Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 30 of 34

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar Nov 2014

A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar

Michigan Law Review

Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …


The Uncorporation And The Unraveling Of 'Nexus Of Contracts' Theory, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie Apr 2011

The Uncorporation And The Unraveling Of 'Nexus Of Contracts' Theory, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

Michigan Law Review

A corporation is not a contract. It is a state-created entity. It has legal personhood with the right to form contracts, suffer liability for torts, and (as the Supreme Court recently decided) make campaign contributions. However, many corporate law scholars have remained wedded to the conception-metaphor, model, paradigm, what have you-of the corporation as a contract or "nexus" of contracts. The nexus of contracts theory is meant to point up the voluntary, market-oriented nature of the firm and to dismiss the notion that the corporation owes anything to the state. It is also used as a justification for preserving the …


Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: How The Doctrine Can Provide A Viable Solution In Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, Steven Clayton Caywood Jan 2010

Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: How The Doctrine Can Provide A Viable Solution In Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, Steven Clayton Caywood

Michigan Law Review

In the midst of the global recession of the late 2000s, there was an outcry against corporate executives and what the public deemed to be their excessive compensation. Although this anger is still featured in today's headlines, it is nothing new. In fact, excessive executive compensation complaints arose when the very concept of a corporation was still new. Most of the complaints that the public has leveled have had little effect on boards of directors' decisions. Occasionally, however the outcry is so great that the public compels a company's leadership to take action. This happened early in 2009 when American …


The Economic Impact Of Backdating Of Executive Stock Options, M. P. Narayanan, Cindi A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun Jun 2007

The Economic Impact Of Backdating Of Executive Stock Options, M. P. Narayanan, Cindi A. Schipani, H. Nejat Seyhun

Michigan Law Review

This Article discusses the economic impact of legal, tax, disclosure, and incentive issues arising from the revelation of dating games with regard to executive option grant dates. It provides an estimate of the value loss incurred by shareholders of firms implicated in backdating and compares it to the potential gain that executives might have obtained through backdating. Using a sample of firms that have already been implicated in backdating, we find that the revelation of backdating results in an average loss to shareholders of about 7%. This translates to about $400 million per firm. By contrast, we estimate that the …


Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy Jun 2006

Megasubsidiaries And Asset Sales Under Section 271: Which Shareholders Must Approve Subsidiary Asset Sales, Yaman Shukairy

Michigan Law Review

Corporate law statutes determine the nature of the relationship between shareholders, the principal owners of the corporation, and the board of directors, those w ho run and operate the corporation. Under the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), many of the powers are delegated to the board of directors. More specifically, under section 141, "the business and affairs of every corporation . . . [are] managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ." The Delaware courts have interpreted this provision by deferring to decisions by directors and their designated management under the business judgment …


Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas Feb 1998

Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas

Michigan Law Review

Labor unions are active again - but this time as capitalists. The potential strength of union pension funds has long been noted, but until recently unions have held their stock passively or invested in union-friendly companies. In the 1990s, however, unions have become the most aggressive of all institutional shareholders. In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital. Unions, union pension funds, individual union members, and labor-oriented investment funds are …


Cook And The Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review Of William W. Cook's Publications On Corporations, Alfred F. Conard May 1995

Cook And The Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review Of William W. Cook's Publications On Corporations, Alfred F. Conard

Michigan Law Review

A Review of A Treatise on the Law of Stock and Stockholders, as Applicable to Railroad, Banking, Insurance, Manufacturing, Commercial, Business, Turnpike, Bridge, Canal, and Other Private Corporations by William W. Cook


Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee Jr. Jun 1994

Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee Jr.

Michigan Law Review

The two authors of this article have been on opposite sides of this debate, but both recognize that no single explanation is complete and that other factors, such as the self-interest of fund managers, the conflicts of interest faced by institutions who want to retain corporate business, cultural forces, collective action problems, and what we can call path dependence- the difficulty of changing the structure and behavior of highly evolved and specialized institutions - have causal roles in explaining shareholder passivity. The central question in research on American corporate governance is how these forces interact to produce the characteristic …


A Rule Unvanquished: The New Value Exception To The Absolute Priority Rule, Clifford S. Harris Aug 1991

A Rule Unvanquished: The New Value Exception To The Absolute Priority Rule, Clifford S. Harris

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines whether the new value exception remains part of the revised Bankruptcy Code. Part I discusses the background of the new value exception. Part II traces the development of the conflict concerning the survival of the new value exception subsequent to the adoption of the Code. It then discusses the Supreme Court's opinions in Mid/antic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and its progeny, which established the methodology for determining the impact of the revised Bankruptcy Code on preexisting bankruptcy law. Based on an analysis of the Midlantic doctrine, Part II concludes that Congress did …


Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black Dec 1990

Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that shareholder monitoring is possible: It's an idea that hasn't been tried, rather than an idea that has failed. I defer to a second article currently in draft the question of whether more monitoring by institutional shareholders is desirable. Will direct shareholder oversight, or indirect oversight through shareholder-nominated directors, improve corporate performance, prove counterproductive, or, perhaps, not matter much one way or the other? What are the benefits and risks in giving money managers - themselves imperfectly monitored agents - more power over corporate managers? If more shareholder voice is desirable, how much more and …


Misreading The Williams Act, Lyman Johnson, David Millon Jun 1989

Misreading The Williams Act, Lyman Johnson, David Millon

Michigan Law Review

This Article examines the emerging controversy over preemption of the most potent of recent antitakeover laws, the so-called business combination statutes recently passed by Delaware, New York, and other states, and Pennsylvania's director-approval statute. After examining the strategy employed by the states to shield these statutes from constitutional attack, we consider the issues raised by the preemption claim and the arguments currently being advanced by the SEC and others in favor of preemption. Resolving the preemption controversy requires inquiry into the original meaning and objectives of the Williams Act. We argue that this should involve attention not only to the …


Missing The Point About State Takeover Statutes, Lyman Johnson, David Millon Feb 1989

Missing The Point About State Takeover Statutes, Lyman Johnson, David Millon

Michigan Law Review

In a recent article in this journal, Professor Richard Booth offers an extended appraisal of state legislation regulating hostile corporate takeovers. We think Booth's article requires comment for two reasons. The first reason is perhaps more obvious, though less interesting from our point of view. To be blunt, "unfairness" to shareholders due to coercion arising out of two-tier or partial offers simply does not occur with enough frequency to warrant a sixty-seven-page article in a major law review. According to recent congressional testimony by SEC Commissioner Cox, from 1982 to 1986 the number of two-tier offers declined from 18% of …


The Promise Of State Takeover Statutes, Richard A. Booth Jun 1988

The Promise Of State Takeover Statutes, Richard A. Booth

Michigan Law Review

The purpose of this article is, first, to describe the problems associated with two-tier tender offers and the closely related, and perhaps still more coercive, partial tender offer. Second, the article will address the natural question why such offers have not already been banned, suggesting a better view of what coercion means in the context of a tender offer. Third, the article will offer a management-oriented view of coercion, explaining the legitimate interests of managers (and other groups) in resisting takeovers, as well as how greenmail and poison pills, though subject to abuse, can be used quite properly to combat …


Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr. Oct 1986

Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Part I will seek to understand why firms trade in the stock market at a substantial discount from their asset value. It will answer that existing theories of the firm have not given adequate attention to a critical area where shareholders and managers have an inherent conflict, one that the existing structure of the firm does not resolve or mitigate. Despite the significant changes in the internal structure of the corporation over the last half century that have been described by business historians, there remains a deep internal strain between shareholders, on the one hand, and managers and employees, on …


Social Investing And The Law Of Trusts, John H. Langbein, Richard A. Posner Nov 1980

Social Investing And The Law Of Trusts, John H. Langbein, Richard A. Posner

Michigan Law Review

In Part I, after presenting a brief primer on the economics of securities markets, we analyze the economic and policy issues presented by social investing. We conclude that the usual forms of social investing involve a combination of reduced diversification and higher administrative costs not offset by net consumption gains to the investment beneficiaries. Social investing may therefore be economically unsound even though there is no reason to expect a portfolio constructed in accordance with the usual principles of social investment to yield a below-average rate of return - provided that administrative costs are ignored.

Part II relates our policy …


A Reconsideration Of The Stock Market Exception To The Dissenting Shareholder's Right Of Appraisal, Michigan Law Review Apr 1976

A Reconsideration Of The Stock Market Exception To The Dissenting Shareholder's Right Of Appraisal, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note engages in such a reassessment. It contends, first, that appraisal has not been an unreasonable burden on corporations and that adjustments in the appraisal procedure can eliminate remaining inequities. Next, it asserts that the stock market exception inadequately protects the dissenting shareholder, since a market might, for a variety of reasons, price a shareholder's stock at less than its intrinsic value. Finally, this Note concludes that an appraisal procedure with modifications, and not the stock market exception, reflects the appropriate balance of corporate and shareholder interests.


