Law Commons^™

Inside Regulatory Interpretation: A Research Note, Christopher J. Walker

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

We now live in a regulatory world, where the bulk of federal lawmaking takes place at the bureaucratic level. Gone are the days when statutes and common law predominated. Instead, federal agencies—through rulemaking, adjudication, and other regulatory action—have arguably become the primary lawmakers, with Congress delegating to its bureaucratic agents vast swaths of lawmaking power, the President attempting to exercise some control over this massive regulatory apparatus, and courts struggling to constrain agency lawmaking within statutory and constitutional bounds. This story is not new. Over two decades ago, for instance, Professor Lawson lamented the rise of the administrative state and …

Separation Of Powers And The Rule Of Law, George Anhang

Akron Law Review

This Note, building upon dicta in two recent U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment overbreadth doctrine cases - Massachusetts v. Oakes and Osborne v. Ohio - argues that separation of powers can be seen as a delicate incentive structure which although not insuring this certainty and predictability, helps to promote it.

The Note does not attempt to show that this view of separation of powers is the driving force behind all Supreme Court separation of powers opinions. The Note is mainly interested in offering a coherent rationale for separation of powers doctrine. Nevertheless, the Note briefly discusses the two Supreme Court …

In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings: The Semantics Of "Presumption" And "Need", James M. Popson

Akron Law Review

This note analyzes the District Court of the District of Columbia’s application of the doctrine of executive privilege in In re Grand Jury Proceedings. Part II provides a brief history of executive privilege and discusses precedents that impacted the court’s decision. Part III indicates the procedural posture of the case and sets forth the substantive facts. Part IV discusses the court’s analysis of the executive privilege issue in light of recent District of Columbia Circuit Court decisions. Part V concludes that In re Grand Jury Proceedings bolstered the notion of a presumption in favor of the privilege, while observing that …

Standing And Covert Surveillance, Christopher Slobogin

Pepperdine Law Review

This Article describes and analyzes standing doctrine as it applies to covert government surveillance, focusing on practices thought to be conducted by the National Security Agency. Primarily because of its desire to avoid judicial incursions into the political process, the Supreme Court has construed its standing doctrine in a way that makes challenges to covert surveillance very difficult. Properly understood, however, such challenges do not call for judicial trenching on the power of the legislative and executive branches. Instead, they ask the courts to ensure that the political branches function properly. This political process theory of standing can rejuvenate the …

Rationalizing The Constitution: The Military Commissions Act And The Duboius Legacy Of Ex Parte Quirin, Chad Deveaux

Akron Law Review

Alexander Hamilton famously characterized the Judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch. It “has no influence over either the sword or the purse” and thus “must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” But this perceived safeguard has sometimes proven to be the institution’s undoing. Faced with the prospect of appearing impotent, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, played the role of doctrinal apologist. The Court has bent seemingly immutable constitutional prerogatives to sanction Executive action when a contrary ruling would likely go unheeded.

The United States Antiboycott Law And Other Export Controls, Cecil Hunt

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Agency Adjudication And Judicial Nondelegation: An Article Iii Canon, Mila Sohoni

Northwestern University Law Review

The rules governing judicial review of adjudication by federal agencies are insensitive to a critical separation of powers principle. Article III jurisprudence requires different treatment of agency adjudication depending on whether the agency is adjudicating a “private right” or a “public right.” When agencies adjudicate private rights, review of the agency adjudication must be available to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis. In contrast, Article III jurisprudence does not require review to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis of agency adjudications of purely public rights. That means that federal courts reviewing agency adjudications of …

Congressional Arbitrage At The Executive's Expense: The Speech Or Debate Clause And The Unenforceable Stock Act, Anna Fodor

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Executive Action On Immigration: Constitutional Or Direct Conflict?, Todd Curtin

Florida A & M University Law Review

On November 20, 2014, the White House released a press statement notifying viewers that President Obama would do everything within his executive powers to solve the problems surrounding the immigration system. The White House made it clear that the President would be acting with legal authority in taking these steps. This paper addresses whether or not the Obama Administration did, in fact, act with legal authority by initiating the following steps using his executive authority: “cracking down on illegal immigration at the border; deporting felons, not families; and accountability through criminal background checks and taxes.” President Obama, acting through Secretary …

A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …

Administrative Federalism As Separation Of Powers, David S. Rubenstein

Washington and Lee Law Review

Federal agencies are key players in our federalist system: they make front-line decisions about the scope of federal policy and whether such policy should preempt state law. How agencies perform these functions, and how they might fulfill them better, are questions at the heart of “administrative federalism.” Some academic proposals for administrative federalism work to enhance states’ ability to participate in federal agency decisionmaking. Other proposals work to protect state autonomy through adjustments to the Supreme Court’s administrative preemption doctrine. As jurists and scholars debate what these proposals entail for federalism, this Article doubles-down with a twist: it examines what …