes preempt state law much more broadly. The Patent Act entirely preempts state law with respect to non-secret inventions and the 1976 Copyright Act preempts state copyright law with respect to all works fixed in a tangible medium …
Apple's Court-Appointed Watchdog May Not Have Much Bite, Joseph Bauer
Apple's Court-Appointed Watchdog May Not Have Much Bite, Joseph Bauer
Joseph P. Bauer
Joe Bauer was quoted in the MacNewsWorld article Apple's Court-Appointed Watchdog May Not Have Much Bite on October 18. "Apple has been bullheaded about this," Joseph P. Bauer, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, told MacNewsWorld. "It's been so uncooperative with the court that the court has reacted a little more harshly than it would with a defendant who said, 'We will violate no more.'" - See more at: http://www.macnewsworld.com/story/Apples-Court-Appointed-Watchdog-May-Not-Have-Much-Bite-79221.html#sthash.WR6UdvAH.dpuf
Strategic Effects Of Three-Part Tariffs Under Oligopoly, Yong Chao
Strategic Effects Of Three-Part Tariffs Under Oligopoly, Yong Chao
Yong Chao
The distinct element of a three-part tariff, compared with linear pricing or a two-part tariff, is its quantity target within which the marginal price is zero. This quantity target instrument enriches the firm's strategy set in dictating the competition to a specific level, even in the absence of usual price discrimination motive. With general differentiated linear demand system, the competitive effect of a three-part tariff in contrast to linear pricing depends on the degree of substitutability between products: competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated, yet softened when two products are more substitutable.
Increased Market Power As A New Secondary Consideration In Patent Law, Andrew Blair-Stanek
Increased Market Power As A New Secondary Consideration In Patent Law, Andrew Blair-Stanek
Andrew Blair-Stanek
Courts have developed nine non-technical secondary considerations to help juries and judges in patent litigation decide whether a patent meets the crucial statutory requirement of being non-obvious. This article proposes a new, tenth secondary consideration: increased market power. If a patent measurably increases its holders’ market power, that should weigh in favor of finding the patent non-obvious. This new secondary consideration incorporates the predictive benefits of several existing secondary considerations, while increasing the accuracy and availability of evidence for fact-finders to determine whether a patent is non-obvious.
Retaliatorily Discharged Employees’ Standing To Sue Under The Antitrust Laws, Gary Shaw
Retaliatorily Discharged Employees’ Standing To Sue Under The Antitrust Laws, Gary Shaw
Gary M. Shaw
No abstract provided.
Pfizer, Inc. V. India Foreign Sovereigns’ Standing To Sue For Treble Damages, Gary Shaw
Pfizer, Inc. V. India Foreign Sovereigns’ Standing To Sue For Treble Damages, Gary Shaw
Gary M. Shaw
No abstract provided.
Global Justice And International Economic Law: Three Takes, Frank Garcia
Global Justice And International Economic Law: Three Takes, Frank Garcia
Frank J. Garcia
For centuries, international trade has been seen as essential to the wealth and power of nations, and defended as a system through which all could benefit. It is only recently that trade's problematic role as an engine of distributive justice has begun to be understood, due in part to globalization and the global justice debates. In this compelling new book, international legal scholar Frank J. Garcia proposes a radically new way to evaluate, construct, and manage international trade - one that is based on norms of economic justice as well as comparative advantage and national interest. This book examines three …
The Failure Of Corporate Governance Standards And Antitrust Compliance, Jesse Markham
The Failure Of Corporate Governance Standards And Antitrust Compliance, Jesse Markham
Jesse Markham
This article explores the interplay between corporate governance law and antitrust law, and concludes that fiduciary standards should be strengthened. Part I explains the need for powerful incentives to comply with antitrust laws, given the economic rewards from violations. Part II explores recent trends in antitrust law enforcement to show that violations continue more or less unabated despite major improvements in detection and prosecution of violations. Part III argues why monetary sanctions imposed on corporations should be abandoned as the primary enforcement tool, given that they merely place economic burdens on shareholders who are powerless to intervene ex ante, or …