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Steven Semeraro

Selected Works

Antitrust

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Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Law

Property's End: Why Competition Policy Should Limit The Right Of Publicity, Steven Semeraro Jul 2010

Property's End: Why Competition Policy Should Limit The Right Of Publicity, Steven Semeraro

Steven Semeraro

The right of publicity is an intellectual property right that empowers celebrities to prohibit the unauthorized use of their names, images, and identities. Over the past two decades, academic commentators have presented powerful critiques of this right. Yet, legislatures and courts have turned a deaf ear, continuing to expand publicity rights. This article has two goals. First, it explains why the seemingly persuasive critique of the right of publicity has failed to influence law makers. The right’s critics claim that publicity cannot be property because the arguments used to justify actual property simply do not apply to publicity. When one …


Distinguishing The Right Of Publicity: Property Rights, Free Speech Privilege, And Competition Policy, Steven Semeraro Mar 2009

Distinguishing The Right Of Publicity: Property Rights, Free Speech Privilege, And Competition Policy, Steven Semeraro

Steven Semeraro

The right of publicity is an enigmatic property right. Its many critics argue that it should not be a property right at all, because 1) it is unnecessary to stimulate the pursuit of fame; 2) unneeded to manage the value of publicity; and 3) undeserved in any recognized moral sense. Yet, this ostensibly persuasive critique has had little practical impact. The right of publicity today is stronger than ever. This article contends that the prevailing critique of publicity rights has failed to influence the courts in large part because each quiver in its arsenal would be just as fatal were …


The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis: Do Credit Card Systems Effectively Tax The Poor And Reward The Rich?, Steven Semeraro Aug 2008

The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis: Do Credit Card Systems Effectively Tax The Poor And Reward The Rich?, Steven Semeraro

Steven Semeraro

Robin Hood and his band of merry men infamously, if apocryphally, robbed from the rich and gave to the poor. Over the last decade, some economists have postulated that credit card companies do the opposite – forcing low-income cash customers to pay higher prices for retail goods that effectively fund the frequent flier miles and other rewards that go predominantly to affluent cardholders. Because the credit card systems prohibit surcharging, everyone pays the same price. But, these analysts reason, merchants inflate their prices across the board to cover the cost of credit card acceptance. While credit card customers are rewarded …


The Antitrust Economics (And Law) Of Surcharging Credit Card Transactions, Steven Semeraro Aug 2008

The Antitrust Economics (And Law) Of Surcharging Credit Card Transactions, Steven Semeraro

Steven Semeraro

When a customer uses a credit card, the merchant pays a small percentage of the purchase price to the bank that issued the card. This cost of card acceptance, known as the interchange fee, adds up to big money . . . really big. This year, the credit card companies anticipate that interchange fees will total $48 billion, an increase of nearly 300% since 2001. Merchants can do little to influence these fees, because credit cards are critical to their businesses and the systems’ rules prohibit surcharging. In recent years, commentators with growing levels of confidence have suggested that this …


Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades Of Antitrust Uncertainty, Steven Semeraro Mar 2007

Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades Of Antitrust Uncertainty, Steven Semeraro

Steven Semeraro

This article re-examines the historical, economic, and legal analyses of credit card interchange fees, rejecting the standard assumptions that (1) collectively set interchange fees are unlikely to harm consumers and (2) these fees cannot feasibly be set in a competitive fashion. Through a new historical assessment and consideration of the most recent economic learning, this article shows that under current market conditions collusively set interchange fees are likely to harm consumers and thus violate the antitrust laws. In addition, a competitive remedy is feasible. The six largest Visa and MasterCard issuers, which are larger than the Discover Card System and …


Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades Of Antitrust Uncertainty, Steven Semeraro Mar 2007

Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades Of Antitrust Uncertainty, Steven Semeraro

Steven Semeraro

This article re-examines the historical, economic, and legal analyses of credit card interchange fees, rejecting the standard assumptions that (1) collectively set interchange fees are unlikely to harm consumers and (2) these fees cannot feasibly be set in a competitive fashion. Through a new historical assessment and consideration of the most recent economic learning, this article shows that under current market conditions collusively set interchange fees are likely to harm consumers and thus violate the antitrust laws. In addition, a competitive remedy is feasible. The six largest Visa and MasterCard issuers, which are larger than the Discover Card System and …