Law Commons^™

Democratizing Abolition, Brandon Hasbrouck

Scholarly Articles

When abolitionists discuss remedies for past and present injustices, they are frequently met with apparently pragmatic objections to the viability of such bold remedies in U.S. legislatures and courts held captive by reactionary forces. Previous movements have seen their lesser reforms dashed by the white supremacist capitalist order that retains its grip on power in America. While such objectors contend that abolitionists should not ask for so much justice, abolitionists should in fact demand significantly more.

Remedying our country’s history of subordination will not be complete without establishing abolition democracy. While our classical conception of a liberal republic asks us …

Allow Me To Transform: A Black Guy’S Guide To A New Constitution, Brandon Hasbrouck

Scholarly Articles

Elie Mystal’s Allow Me to Retort: A Black Guy’s Guide to the Constitution works within the tradition of lay synopses of constitutional law, filling a gap among those that came before. Some works have provided nonlawyers with an explicitly Black perspective on major issues in modern civil rights, while others have provided an introduction to constitutional law as a field. Mystal broadens the focus and audience, illuminating constitutional issues with his trademark humor and his life experience as a Black man in America. He creates a comprehensive overview for lay readers, emphasizing the experiences and needs of Black men. The …

The Originalist Jurisprudence Of Justice Samuel Alito, J. Joel Alicea

Scholarly Articles

Since Justice Alito’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 2006, constitutional theorists have struggled with how to characterize his approach to constitutional adjudication. Many scholars have argued that “Justice Alito is not to any significant extent an originalist” but is, instead, “a methodological pluralist” who uses both originalist and non-originalist tools of constitutional adjudication. Others have contended that “Justice Alito’s jurisprudence is originali[st], though not in the traditional sense.”

Establishment As Tradition, Marc O. Degirolami

Scholarly Articles

Traditionalism is a constitutional theory that focuses on concrete political and cultural practices, and the endurance of those practices before, during, and after the ratification of the Constitution, as the presumptive determinants of constitutional meaning and constitutional law. The Supreme Court has long interpreted traditionally but now says explicitly that it uses a method of “text, history, and tradition” in several areas of constitutional law. Foremost among these is the Establishment Clause. This Essay examines two questions about traditionalism, both of which concern the Establishment Clause in distinct but related ways. First, why has traditionalism had special salience in this …

The False Promise Of Jurisdiction Stripping, Daniel Epps, Alan M. Trammell

Scholarly Articles

Jurisdiction stripping is seen as a nuclear option. Its logic is simple: By depriving federal courts of jurisdiction over some set of cases, Congress ensures those courts cannot render bad decisions. To its proponents, it offers the ultimate check on unelected and unaccountable judges. To its critics, it poses a grave threat to the separation of powers. Both sides agree, though, that jurisdiction stripping is a powerful weapon. On this understanding, politicians, activists, and scholars throughout American history have proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures as a way for Congress to reclaim policymaking authority from the courts.

The conventional understanding is wrong. Whatever …

Practice-Based Constitutional Theories, J. Joel Alicea

Scholarly Articles

This Feature provides the first full-length treatment of practice-based constitutional theories, which include some of the most important theories advanced in modern scholarship. Practice-based constitutional theories come in originalist and nonoriginalist—as well as conservative and progressive—varieties, and they assert that a constitutional theory should generally conform to our social practices about law. If, for example, it is part of our social practices for courts to apply a robust theory of stare decisis, then a constitutional theory that would require a less deferential theory of stare decisis is a less persuasive theory. Practice-based constitutional theorists would usually see it as a …

The Appropriate Appropriations Inquiry, Chad Squitieri

Scholarly Articles

The Supreme Court is set to hear oral argument this fall concerning whether the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is unconstitutionally self-funded. The question presented in the case asks whether the statute establishing the CFPB’s self-funding scheme, 12 U.S.C. § 5497, “violates the Appropriations Clause.” But that question is incomplete at best, because although the Appropriations Clause requires that “appropriations” be “made by law,” the Appropriations Clause does not itself vest Congress with any authority to make “law” in the first place. Instead, Congress’s authority to make appropriations laws is vested in part by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Thus, …

Mysterizing Religion, Marc O. Degirolami

Scholarly Articles

In this short essay, I suggest that "mysterizing" religion may change the stakes in some of the most controversial contemporary conflicts in law and religion. To mysterize (not a neologism, but an archaism) is to cultivate mystery about a subject, in the sense described above-to develop and press the view that a certain subject or phenom-enon is not merely unknown, but unknowable by human beings. At the very least, such mysteries are unknowable by those human beings who have charge of the secular legal order of earthly human affairs, Paul's "princes of this world." That is what I propose to …

Traditionalism Rising, Marc O. Degirolami

Scholarly Articles

Constitutional traditionalism is rising. From due process to free speech, religious liberty, the right to keep and bear arms, and more, the Court made clear in its 2021 term that it will follow a method that is guided by “tradition.”

This paper is in part an exercise in naming: the Court’s 2021 body of work is, in fact, thoroughly traditionalist. It is therefore a propitious moment to explain just what traditionalism entails. After summarizing the basic features of traditionalism in some of my prior work and identifying them in the Court’s 2021 term decisions, this paper situates these recent examples …