Law Commons^™

How Reputational Nondisclosure Agreements Fail (Or, In Praise Of Breach), Mark Fenster

Marquette Law Review

Investigative reporters and the #MeToo movement exposed the widespread use of non-disclosure agreements intended to maintain confidentiality about one or both contracting parties’ embarrassing acts. These reputational NDAs (RNDAs) have been widely condemned and addressed in the past half-decade by legislators, activists, and academics. Their exposure, often via victims’ breaches, revealed a curious and distinct dilemma for the non-breaching party whose reputation is vulnerable to disclosure. In most contracts, non-breaching parties might choose to forgo enforcement because of the cost and uncertain success of litigation and the availability of other pathways to a satisfactory resolution. Parties to a RNDA, by …

The Myth Of Optimal Expectation Damages, Theresa Arnold, Amanda Dixon, Madison Sherrill, Mitu Gulati

Marquette Law Review

A much-debated question in contract law scholarship is what the optimal measure of damages for breach should be. The casebook answer—drawing from the theory of efficient breach—is expectation damages. This standard answer, which was a major contribution of the law and economics field, has come under attack by theoreticians within that field itself. To shed an empirical perspective on the question, we look at data on the types of damages provisions parties contract for themselves in international debt contracts. Specifically, we examine issuer call provisions, which are economically equivalent to damages for prepayment, yet not viewed as legally problematic in …

The Exculpatory Contract And Public Policy, Ralph C. Anzivino

Marquette Law Review

Across the country, lawyers have searched for the magic formula to draft an exculpatory contract that would successfully exculpate their client in the event someone was injured while participating in a recreational activity sponsored by the client. Some examples of events would include snow skiing, swimming at a guest-only pool, horseback riding, white-water rafting, camping, running in a marathon, visiting a haunted house at Halloween, or a myriad of other events. The uniform standard by which the enforceability of these exculpatory clauses is measured is whether the exculpatory contract is against public policy.

The public policy of any state can …

Turning Wisconn Valley Into The Next Silicon Valley: Reforming Wisconsin Non-Compete Law To Attract High-Tech Employers, Kelly Krause

Marquette Law Review

The July 2017 arrival of Taiwanese tech-giant Foxconn and the

establishment of the Wisconn Valley Science and Technology Park in Wisconsin

reflects a larger trend in the United States to reinvent the nation’s

manufacturing economy with high-tech production. High-tech employers have

substantial interests in retaining employees in order to protect their valuable

proprietary information and market share. Non-compete agreements, also

known as restrictive covenants or covenants not to compete, are often the legal

device used to secure these interests. This Comment argues that to attract and

retain employers in the tech industry, Wisconsin should reform its non-compete

law by adopting …

Codify This: Exculpatory Contracts In Wisconsin Recreational Businesses, Blake A. Nold

Marquette Law Review

It is common practice for recreational businesses, such as ski resorts or fitness centers, to require their customers to sign a release of liability form. The purpose of this release form is to relieve the business from any potential liability in the event a customer suffers an injury. However, since 1982, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has yet to uphold an exculpatory contract. Rather than attempting to lay out principles and guidelines for how to draft an exculpatory agreement—in hopes that it will be ruled enforceable—this Comment proposes that Wisconsin recreational businesses, like ski resorts or gyms, should not require customers …

Pluralism Applied: A Concordant Approach To Selecting Contract Rules, Samuel F. Ernst

Marquette Law Review

Contract rules can be justified by utilitarian theories (such as efficiency theory), which are concerned with promoting rules that enhance societal wealth and utility. Contract rules can also be justified by rights-based theories (such as promissory and reliance theories), which are concerned with protecting the contractual freedom and interests ofthe individual parties to the contract. Or, contract rules can be analyzed through the lenses of a host of other theories, including critical legal theory, bargain theory, and so on. Because no single, unitary theory can ever explain the complex body of laws and societal conventions surrounding contracts, the best rule …

Who Needs Contracts? Generalized Exchange Within Investment Accelerators, Brad Bernthal

Marquette Law Review

This Article investigates why an expert volunteers on behalf of startups that participate in a novel type of small venture capital ("VC") fund known as a mentor-driven investment accelerator ("MDIA"). A MDIA organizes a pool of seasoned individuals - called "mentors" - to help new companies. An obvious organizational strategy would be to contract with mentors. Mentors instead voluntarily assist. Legal studies of norm-based exchanges do not explain what this Article calls the "mentorship conundrum" - i.e., the puzzling motivation of a mentor to volunteer within otherwise for-profit environments. This Article is the first to bridge the insights of generalized …

Liberalism’S Fine Print: Boilerplate’S Allusion To Human Nature, Kenneth K. Ching

Marquette Law Review

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Contract Design And The Shading Problem, Robert E. Scott

Marquette Law Review

Despite recent advances in our understanding of contracting behavior, economic contract theory has yet to identify the principal causes and effects of contract breach. In this Article, I argue that opportunism is a primary explanation for why commercial parties deliberately breach their contracts. I develop a novel variation on opportunism that I identify as “shading,” a behavior that more accurately describes the vexing problems courts face in rooting out strategic behavior in contract litigation. I provide some empirical support for the claim that shading behavior is both pervasive in litigation over contract breach and extremely difficult for generalist courts to …