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Decision-making

Law and Philosophy

Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Law

Objectivity In Legal Judgement, Heidi Li Feldman Mar 1994

Objectivity In Legal Judgement, Heidi Li Feldman

Michigan Law Review

This essay unites the philosophical concern with blend concepts and the legal concern with objectivity. Comparing blend legal concepts with other kinds of blend concepts develops our resources for ascertaining the distinctive characteristics of blend concepts. Cultivating a more refined understanding of blend concepts sharpens our inquiry into objectivity. In Part I of this essay, I explicate the distinctive characteristics of blend concepts, demonstrating that some representative legal concepts, drawn from tort law, possess these characteristics. In Part II, I develop a conception of objectivity suitable for blend judgments - the blend conception of objectivity - and use this conception …


Conceptions Of Value In Legal Thought, Richard H. Pildes May 1992

Conceptions Of Value In Legal Thought, Richard H. Pildes

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Love's Knowledge by Martha C. Nussbaum


Playing With The Rules, Mark V. Tushnet May 1992

Playing With The Rules, Mark V. Tushnet

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and Life by Frederick Schauer


Judge Posner's Jurisprudence Of Skepticism, Steven J. Burton Dec 1988

Judge Posner's Jurisprudence Of Skepticism, Steven J. Burton

Michigan Law Review

This essay suggests that there is an instructive incompleteness in Judge Posner's transition from scientific observer to legal actor. His legal skepticism should be understood as a legacy of his days as an inquiring economist, observing and forming beliefs about law and the judicial process from the academy. His affirmation of judicial practices stems from his new respect for practical reason, which seems to result from the experience of performing judicial duties. This essay will argue that a more complete assimilation of the practical perspective of the legal actor would undercut Judge Posner's arguments for legal skepticism.


Practical Legal Studies And Critical Legal Studies, Jay M. Feinman Dec 1988

Practical Legal Studies And Critical Legal Studies, Jay M. Feinman

Michigan Law Review

The basic questions that Practical Legal Studies confronts are how judges decide cases and how judges should decide cases. The traditional analytic response to these questions has been that judges apply formal methods of legal reasoning, and the formal methods sufficiently comport with the courts' role in the political structure to provide legitimacy. That response has been untenable for a generation or more; thus PLS has moved to informal legal reasoning as a description of adjudication and as a source of legitimacy.

Posner presents a two-part response to the questions. First, judges can relatively easily arrive at the correct decision …


Legal Theory And Common Law, Robert R. Morse Jr. May 1987

Legal Theory And Common Law, Robert R. Morse Jr.

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Legal Theory and Common Law edited by William Twining


The Jurisprudence Of Reasons, Frederick Schauer May 1987

The Jurisprudence Of Reasons, Frederick Schauer

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Law's Empire by Ronald Dworkin


Law And Social Science, Richard D. Schwartz May 1987

Law And Social Science, Richard D. Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

A Review of An Invitation to Law and Social Science: Desert, Disputes, and Distribution by Richard Lempert and Joseph Sanders


Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, E. Philip Soper Jan 1977

Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, E. Philip Soper

Michigan Law Review

This article offers a review of the Hart-Dworkin dispute and a qualified defense of the positivist's model against Dworkin's attack. The defense is cast primarily in the form of the second possible response to a descriptive theory: Dworkin's attack fails, I suggest, because it involves descriptive claims that can be accommodated to the positivist's conceptual theory regardless of one's view about the plausibility of those claims.


Dworkin's "Rights Thesis", Michigan Law Review May 1976

Dworkin's "Rights Thesis", Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that the rights thesis is untenable. It shows that Dworkin's distinction between arguments of principle and arguments of policy, upon which the rights thesis is based, cannot withstand close scrutiny. The Note questions whether it is sensible to speak of an objectively soundest theory of law, and argues that, even if such a theory is feasible, Dworkin has failed to prove that it will always dictate a unique result (or, put in different words, that the rights thesis is part of the putative soundest theory). If Dworkin's idea of a soundest theory is oppugned, or if the …