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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Law
Some Observations On Separation Of Powers And The Wisconsin Constitution, Chad M. Oldfather
Some Observations On Separation Of Powers And The Wisconsin Constitution, Chad M. Oldfather
Marquette Law Review
In recent years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided several high- profile cases concerning the separation of powers under the state constitution. In the abstract, questions concerning the separation of powers do not seem inherently partisan, largely because the partisan balance of government will shift over time. Yet, as has been the case with many of its recent decisions, the justices’ votes have broken along what most observers regard as partisan lines, and the opinions have featured heated prose including accusations of result orientation and methodological illegitimacy.
Executive Power In The Obama Administration And The Decision To Seek Congressional Authorization For A Military Attack Against Syria: Implications For Theories Of Unilateral Action, Kenneth R. Mayer
Utah Law Review
The primary axiom of the unilateral-powers literature is that the institutional setting and political incentives that confront presidents push them to seek maximum discretion over policy. The straightforward implication is that presidents will seek control (Terry Moe calls it autonomy)—always contentious given the competitive political authority at the heart of separation of powers, but necessary to them given their interests and position in the political system. Empirically, presidents are expected to (and do) act unilaterally, moving first to put their stamp on policy and process, shape institutional structures, and alter the status quo to shift government outputs toward their preferred …
Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating The Obama Administration’S Commitment To Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, William P. Marshall
Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating The Obama Administration’S Commitment To Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, William P. Marshall
Utah Law Review
This Article agrees with the premise that increased polarization in American politics has made the work of the executive branch more difficult and that this Congress in particular has failed to act responsibly. It also agrees that presidents may no longer be able to expect that members of Congress will abandon their partisan interests in favor of the common good.9 It does not agree, however, that separation-of-powers constraints on the presidency should be adjusted to reflect this new political dynamic.
The Struggle Over Executive Appointments, John C. Roberts
The Struggle Over Executive Appointments, John C. Roberts
Utah Law Review
This Article argues that the long-term struggle between the President and the Senate over executive appointments has now reached a crisis and that we may be approaching a point where the President’s crucial duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is significantly impaired. During the Obama administration, an unprecedented number of judgeships and executive branch positions remain unfilled, threatening the smooth functioning of government at an especially demanding time.
Holding The President Accountable To Constitutional Limits, Louis Fisher
Holding The President Accountable To Constitutional Limits, Louis Fisher
Utah Law Review
As with Congress and the judiciary, presidents have access to powers expressly stated in the Constitution and those necessarily implied in those grants. In highly limited circumstances, presidents may also exercise a “prerogative” (i.e., unilateral action), but that authority is frequently misunderstood and subject to abuse. Unlike those in the other branches, presidents lay claim to a host of powers far beyond enumerated and implied powers. In seizing steel mills in 1952 to prosecute the war in Korea, President Harry Truman acted on what he called an “inherent” power that was not subject to judicial or legislative checks. Presidents Richard …
Reinvigorating The Judiciary’S Role In Resolving Interbranch Disputes, Michael Teter
Reinvigorating The Judiciary’S Role In Resolving Interbranch Disputes, Michael Teter
Utah Law Review
The Framers established a federal government of three coequal, coordinate branches—each with its own constitutional responsibilities and each charged with checking the other two branches. Indeed, separated functions and balance of power are the two underlying elements of our bedrock constitutional principle of separation of powers. The current style of governance in the Unites States poses a unique and serious threat to that basic principle. Congressional dysfunction prevents the legislative branch from legislating, pushes the executive branch toward assuming greater lawmaking authority, and undermines the ability of both the judiciary and executive branch to fulfill their own constitutional obligations.
The Lawyer's Role In A Contemporary Democracy, Promoting Social Change And Political Values, Natural Legal Guardians Of Judicial Independence And Academic Freedom, Robin D. Barnes
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
The New York City Corporation Counsel: The Best Legal Job In America, Michael A. Cardozo
The New York City Corporation Counsel: The Best Legal Job In America, Michael A. Cardozo
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.
The United States Federal Judiciary May Not Be A Third, Co-Equal Branch Of Government - What Are The Implications For The Irish Debate On Judicial Activism, Lawrence Donnelly
The United States Federal Judiciary May Not Be A Third, Co-Equal Branch Of Government - What Are The Implications For The Irish Debate On Judicial Activism, Lawrence Donnelly
San Diego International Law Journal
In support of this argument, this essay first examines the language of Article III of the United States Constitution and then briefly reviews the origins of the widely held perception that the federal judiciary is a "co-equal" branch of government. It next considers Borkian constitutionalism, opining that if one is to read the Constitution as Bork urges, this essay's tentative proposition can't be far off the mark. The focus then shifts to the express language of the Irish Constitution, which accords a far greater responsibility to the judiciary than its American counterpart. In this context, it reviews some pronouncements in …
Legislative Delegation And Two Conceptions Of The Legislative Power, Robert C. Sarvis
Legislative Delegation And Two Conceptions Of The Legislative Power, Robert C. Sarvis
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
[Excerpt] "The current federal government, with its burgeoning administrative agencies, does not embody what most Americans would recognize as the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. This is, in part, due to the Congress’s frequent practice of delegating legislative powers to the executive branch, i.e., giving administrative agencies the power to promulgate rules regulating private behavior and having the force of law. Legislative delegation has been the subject of academic, legal, and political wrangling since the early congresses and clearly calls into question whether modern practice adheres to constitutional norms. This article discusses legislative delegation in terms of some core …
A Few Thoughts On The Importance Of An Independent Judiciary, Robert E. Hirshon
A Few Thoughts On The Importance Of An Independent Judiciary, Robert E. Hirshon
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process
No abstract provided.
Tourtellot: An Anatomy Of American Politics, Michigan Law Review
Tourtellot: An Anatomy Of American Politics, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
A Review of AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN POLITICS. By Arthur Bernon Tourtellot.