Law Commons^™

Securities Exchange Act Section 4e(A): Toothless "Internal-Timing Directive" Or Statute Of Limitation?, Richard E. Brodsky

William & Mary Business Law Review

The Securities and Exchange Commission has a problem, and everyone knows it: its investigative process suffers from excessive delay, which harms both individuals and entity it investigates and its own enforcement program. This problem has long been recognized and complained about, but never remedied.

In 2010, Congress passed a law specifically designed to solve the problem of excessive delay but, the way the SEC has read the law—which has been acquiesced in by the courts and ignored by subsequent Congresses—has rendered it toothless and essentially meaningless. This has been accomplished, first, by the Commission’s cabined interpretation of the purpose of …

You Can’T Stop What You Can’T See: Complementary Risk Mitigation Through Compensation Disclosure, Matt Reeder

William & Mary Business Law Review

Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires regulators to help prevent the next financial crisis by monitoring executive compensation arrangements to prevent them from becoming excessive or leading to “material financial loss.” A now-pending rule seeks to do just this. This Article argues that the rule is well-conceived inasmuch as it limits the total portion of compensation that can be based on risk-inducing incentives, ties incentive-based compensation to longer-term performance, places a ceiling on potential incentivebased earnings, provides for downward adjustment and clawbacks, prohibits many hedging behaviors, and institutionalizes governance mechanisms and oversight policies. But, by placing a number of …

Collateral Damage: The Legal And Regulatory Protections For Customer Margin In The U.S. Derivatives Markets, Christian Chamorro-Courtland

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Article provides a detailed analysis ofthe laws and regulations that apply to margin posted by customers entering into futures and cleared swaps contracts in the United States. It describes the types ofmargin accounts used by Futures Commission Merchants (“FCM”) and Central Counterparties (“CCPs”). It analyzes the rights of customers upon the insolvency of their FCM.

First, this Article explains why futures customers currently receive a lower level of protection under the Commodity Exchange Act than that received by cleared swaps customers under the Dodd-Frank Act. On the one hand, futures customers currently share risk as co-owners for margin that …

The Volcker Rule And The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality: Utterly Incompatible, Christine P. Henry

William & Mary Business Law Review

The Volcker Rule, enacted in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer Protection Act to address the “too big to fail” problem in today’s interconnected global economy, has been controversial from the outset. The deadline for banks to comply with Volcker regulations has been extended several times, with the most recent deadline set for July 21, 2016. This Note examines the impact of the Volcker Rule on foreign banks, detailing the specific effects of Volcker regulations on two prominent German banks, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank, and analyzes the countervailing European approach to regulating proprietary trading and risky investment. …

Broker-Dealers, Institutional Investors, And Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About Nothing?, Lynn Bai

William & Mary Business Law Review

Under the mandate of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the SEC is soliciting public opinions on whether broker-dealers should be subject to a fiduciary duty when advising retail and institutional investors. This Article focuses on the advisability of such a proposal for institutional investors. It shows that, first, a fiduciary duty could potentially enhance broker-dealers’ standard of conduct for only a subset of institutional investors who are well capitalized, capable of assessing risks independently, and acknowledge in writing their nonreliance on broker-dealers’ advice. Thus, the benefit of fiduciary duty is much narrower than what …

Executive Compensation And Income Inequality, Daniel J. Morrissey

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Article explores the connection between exorbitant executive compensation and the growing income inequality in our country. It discusses the traditional legal attempts to rein in corporate remuneration as well as the more recent “Say-on-Pay” right given to shareholders in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. The Article concludes that negative stockholder votes can be evidence that directors have breached their fiduciary duties by granting overly generous pay hikes to their top officials.

Systemic Risk And Dodd-Frank's Volcker Rule, Julie A.D. Manasfi

William & Mary Business Law Review

With the recent global financial crisis starting in 2007, the issue of “systemic risk” has attracted much attention in our financial system. Some legislators have asserted that proprietary trading by banking entities, generally the trading of financial instruments for a banking entity’s own account, played a critical role in the recent global financial crisis. These sentiments parallel arguments that the practices of banks and their securities affiliates in the 1920s were partly responsible for the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent Great Depression. At the heart of these assertions is the issue of whether combining the businesses of commercial …

Seeking True Financial Reform: Ending The Debt-Equity Distinction, Joseph B. Allen

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Note identifies the failure of Congress to address tax incentives for leverage as a principal cause of the recent financial crisis and a fundamental flaw of recent financial reform legislation. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Code provides substantially disparate tax treatment for debt and equity financing by allowing firms to deduct interest payments on indebtedness, but not providing an equivalent deduction for equity funding. This “debt-equity distinction” artificially reduces the cost of capital for debt financing relative to equity financing and encourages firms to over-employ leverage in their capital structure. This in turn increases financial distress costs and externalities to …