Res Judicata In The Derivative Action: Adequacy Of Representation And The Inadequate Plaintiff, Michigan Law Review Apr 1973

Res Judicata In The Derivative Action: Adequacy Of Representation And The Inadequate Plaintiff, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this Note to examine the adequacy of representation in a derivative suit and to consider the appropriateness of applying res judicata to foreclose the corporate cause of action. Discussion will focus on the following areas: (1) the problem of the inadequate plaintiff; (2) the efficacy of judicially created devices designed to ensure the adequacy of representation; and, (3) the feasibility of partially exempting the derivative cause of action from the operation of res judicata.


Warrants In Bond-Warrant Units: A Survey And Assessment, Henry B. Reiling Aug 1972

Warrants In Bond-Warrant Units: A Survey And Assessment, Henry B. Reiling

Michigan Law Review

This Article surveys the warrant in the context of a bond-warrant unit (the typical medium of issuance), and in four main subdivisions assesses (I) the warrant's role in corporate finance, and several major implications and features of its use today for (II) shareholders of the prospective issuer, (III) warrant holder, and (IV) issuer. The present status of the warrant as a highly significant mode of financing requires that particular attention be given to the justification for the issuance of warrants in the light of earlier authoritative criticism, and to the tax consequences and concepts now attending their use. Fortunately, several …


The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign Gm, Donald E. Schwartz Jan 1971

The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign Gm, Donald E. Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

Proxy contests are generally fought for control of a corporation. The rules governing this form of corporate combat seek to provide shareholders with adequate information about the rival forces for control so that they can intelligently choose between them. The information furnished in proxy materials and discussions at annual meetings have traditionally been devoted almost entirely to subjects such as finance, production, acquisitions, and the like.


Corporations-Class Actions Under Section 16(B) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934-Federal Rule 23, Richard. J. Archer Nov 1947

Corporations-Class Actions Under Section 16(B) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934-Federal Rule 23, Richard. J. Archer

Michigan Law Review

Pursuant to section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 an action was commenced by a shareholder to recover for the corporation profits realized by another shareholder through "short swing" transactions in securities of the corporation, the estimated profits being $50,770. Plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit stating the reasons why recovery of the full amount was doubtful and made application for , leave to settle and compromise for $5,000. The corporation's attorney agreed to this proposal. Held, the merits of the compromise cannot be considered until in conformance with Rule 23 ( c), actual notice of the …


Corporations-The Fair And Equitable Test In Recapitalizations, Robert O. Hancox Dec 1946

Corporations-The Fair And Equitable Test In Recapitalizations, Robert O. Hancox

Michigan Law Review

Changes in capital structures of corporations which modify rights of security holders generally occur under one of two circumstances: (1) reorganization of insolvent corporations which affects the rights of creditors as well as shareholders and necessitates judicial supervision; and (2) recapitalization of solvent corporations involving only the relative rights of the different classes of shareholders. It is the author's present purpose to focus attention on the effect of the latter type of modification on the most zealously guarded right of the preferred shareholder--the right to accrued dividends on cumulative preferred stock.


Taxation-Income Tax-Dealings By Corporation In Its Own Stock, John N. Seaman Jun 1939

Taxation-Income Tax-Dealings By Corporation In Its Own Stock, John N. Seaman

Michigan Law Review

From 1921 to 1929, appellee corporation bought shares of its own stock, not for retirement, but to sustain the market, to increase the number of shareholders by resale in smaller blocks, and for other reasons. This stock was held as treasury stock. In 1929 it was sold by the corporation, at a profit. From 1920 to 1934 the Treasury Regulations exempted the proceeds of such a transaction from income tax, treating the purchase and sale as separate decrease and increase in the capital, and not as resulting in income. But in 1934 the regulation was changed, so as to tax …


Bankruptcy - Corporate Reorganization - Fairness Of The Plan, Stanton J. Schuman Mar 1939

Bankruptcy - Corporate Reorganization - Fairness Of The Plan, Stanton J. Schuman

Michigan Law Review

In a reorganization under 77B the unsecured creditors were to be paid by receiving non-voting preferred stock of the insolvent debtor up to the amount of their claims. The old preferred stockholders were to keep the balance of this same class of stock. One thousand shares of voting common stock were to be given to the old shareholders on the basis of one new share for each old share. The plan was approved by ninety-four per cent of the creditors, but the master proposed an amendment whereby the creditors were to have the right to vote in the selection of …


Corporations - Capital, Capital Stock And Stock, Frederick K. Brown Dec 1936

Corporations - Capital, Capital Stock And Stock, Frederick K. Brown

Michigan Law Review

The recent case of Haggard v. Lexington Utilities Co. is typical of the nominalistic confusion occasioned by the use of the terms "capital" and "capital stock." Whatever progress the courts have made toward making them words of precise signification has not been reflected in the drafting of statutes, where they are employed to represent a bewildering number of connotations. The courts have recognized this and have not sought to make them words of art with a single, definitive meaning but through the mechanics of statutory interpretation have sought to divine the legislative intent.


