Law Commons^™

Table Of Contents

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

Less Restrictive Alternatives And The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine, Thomas B. Nachbar

Seattle University Law Review

In Ohio v. American Express, both the majority and dissent introduced into Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence a new test for evaluating restraints under the rule of reason: a less restrictive alternatives test. Occasionally appearing in circuit court cases, less restrictive alternatives tests have not been part of Supreme Court’s approach to the rule of reason, which generally evaluates restraints of trade by balancing their anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.

American Express was the first Supreme Court case to mention a less restrictive alternatives test, potentially representing a major shift in antitrust law, but it was not the last. In 2021’s …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents.

Defining Unreasonable Radius Clauses For American Music Festivals, Trevor Lane

Seattle University Law Review

Since 1969, the music festival remains a staple of American musical culture, and in order to meet consumer demands, today’s music festival promoters rely on radius clauses ancillary to the performance agreements that they use with artists. These radius clauses limit artists’ ability to perform at other music festivals and concerts within a specified temporal and geographic radius of the contracted music festival. Beginning in 2010, legal challenges have alleged that broadly defined radius clauses used by music festival promoters violate Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. This Note contends that radius clauses which limit artists from performing beyond …

Uber, Lyft, And Regulating The Sharing Economy, Brett Harris

Seattle University Law Review

The “sharing economy” goes by many names such as the “gig economy,” the “1099 economy,” and the “on-demand economy,” all of which describe the economic system that uses online platforms to connect workers and sellers with clients and consumers, primarily through smartphone applications. Many of the sharing economy companies are also called the “tech disruptors.” They earned this title because they have changed the way that people do business. But in changing the way that people do business, they have also created unique regulatory challenges for governments across the country. The news is rife with stories about when these regulations …

State Action On Appeal: Parker Immunity And The Collateral Order Doctrine In Antitrust Litigation, Jason Kornmehl

Seattle University Law Review

The collateral order doctrine is perhaps the most significant exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable. The doctrine is particularly important in antitrust litigation when a defendant asserts state action immunity, often referred to as Parker immunity. However, the circuit courts have struggled with the question of whether a denial of Parker immunity is immediately appealable as a collateral order. This unsettled procedural issue is further complicated by the fact that the substantive law on Parker immunity differs depending on the entity asserting state action. This Article argues that a governmental entity that is deemed part …

E-Books, Collusion, And Antitrust Policy: Protecting A Dominant Firm At The Cost Of Innovation, Nicholas Timchalk

Seattle University Law Review

Amazon’s main rival, Apple, went to great lengths and took major risks to enter the e-book market. Why did Apple simply choose not to compete on the merits of its product and brand equity (the iPad and iBookstore) as it does with its other products? Why did Apple decide not to continue to rely on its earlier success of situating its products differently in the market than other electronics and working hard to be different and cutting-edge with its e-book delivery? This Note argues that the combination of Amazon’s 90% market share, network externalities, and an innovative technology market creates …

Toward An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande

Seattle University Law Review

The predominant view in the antitrust field has been that private enforcement, and especially class action cases, yields little or no positive results. This Article analyzes these twenty cases, compares and contrasts their analysis with that of our earlier group of forty cases, and draws new insights from the results of all sixty combined. This Article demonstrate that private antitrust litigation has provided a substantial amount of compensation for victims of anticompetitive behavior: at least $33.8 to $35.8 billion. The studies also demonstrate that private antitrust enforcement has had an extremely strong deterrent effect. In fact, this research demonstrates that …

The Robinson-Patman Act And Consumer Welfare: Has Volvo Reconciled Them?, John B. Kirkwood

Seattle University Law Review

In this article, I address that broader question. In Part II, I summarize the facts and opinions in Volvo, particularly the final section of the majority opinion where the Court observed that Volvo's discrimination was procompetitive. In Part III, I review the growing consensus in antitrust law that the fundamental goal of the antitrust statutes (other than the Robinson-Patman Act) is to promote consumer welfare. Today when most courts say that a practice furthers competition, they mean that it improves consumer welfare-specifically, the welfare of consumers in the relevant market. In Part IV, I use that interpretation of …

Antitrust Issues In The Settlement Of Patent Disputes, Part Iii, Thomas B. Leary

Seattle University Law Review

Once again, I will address the issue of litigation settlements between companies that hold patents on pharmaceutical products (sometimes "pioneers") and would-be generic entrants ("generics") who challenge the validity of the patent and/or a claim of infringement. This discussion will focus on the Tamoxifen opinion, with passing reference to other decisions. Obviously, reasonable people can disagree on these issues, but I still believe the Commission's approach in Schering was correct.

Patent Ships Sail An Antitrust Sea, Joseph Scott Miller

Seattle University Law Review

The deeper truths evoked by patent ships sailing an antitrust sea are three. First, free competition is the pervasive, baseline reality, the background norm; patent protection is the temporary, partial exception. Second, we grasp both patent and antitrust policy with a common science: economics. Third, although neither patent nor antitrust law doctrines are good tools for fixing fundamental problems in the other body of law, both bodies of law help us better understand the shortcomings of the other. I explore these ideas in turn, below.

Independent Ink At The Crossroads Of Antitrust And Intellectual Property Law: The Court's Holding Regarding Market Power In Cases Involving Patents And Implications In Cases Involving Copyrights, Leonard J. Feldman, Rima J. Alaily, Chad D. Farrell

Seattle University Law Review

By eliminating the market power presumption for patent holders, Independent Ink calls into question the presumption's continued validity for tying arrangements involving copyrights. While the Court's holding directly applies only to patents, we present three reasons why, after Independent Ink, the presumption can no longer be viable in antitrust lawsuits challenging a tying arrangement involving a copyrighted product. First, the Court's rationale for eliminating the presumption including citations to extensive academic writings, agency guidelines, and legislative amendments precludes the presumption's continued application in any other context. Second, copyrights are significantly less likely than patents to confer market power because …

Maximum Vertical Price Fixing From Albrecht Through Brunswick To Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey, James M. Fesmire

Seattle University Law Review

The article attempts to sort out some of this confusion caused by the legal journey from Albrecht to Khan by portraying that long road as a successful example of the antitrust injury doctrine's ability to bring substantive antitrust law into compliance with the goals of antitrust. First, the article examines how the existence of successive monopoly provides an incentive for maximum vertical price fixing and how maximum vertical price fixing leads to an increase in consumer welfare. Second, it examines manufacturer alternatives to vertical price restraints, finding them less attractive in terms of social welfare. Third, the article analyzes other …