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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Dog That Didn't Bark: Private Investment Funds And Relational Contracts In The Wake Of The Great Recession, Robert Illig
The Dog That Didn't Bark: Private Investment Funds And Relational Contracts In The Wake Of The Great Recession, Robert Illig
Robert C Illig
In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis, the contract rights of numerous hedge funds and venture capital funds were breached. These contracts were complex and sophisticated and had been negotiated at great time and expense. Yet despite all of the assumptions of neo-classical contracts theory, nothing happened. Practically none of these injured parties sued to enforce their rights. Professor Illig uses this dearth of litigation to conduct a form of natural experiment as to the value of contract law. Discrete market participants contracted before the crash and then pursued their rights in court afterwards, while relational market participants contracted …
A Business Lawyer's Bibliography: Books Every Dealmaker Should Read, Robert C. Illig
A Business Lawyer's Bibliography: Books Every Dealmaker Should Read, Robert C. Illig
Robert C Illig
To become a truly great business lawyer, one must not only master legal analysis and deal execution. One must attain a command of context. Attorneys are more than mere “transaction cost engineers.” We are counselors – purveyors of judgment, caution and insight. But how best to cultivate such expertise? Wisdom is the reward of experience, and requires time to develop. How, then, can the young lawyer hasten her education and achieve an understanding beyond her years? And what of the seasoned professional who lacks expertise in a particular field? How is she to obtain a broader familiarity without re-living her …
Oregon's Experiment With Sustainable Corporate Governance: A Friendly Critique, Robert C. Illig
Oregon's Experiment With Sustainable Corporate Governance: A Friendly Critique, Robert C. Illig
Robert C Illig
No abstract provided.
The Oregon Method: An Alternative Model For Teaching Transactional Law, Robert C. Illig
The Oregon Method: An Alternative Model For Teaching Transactional Law, Robert C. Illig
Robert C Illig
No abstract provided.
Hedge Funds: The Missing Link In Executive Pay Reform, Robert Illig
Hedge Funds: The Missing Link In Executive Pay Reform, Robert Illig
Robert C Illig
No abstract provided.
Al Gore, Oprah, And Silicon Valley: Bringing Main Street And Corporate America Into The Environmental Movement, Robert C. Illig
Al Gore, Oprah, And Silicon Valley: Bringing Main Street And Corporate America Into The Environmental Movement, Robert C. Illig
Robert C Illig
No abstract provided.
The Promise Of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, Robert C. Illig
The Promise Of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, Robert C. Illig
Robert C Illig
Progressive legal scholars argue that institutional investors should play a greater role in disciplining corporate managers. These reformers seek to harness the talent and resources of mutual funds and public pension funds to increase managerial accountability to shareholder interests. Conservative scholars respond that empowering institutional investors would do little more than relocate the underlying agency costs. Although shirking by corporate managers might indeed be reduced, institutional investors suffer from their own set of agency problems and so would need their own monitor. Ultimately, someone must watch the watchers. This Article argues that neither corporate managers nor institutional investors are properly …
What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap For Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, Robert C. Illig
What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap For Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, Robert C. Illig
Robert C Illig
Hedge funds and other private equity funds are aggressive monitors of corporate America. Their investment strategies are designed to squeeze agency costs and other inefficiencies out of underperforming companies. Mutual funds and public pension funds, by contrast, have remained relentlessly passive despite their many resources. Rather than seek to improve the performance of their portfolio companies, they generally prefer to exit any investments that turn sour. Why the difference? In this Article, Professor Illig compares the business environments and regulatory regimes affecting different types of institutional investors. He concludes that the primary reason that most institutional investors do not better …
Minority Investor Protections As Default Norms: Using Price To Illuminate The Deal In Close Corporations, Robert C. Illig
Minority Investor Protections As Default Norms: Using Price To Illuminate The Deal In Close Corporations, Robert C. Illig
Robert C Illig
No abstract provided.