Law Commons^™

Temporary Securities Regulation, Anita K. Krug

Washington and Lee Law Review

In times of crisis, including during the 2020–2021 global pandemic, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has engaged in a type of securities regulation that few scholars have acknowledged, let alone evaluated. Specifically, during recent market crises, the SEC adopted rules that are temporary, designed to help the securities markets and their participants— both public companies and public investment funds, such as mutual funds and ETFs—weather the crisis at hand but go no further. Once that goal has been accomplished, these rules usually expire, replaced by the permanent rules that they temporarily supplanted. Although the temporary-rulemaking endeavor is laudable—and …

Real Insider Trading, Michael A. Perino

Washington and Lee Law Review

In popular rhetoric, insider trading cases are about leveling the playing field between elite market participants and ordinary investors. Academic critiques vary. Some depict an untethered insider trading doctrine that enforcers use to expand their power and enhance their discretion. Others see enforcers beset with agency cost problems who bring predominantly simple, easily resolved cases to create the veneer of vigorous enforcement. The debate has, to this point, been based mostly on anecdote and conjecture rather than empirical evidence. This Article addresses that gap by collecting extensive data on 465 individual defendants in civil, criminal, and administrative actions to assess …

The Independent Board As Shield, Gregory H. Shill

Washington and Lee Law Review

The fiduciary duty of loyalty bars CEOs and other executives from managing companies for personal gain. In the modern public corporation, this restriction is reinforced by a pair of institutions: the independent board of directors and the business judgment rule. In isolation, each structure arguably promotes manager fidelity to shareholder interests—but together, they enable manager prioritization. This marks a particularly striking turn for the independent board. Its origin story and raison d’être lie in protecting shareholders from opportunism by managers, but it functions as a shield for managers instead.

Numerous defects in the design and practice of the independent board …

Adversarial Failure, Benjamin P. Edwards

Washington and Lee Law Review

Investors, industry firms, and regulators all rely on vital public records to assess risk and evaluate securities industry personnel. Despite the information’s importance, an arbitration-facilitated expungement process now regularly deletes these public records. Often, these arbitrations recommend that public information be deleted without any true adversary ever providing any critical scrutiny to the requests. In essence, poorly informed arbitrators facilitate removing public information out of public databases. Interventions aimed at surfacing information may yield better informed decisions. Although similar problems have emerged in other contexts when adversarial systems break down, the expungement process to purge information about financial professionals provides …

Social Activism Through Shareholder Activism, Lisa M. Fairfax

Washington and Lee Law Review

This article is based on the author's keynote address at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

In 1952, the SEC altered the shareholder proposal rule to exclude proposals made “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.” The SEC did not reference civil rights activist James Peck or otherwise acknowledge that its actions were prompted by Peck’s 1951 shareholder proposal to Greyhound for desegregating seating. Instead, the SEC indicated that its change simply reflected a codification …

Chancery’S Greatest Decision: Historical Insights On Civil Rights And The Future Of Shareholder Activism, Omari Scott Simmons

Washington and Lee Law Review

This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation to influence management—has become a popular tool to effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality, civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity. These efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate management. However, a consensus on …

From Public Policy To Materiality: Non-Financial Reporting, Shareholder Engagement, And Rule 14a-8’S Ordinary Business Exception, Virginia Harper Ho

Washington and Lee Law Review

This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

In 2017, shareholder proposals urging corporate boards to report on their climate-related risk made headlines when they earned majority support from investors at ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, and PPL. The key to this historic vote was the support of Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard, which broke with management and cast their votes behind the proposals. The 2018 proxy season saw several more climate-related proposals earn majority support, and in 2018 …

The Leidos Mixup And The Misunderstood Duty To Disclose In Securities Law, Matthew C. Turk, Karen E. Woody

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Article concerns the recent Supreme Court case, Leidos,Inc. v. Indiana Public Retirement System (Leidos), and examines the broader issues that it raised for securities law. The consensus among scholars and practitioners is that Leidos presented a direct conflict among the circuit courts over a core question of securities law—when a failure to comply with the SEC’s disclosure requirements can constitute fraud under Rule 10b-5. This Article provides a much different interpretation of the case. It begins by demonstrating that the circuit split which is presumed to have brought Leidos to the Supreme Court does not in fact exist. …

The Gatekeepers Of Crowdfunding, Andrew A. Schwartz

Washington and Lee Law Review

Securities crowdfunding is premised on two core policy goals: inclusivity and efficiency. First, crowdfunding is conceived as an inclusive system where all entrepreneurs are given a chance to pitch their idea to the “crowd.” Second, crowdfunding is supposed to be an efficient way to channel funds from public investors to promising startup companies. There is a fundamental tension between these two policy goals, however. A totally inclusive system would ensure that platforms list any and every company that wants to participate. But platforms need to curate and select the companies they list in order to establish a reputation as a …

