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Full-Text Articles in Law
Stakeholder Protection In Germany And Japan, Mark J. Loewenstein
Stakeholder Protection In Germany And Japan, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
This Essay considers the stakeholder debate in the context of the German and Japanese legal systems. Although, nominally, corporations in those countries must operate in the interests of shareholders, in fact nonshareholder constituencies have considerable influence on corporate decision makers. Of equal importance, weak securities markets and ineffective or nonexistent legal protections for shareholders are also important factors in strengthening the position of nonshareholder constituencies and freeing directors to consider their interests. Thus, the stakeholder debate is more of an issue in the United States and Britain, where more shareholder-centic models flourish.
Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis
Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis
Publications
No abstract provided.
Of Lollipops And Law -- A Proposal For A National Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, Ted J. Fiflis
Of Lollipops And Law -- A Proposal For A National Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, Ted J. Fiflis
Publications
Early last year, Mesa Petroleum Company made a tender offer for shares of Unocal Corporation in an effort to take over Unocal. Unocal responded by using the "lollipop" defense, which is a discriminatory issuer self-tender offer. Unocal's use of this defense resulted in huge economic losses to many of Unocal's small shareholders who were not knowledgeable about the ramifications of their participation or non-participation in the tender offer. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld Unocal's use of this defense as an appropriate exercise of business judgment. A federal district court in California refused to strike down the lollipop under federal law …
Eliminating The Capital Gains Preference. Part Ii: The Problem Of Corporate Taxation, Michael J. Waggoner
Eliminating The Capital Gains Preference. Part Ii: The Problem Of Corporate Taxation, Michael J. Waggoner
Publications
No abstract provided.
Removal Of The Corporate Director During His Term Of Office, Arthur H. Travers Jr.
Removal Of The Corporate Director During His Term Of Office, Arthur H. Travers Jr.
Publications
The traditional rules governing the removal of corporate directors have evolved so as to insulate the board of directors from the shareholders who elect them. Professor Travers in his article examines initially the interests being advanced by protecting the board members from removal by their electorate. He then critically analyzes the law as it relates to these interests in order to suggest a more rational approach.