Corporations - Amendment Of Charter - Right To Redemption Of Preferred Stock., Michigan Law Review Dec 1936

Corporations - Amendment Of Charter - Right To Redemption Of Preferred Stock., Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff owned 100 shares of preferred stock of defendant corporation, the certificates for which, and the articles of incorporation, provided for redemption on a· given date. Subsequent to plaintiff's becoming a stockholder but prior to the redemption date of his stock, a statute was passed allowing the majority of voting shareholders of a corporation to amend its articles "without limitation." Pursuant thereto the date for redemption of plaintiff's stock was postponed twenty-five years. Under the amended articles defendant refused plaintiff's tender of the stock and demand of payment on the original redemption date. In an action against the corporation, held …


International Law - Recognition Of Soviet Russia - Extraterritorial Effect Of Decrees Of Confiscation And Nationalization Nov 1936

International Law - Recognition Of Soviet Russia - Extraterritorial Effect Of Decrees Of Confiscation And Nationalization

Michigan Law Review

The Moscow Fire Insurance Company, the Northern Insurance Company of Moscow, and the First Russian Insurance Company were incorporated in Russia under the Czarist regime, and given authority to do business in New York. Deposits were made in New York for the benefit of policy holders and creditors in this country. Subsequent to the revolution in Russia and the Soviet decrees nationalizing all Russian corporations and confiscating without compensation such corporations' assets in Russia and abroad, these deposits were turned over to the New York State Insurance Commissioner for liquidation. Large sums remained after domestic claims were satisfied and the …


Corporations-Qualifications Of Officers-Effect On Existing By-Laws Of Change In Statute Jun 1934

Corporations-Qualifications Of Officers-Effect On Existing By-Laws Of Change In Statute

Michigan Law Review

Corporate by-laws adopted under and following Act No. 84, Michigan Public Acts of 1921, required that directors be chosen from stockholders, the positions to become vacant should the directors dispose of their stock. In 1931 the statute was changed, now reading that "directors . . . need not be shareholders unless the articles so provide." The by-laws were not altered. Qualified directors subsequently disposed of their stock and petitioned the chancery court under the statute for dissolution of the corporation and appointment of a receiver. Appealing from an order granting that petition, creditors and stockholders of the corporation contended that …


Corporations - Attacks On Salaries Paid To Corporate Executives Mar 1934

Corporations - Attacks On Salaries Paid To Corporate Executives

Michigan Law Review

In October, 1933, the former president and chairman of the governing board of one of the world's greatest banks appeared before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, in Washington. During the course of the testimony, it was revealed that through the years 1929-33 this executive had received from his bank upwards of $1,100,000 in salary, bonus, and extra compensation. For the two years immediately past, he had served as a director in fifty-nine other corporations, from one of which he had at one time received a salary of $40,000 a year for services as director only, and from another …


The Massachusetts Trust-Called Partnership, Joint-Stock Company, Corporation By The Courts Jun 1928

The Massachusetts Trust-Called Partnership, Joint-Stock Company, Corporation By The Courts

Michigan Law Review

The so-called Massachusetts Trust, as a form of business organization, had its beginning in England some two hundred years ago, and as trading associations they came to be preferred to corporations, in the early days of their history, for their members lacked the immunity from debts of the concern that corporate shareholders possessed. The business trust, in a rudimentary form, made its initial appearance in Massachusetts in 1827, and due to the current of more or less dissatisfaction with the corporate form of business organization there appears to be a present tendency toward the trust form, though Mr. Cook believes …


Corporations-Right Of Majority To Amend Charter Under Reserved Right Of State Apr 1928

Corporations-Right Of Majority To Amend Charter Under Reserved Right Of State

Michigan Law Review

As everyone knows, the famous Dartmouth College case established, rightly or wrongly, that a corporate charter is a contract between the state and the corporation and the members of the corporation. Ever since that case the states have sought to avoid the resulting restrictions placed on the power to amend or repeal by the federal Constitution by expressly reserving the power at the time of incorporation.