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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Free Speech And Parity: A Theory Of Public Employee Rights, Randy J. Kozel
Free Speech And Parity: A Theory Of Public Employee Rights, Randy J. Kozel
Randy J Kozel
More than four decades have passed since the U.S. Supreme Court revolutionized the First Amendment rights of the public workforce. In the ensuing years the Court has embarked upon an ambitious quest to protect expressive liberties while facilitating orderly and efficient government. Yet it has never articulated an adequate theoretical framework to guide its jurisprudence. This Article suggests a conceptual reorientation of the modern doctrine. The proposal flows naturally from the Court’s rejection of its former view that one who accepts a government job has no constitutional right to complain about its conditions. As a result of that rejection, the …
Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, Randy J. Kozel
Stare Decisis As Judicial Doctrine, Randy J. Kozel
Randy J Kozel
Stare decisis has been called many things, among them "~a principle of policy, " "a series ofprudential and pragmatic considerations, " and simply "the preferred course. " Often overlooked is the fact that stare decisis is also a judicial doctrine, an analytical system used to guide the rules of decision for resolving concrete disputes that come before the courts. This Article examines stare decisis as applied by the U.S. Supreme Cour~, our nation 's highest doctrinal authority. A review of the Court 'sjurisprudence yields two principal lessons about the modern doctrine of stare decisis. First, the doctrine is comprised largely …
The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel
The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel
Randy J Kozel
The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …
Second Thoughts About The First Amendment, Randy J. Kozel
Second Thoughts About The First Amendment, Randy J. Kozel
Randy J Kozel
The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a notable willingness to reconsider — and depart from — its First Amendment precedents. In recent years the Court has marginalized its prior statements regarding the constitutional value of false speech. It has revamped its process for identifying categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. It has rejected its past decisions on corporate electioneering and aggregate campaign contributions. And it has revised its earlier positions on union financing, abortion protesting, and commercial speech. Under the conventional view of constitutional adjudication, dubious precedents enjoy a presumption of validity through the doctrine of stare decisis. This Article …
Original Meaning And The Precedent Fallback, Randy J. Kozel
Original Meaning And The Precedent Fallback, Randy J. Kozel
Randy J Kozel
There is longstanding tension between originalism and judicial precedent. With its resolute focus on deciphering the enacted Constitution, the originalist methodology raises questions about whether judges can legitimately defer to their own pronouncements. Numerous scholars have responded by debating whether and when the Constitution’s original meaning should yield to contrary precedent. This Article considers the role of judicial precedent not when it conflicts with the Constitution’s original meaning but rather when the consultation of text and historical evidence is insufficient to resolve a case. In those situations, deference to precedent can serve as a fallback rule of constitutional adjudication. The …