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Quarterback By Committee: A Response In Memory Of Dan Markel, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

Quarterback By Committee: A Response In Memory Of Dan Markel, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

In Catalyzing Fans, Dan Markel, Michael McCann and Howard Wasserman propose so-called “Fan Action Committees” (“FACs”), whereby fans would crowdfund a sum of money and then spend it to influence the personnel decisions of their favorite teams. This Response — dedicated to the memory of Dan Markel — suggests that an effective FAC could upset a team’s overall hiring and compensation system, thereby risking a downturn in team performance to the detriment of all concerned.


Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Many public companies have shed takeover defenses in recent years, on the theory that such defenses reduce share price. Yet new data presented here shows that practically all new public companies--those launching their initial public offering (IPO)--go public with powerful takeover defenses in place. This behavior is puzzling because the adoption of takeover defenses presumably lowers the price at which the pre-IPO shareholders can sell their own shares in and after the IPO. Why would founders and early investors engage in this seemingly counterproductive behavior? Building on prior attempts to solve this mystery, this Article claims that IPO firms adopt …


The Perpetual Corporation, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2012

The Perpetual Corporation, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Courts and commentators take for granted that the ultimate objective of a business corporation is long-run profitability, not immediate profits. But a corporation is a creature of statute, so a statutory source for this rule must be found--or it is not really a rule. Yet prior literature has not identified any such legal basis, leaving a gap in corporate theory. This Article fills that gap by showing that the modern corporation is obliged to act with a long-term view because it has "perpetual existence" under the law. This Article then explains that because they must plan for a perpetual future, …


Veil Piercing To Non-Owners: A Practical And Theoretical Inquiry, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 2011

Veil Piercing To Non-Owners: A Practical And Theoretical Inquiry, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

In the typical veil piercing case, the plaintiff seeks to hold the owners of an entity liable for the entity’s obligations. Recently, however, plaintiffs have sought to hold managers of an entity liable for the entity’s obligations even if the manager is not an owner. This article considers this phenomenon in light of the underlying theory of veil piercing and in the context of both corporate law and the law of limited liability companies. In brief, the theory of veil piercing in its traditional application – to shareholders of a corporation – is weak, and it is weaker still when …


The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang Jan 2005

The Corporation As Insider Trader, Mark J. Loewenstein, William K.S. Wang

Publications

With regard to issuer purchases, some of the traditional policy rationales against insider trading do not apply or apply with less force. Nevertheless, courts, commentators, and the SEC have all stated or assumed that a public corporation violates rule 10b-5 by buying its own shares in the market based on material, nonpublic information. In rule 10b-5 cases involving face-to-face transactions, several circuit courts have ruled that the company may not purchase its own stock based on material information not known to the seller. No good reason exists not to apply these precedents to stock market trades by issuers, especially because …


A New Direction For State Corporate Codes, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 1997

A New Direction For State Corporate Codes, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.