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Full-Text Articles in Law

Could Corporations Become A Vehicle For Social Change?, Michele Benedetto Neitz Oct 2015

Could Corporations Become A Vehicle For Social Change?, Michele Benedetto Neitz

Publications

The for-profit tide is changing. The rising number of business owners using the corporate form to achieve goals other than profits raises an interesting question: Are we entering a new post-profit era for corporations?


The Nonfinancial Returns Of Crowdfunding, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

The Nonfinancial Returns Of Crowdfunding, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Securities crowdfunding — the sale of unregistered securities to the public over the Internet — has come under attack before it has even begun. Legal scholars in particular have expressed concern that investors will lose any money they invest in crowdfunding companies. Even assuming that this may be true from a purely financial perspective, these critics are missing an important point: Crowdfund investors with negative returns will not simply have lost their money, but rather they will have spent it (at least in part) on nonpecuniary benefits, including entertainment, political expression and community building. These nonfinancial returns of crowdfunding are …


Equity And Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 2015

Equity And Corporate Law, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

The article explores the continuing relevance of the 1991 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., in particular the extent to which evolving concepts of good faith have, or should, displace the free-wheeling equity doctrine of Schnell.


Quarterback By Committee: A Response In Memory Of Dan Markel, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

Quarterback By Committee: A Response In Memory Of Dan Markel, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

In Catalyzing Fans, Dan Markel, Michael McCann and Howard Wasserman propose so-called “Fan Action Committees” (“FACs”), whereby fans would crowdfund a sum of money and then spend it to influence the personnel decisions of their favorite teams. This Response — dedicated to the memory of Dan Markel — suggests that an effective FAC could upset a team’s overall hiring and compensation system, thereby risking a downturn in team performance to the detriment of all concerned.


The Digital Shareholder, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

The Digital Shareholder, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Crowdfunding, a new Internet-based securities market, was recently authorized by federal and state law in order to create a vibrant, diverse, and inclusive system of entrepreneurial finance. But will people really send their money to strangers on the Internet in exchange for unregistered securities in speculative startups? Many are doubtful, but this Article looks to first principles and finds reason for optimism.

Well-established theory teaches that all forms of startup finance must confront and overcome three fundamental challenges: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. This Article systematically examines this “trio of problems” and potential solutions in the context of crowdfunding. …


Reflections On Teaching Business Associations: The Case For Teaching More Agency And Unincorporated Business Entity Law, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 2015

Reflections On Teaching Business Associations: The Case For Teaching More Agency And Unincorporated Business Entity Law, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

This paper argues for increased coverage of the law of agency and alternative entities in business associations courses.


Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Many public companies have shed takeover defenses in recent years, on the theory that such defenses reduce share price. Yet new data presented here shows that practically all new public companies--those launching their initial public offering (IPO)--go public with powerful takeover defenses in place. This behavior is puzzling because the adoption of takeover defenses presumably lowers the price at which the pre-IPO shareholders can sell their own shares in and after the IPO. Why would founders and early investors engage in this seemingly counterproductive behavior? Building on prior attempts to solve this mystery, this Article claims that IPO firms adopt …