Cash For Your Conscience: Do Whistleblower Incentives Improve Enforcement Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, Amy Deen Westbrook

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Legal Frankenstein’S Monster: The Complete Bar Order In Securities Fraud Class Action Lawsuits, Jonathan C. Stanley

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Canons Of Construction For Dysfunctional Statutes: A Comment On Bennett, Paul G. Mahoney

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Whistling Loud And Clear: Applying Chevron To Subsection 21f Of Dodd–Frank, Shaun M. Bennett

Washington and Lee Law Review

This Note addresses a circuit court split arising from a portion of the anti-retaliation provisions in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Subsection 21F’s retaliation prohibitions apply to those employers whose employees make required or protected disclosures under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) or any other rule or regulation under the SEC’s jurisdiction. SOX provides anti -retaliation protections — similar to those available under Dodd–Frank — for employees of publicly traded companies who report misconduct. However, SOX expressly affords protections to those who provide information to “a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; any Member of …

Comment On Whistling Loud And Clear: Applying Chevron To Subsection 21f Of Dodd–Frank, Sarah C. Haan

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Securities Regulation In Virtual Space, Eric C. Chaffee

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Adding A Due Diligence Defense To § 13(B) And Rule 13b 2 – 2 Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934, Michael Evans

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Mad Money: Rethinking Private Placements, Abraham J.B. Cable

Washington and Lee Law Review

Currently, regulations try to limit unregistered sales of stock (private placements) to the “smart money,” either by informing investors through disclosure or excluding unsophisticated investors from the market. In theory, these smart-money approaches promote the dual goals of capital formation and investor protection. But in practice, regulators have struggled to craft effective disclosure or screening mechanisms. In light of these failures, this Article advocates for a new approach—investment caps that allow every investor a limited amount of “mad money” to invest in risky private placements. This mad-money approach can protect investors by encouraging basic diversification and liquidity, while advancing capital …

Review: Is Hedge Fund Registration Necessary? , J. W. Verret

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Docket Dividends: Growth In Shareholder Litigation Leads To Refinements In Chancery Procedures, Donald F. Parsons Jr., Jason S. Tyler

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Necessary To Accomplish The Goals Of The Dodd–Frank Act’S Title Iv?, Luther R. Ashworth Ii

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Why Register Hedge Fund Advisers—A Comment, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Contingent Capital In Executive Compensation, Wulf A. Kaal

Washington and Lee Law Review

Contingent capital has great potential to improve corporate governance in Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in executive compensation. The proposal adds an important element to the literature on inside debt and the creditor-centered approach to executive compensation. Contingent convertible bonds with early triggers could be preferable to other debt instruments because, in addition to lowering income inequality and increasing sustainability, the early trigger design can improve incentives for executives …

Do End-Users Get The Best Of Both Worlds?—Title Vii Of Dodd–Frank And The End-User Exception, Carney Simpson

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

"Patient Capital": Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, Jack B. Jacobs

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Legitimate Rights Of Public Shareholders, Lawrence E. Mitchell

Washington and Lee Law Review

In recent years there has been significant ongoing academic debate over the expansion ofpublic shareholders 'participation rights in corporate governance. The debate has accompanied a dramatic increase in institutional shareholder and hedge fund activism attempting to influence the conduct ofcorporate affairs. The legitimacy ofshareholderp articipationr ights depends upon the actual role public shareholders play in contributing to the corporation's function of providing goods and services and, ultimately, to economic growth and social welfare. Few in the debate have stopped to examine this question. This Article presents original empirical evidence that demonstrates that public shareholders do not, on net, contributec apitalt …

Derivatives At Bankruptcy: Lifesaving Knowledge For The Small Firm, Jonathon Keath Hance

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Option Backdating And Its Implications, Jesse M. Fried

Washington and Lee Law Review

Thousands of U.S. companies appear to have secretly backdated stock options. This Article analyzes three forms of secret option backdating: (1) the backdating of executives' option grants; (2) the backdating of nonexecutive employees' option grants; and (3) the backdating of executives' option exercises. It shows that each type of backdating less likely reflects arm's length contracting than a desire to inflate and camouflage executive pay. Secret backdating thus provides further evidence that pay arrangements have been shaped by executives' influence over their boards. The fact that so many firms continued to secretly backdate after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in blatant violation …

Comment: Corporate Governance And The "D-Word", Thomas W. Joo

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Separation Of Ownership And Control In Modem Corporations: Shareholder Democracy Or Shareholder Republic? A Commentary On Dalia Tsuk Mitchell's Shareholders As Proxies. The Contours Of Shareholder Democracy, Lucas E. Morel

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Shareholders As Proxies: The Contours Of Shareholder Democracy, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.