Law Commons^™

Alternatives To California’S Sb 27: Incentivizing The Release Of Tax Returns Without Restricting Ballot Access, Matthew Tang

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Donald Trump is the first President since 1977, and the first major- party nominee since 1980, to refuse to release any of his federal income tax returns. This break in tradition has led lawmakers in at least twenty- five states to propose legislation requiring presidential candidates to disclose their tax returns in order to appear on state ballots. California is one of those states. On July 30, 2017, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed SB 27 into law, effectively barring presidential candidates who have not made available for public inspection the last five years of their income tax returns from appearing …

Democracy, Deference, And Compromise: Understanding And Reforming Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, Scott P. Bloomberg

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In Citizens United, the Supreme Court interpreted the government’s interest in preventing corruption as being limited to preventing quid pro quo— cash-for-votes—corruption. This narrow interpretation drastically circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of elections, in turn prompting scholars to propose a number of reforms for broadening the government interest in campaign finance cases. These reforms include urging the Court to recognize a new government interest such as political equality, to adopt a broader understanding of corruption, and to be more deferential to legislatures in defining corruption.

Building upon that body of scholarship, this Article begins with a descriptive …

The Copyright Act’S Mandatory-Deposit Requirement: Unnecessary And Unconstitutional, Drew Thornley

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Many people are unaware of a federal copyright statute that requires owners of material published in the United States to furnish the federal government with two copies of each item published. Section 407(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 (17 U.S.C. § 407) states that “the owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of publication in a work published in the United States shall deposit, within three months after the date of such publication—(1) two complete copies of the best edition; or (2) if the work is a sound recording, two complete phonorecords of the best edition, together with …

Courts, Trademarks, And The Icann Gold Rush: No Free Speech In Top Level Domains, Jerome O'Callaghan, Paula O'Callaghan

Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review

In recent years, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) expanded top-level domains, such as .com, .net, and .org, to include a very wide variety of new terms. One of the new options is .sucks. This Article examines the potential for conflict when trademark holders seek to protect their mark in the context of the .sucks domain. There is a temptation to see this issue in terms of consumers’ free speech rights pitted against corporate interests. However, the recent privatization of ICANN does not bode well for promoting consumers’ First Amendment rights in domain name battles.

Let Them Eat Cake: Why Public Proprietors Of Wedding Goods And Services Must Equally Serve All People, Labdhi Sheth, Molly Christ

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Social Media And The Government: Why It May Be Unconstitutional For Government Officials To Moderate Their Social Media, Alex Hadjian

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Diy Solutions To The Hobby Lobby Problem, Kristin Haule

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Balancing Disclosure And Privacy Interests In Campaign Finance, Sarah Harding

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

The law of campaign finance pits two important First Amendment interests against each other: disclosure and privacy. The Supreme Court has recognized the need to balance these two interests to allow for effective elections and to safeguard individual rights. However, through the years the Court has failed to balance these interests equally, resulting in vacillating decisions that unfairly sacrifice one for the other. From Burroughs v. United States in 1934 to Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, the Court has failed to provide a workable roadmap for legislatures in the creation of campaign finance disclosure laws and for lower courts …

Election Law—Introduction, Jessica A. Levinson

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

When Rhetoric Obscures Reality: The Definition Of Corruption And Its Shortcomings, Jessica Medina

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Due to public scorn after the unraveling of the Watergate scandal, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s restrictions on political contributions and expenditures. Buckley v. Valeo established that no legitimate government interest existed to justify restrictions on campaign expenditures, and only the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption could justify restrictions on campaign contributions. Since then, the Court has struggled to articulate a definition of corruption that balances First Amendment protections with the potential for improper influence. This Article argues that the Court’s current definition of corruption is too narrow, and proposes …

"The Only Thing We Have To Fear Is Fear Itself": The Constitutional Infirmities With Felon Disenfranchisement And Citing Fear As The Rationale For Depriving Felons Of Their Right To Vote, Erika Stern

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Felon disenfranchisement, a mechanism by which felons and former felons are deprived of their right to vote, is a widespread practice that has been challenged on many grounds. However, felon disenfranchisement has not yet been properly challenged under the First Amendment. This Article argues that states implicate felons’ First Amendment rights through felon disenfranchisement without citing adequate or compelling rationales to justify this severe intrusion. In fact, at least one rationale, a rationale based on the fear of the way felons might vote, is itself inconsistent with First Amendment principles. Disenfranchising felons based on a fear of the way that …

Know Your Audience: Risky Speech At The Intersection Of Meaning And Value In First Amendment Jurisprudence, Clay Calvert, Matthew D. Bunker

Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review

Using the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper as an analytical springboard, this article examines the vast burdens placed on speakers in four realms of First Amendment law to correctly know their audiences, in advance of communication, if they want to receive constitutional protection. Specifically, the article asserts that speakers are freighted with accurately understanding both the meaning and the value audiences will ascribe to their messages, ex ante, in the areas of obscenity, intentional infliction of emotional distress, student speech, and true threats. A speaker’s inability to effectively predict a recipient’s reaction to …

Ask Me No Questions And I’Ll Tell You No Lies: The First Amendments And Falsehoods In Ballot Question Campaigns, Michelle Roberts

Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review

American voters have come to expect exaggeration, distortion, and mudslinging in political campaigns, but do campaigners have a First Amendment right to blatantly lie—to simply make up false statistics and “facts”? A recent appellate court suggests that lying is permissible in initiative and referendum campaigns. However, providing constitutional protection for such statements undermines the most compelling justification for the right to free speech: preservation of enlightened self-government. Voters cannot be expected to govern wisely or in accordance with their consciences when they are subjected to a barrage of lies. The Supreme Court already recognizes discrete areas where free speech rights …