Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication
- File Type
Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Law
Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol
Troubled Waters Between U.S. And European Antitrust, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
Antitrust is an important area of law and policy for most companies in the world. Having divergent rules across antitrust systems means that the same economic behavior may be treated differently depending on the jurisdiction, leading to disparate outcomes in which one jurisdiction finds illegal behavior (but the other does not) when the underlying behavior may be pro-competitive. This disparate set of outcomes creates a world in which the most stringent antitrust system may produce the global standard. As a result, if the antitrust rules applied are too rigid, they threaten to hurt consumers not merely in the jurisdiction where …
Trade Associations, Information Exchange, And Cartels, Spencer Weber Waller
Trade Associations, Information Exchange, And Cartels, Spencer Weber Waller
Spencer Weber Waller
Trade associations can play a procompetitive role in an economy but, as an association of actual and potential competitors, can also raise important competition law issues that must be addressed carefully by legal counsel. This Issue Paper presents a hypothetical problem that illustrates many of the issues that counsel can confront in representing a trade association, its members, or company executives. The Issue Paper raises many of the issues from a United States' perspective with occasional comparative examples from other jurisdictions. Carefully consider how your jurisdiction would, and should, address these all too real issues. In thinking about the …
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
Spencer Weber Waller
No abstract provided.
The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol
The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
In late June 2012, Barclays entered into a $453 million settlement with UK and U.S. regulators due to its manipulation of Libor between 2005 and 2009. Among the agencies that investigated Barclays is the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (as well as other antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies from around the world). Participation in a price fixing conduct, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one firm. We are cautious to draw overly broad conclusions until more facts come out in the public domain. What we note at this time, based on public information, is that the …
Transplanting Antitrust In China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, And State Control, Wentong Zheng
Transplanting Antitrust In China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, And State Control, Wentong Zheng
Wentong Zheng
This Article examines the compatibility of Western antitrust models as incorporated in China's first comprehensive antitrust law – the Antimonopoly Law ("AML") – with China's local conditions. It identifies three forces that shape competition law and policy in China: China's current transitional stage, China's market structures, and pervasive state control in China's economy. This Article discusses how these forces have limited the applicability of Western antitrust models to China in three major areas of antitrust: cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and merger review. Specifically, it details how these forces have prevented China from pursuing a rigorous anti-cartel policy, how …
Cartels, Corporate Compliance, And What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement, D. Daniel Sokol
Cartels, Corporate Compliance, And What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement, D. Daniel Sokol
D. Daniel Sokol
This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy currently used by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. This article employs both quantitative and qualitative survey evidence of cartel practitioners to shed light upon the realities of US cartel enforcement policy. The empirical evidence provided by the practitioner surveys challenges the traditional assumptions behind the success of the DOJ’s cartel program. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that firms regularly game the leniency program to punish their competitors. For various reasons, firms and the DOJ have strong incentives to settle rather than to litigate cases in which …
Jurisprudenta In Materia Concurentei. Obligatia De A Solicita O Hotarare Preliminara., Emanuela Matei
Jurisprudenta In Materia Concurentei. Obligatia De A Solicita O Hotarare Preliminara., Emanuela Matei
Emanuela A. Matei
No abstract provided.
The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Hammond, And Barnett, Joshua Davis, Robert Lande
The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Hammond, And Barnett, Joshua Davis, Robert Lande
Joshua P. Davis
Our article, "Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws," 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 315, documented an extraordinary but usually overlooked fact: private antitrust enforcement deters a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the article showed that private enforcement "probably" deters even more anticompetitive conduct than the almost universally admired anti-cartel enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice. In a recent issue of Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett challenged our analysis. They asserted that our comparison “is more misleading than informative.” It is unsurprising that they …
Vertical Relations In Cartel Theory, Martijn Han
Vertical Relations In Cartel Theory, Martijn Han
Martijn A. Han
A cartel is a group of firms collectively attempting to restrict competition among them. Cartel members most commonly do so by illegally fixing prices, sharing markets, or rigging bids. This dissertation explores managerial incentives to cartelize.
Short-Term Managerial Contracts And Cartels, Martijn Han
Short-Term Managerial Contracts And Cartels, Martijn Han
Martijn A. Han
This paper shows how a series of commonly observed short-term CEO employment contracts can improve cartel stability compared to a long-term employment contract. When a manager's short-term appointment is renewed if and only if the firm hits a certain profit target, then (i) defection from collusion results in superior firm performance, thus reducing the chance of being fired, while (ii) future punishment results in inferior firm performance, thus increasing the chance of being fired in the future. The introduction of this re-employment tradeoff intertwines with the usual monetary tradeoff and can improve cartel stability. Studying the impact of fixed versus …