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Full-Text Articles in Law

Deterrence And Damages: The Multiplier Principle And Its Alternatives, Richard Craswell Jun 1999

Deterrence And Damages: The Multiplier Principle And Its Alternatives, Richard Craswell

Michigan Law Review

One purpose of fines and damage awards is to deter harmful behavior. When enforcement is imperfect, however, so the probability that any given violation will be punished is less than 100%, the law's deterrent effect is usually thought to be reduced. Thus, it is often said that the ideal penalty (insofar as deterrence is concerned) equals the harm caused by the violation multiplied by one over the probability of punishment. For example, if a violation faces only a 25% (or one-in-four) chance of being punished, on this view the optimal penalty would be four times the harm caused by the …


Habeas Corpus--Custody And Release From Custody Requirements Of Habeas Corpus--Viability Of Mcnally V. Hill In The Moden Context, Michigan Law Review Nov 1966

Habeas Corpus--Custody And Release From Custody Requirements Of Habeas Corpus--Viability Of Mcnally V. Hill In The Moden Context, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Section 2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code requires that a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus be "in custody." As a corollary of the "custody" requirement, the common law tradition required that the effect of the writ must be the petitioner's "release from custody.'' Because the United States Constitution and the federal habeas corpus statutes guarantee the availability of the writ in general terms, it is to the common law that the courts have consistently turned for the definition of these terms and for the restrictive effect of these requirements on the availability of the writ …


Legal History In The High Court--Habeas Corpus, Dallin H. Oaks Jan 1966

Legal History In The High Court--Habeas Corpus, Dallin H. Oaks

Michigan Law Review

Ever since Chief Justice Marshall declared that courts could resort to the common law to determine what Congress meant by the term "habeas corpus" in a federal statute, the history of this venerable remedy has played an important role in the Supreme Court. Over the years, however, courts have moved away from using the writ of habeas corpus for its historic functions of eliciting the cause of commitment and compelling adherence to prescribed procedures in advance of trial until today it has become primarily a means by which one court of general jurisdiction exercises post-conviction review over the judgment of …


Evidence-Admissibility And Weight Of Photographs, James W. Collier May 1964

Evidence-Admissibility And Weight Of Photographs, James W. Collier

Michigan Law Review

In a prosecution for fellatio, the people's only witness was a woman who testified that she had participated in the alleged activity with the defendant. Her testimony also verified for introduction a motion picture purporting to show the alleged violations. Defendant was convicted on the basis of this evidence. On appeal, held, reversed. A conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony; and the film, although properly admitted, could not supply the necessary corroboration, since a determination of its accuracy must rely upon the accomplice's foundation testimony. People v. Bowley, 59 Cal. 2d …


Criminal Law-Reiterated Contempt Of Court, Robert C. Bonges Apr 1964

Criminal Law-Reiterated Contempt Of Court, Robert C. Bonges

Michigan Law Review

The defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt of court in a civil proceeding for giving "don't remember" answers, after having been granted immunity from prosecution, to questions concerning his activities, asked during a grand jury investigation of an attempted homicide. For his refusal to testify, the defendant was given the maximum penalty provided for criminal contempt under the applicable statute. After paying the fine and serving the sentence, the defendant was brought before the same grand jury thirty-five days later and was asked the same questions. The defendant repeated the "don't remember" answers and was again fined and incarcerated. …


Habeas Corpus - Procedural Prerequisites - Motion Denied For Failure To Appeal Convicion Despite Failure Being Excusable, Harvey O. Mierke Jr. Apr 1961

Habeas Corpus - Procedural Prerequisites - Motion Denied For Failure To Appeal Convicion Despite Failure Being Excusable, Harvey O. Mierke Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff was convicted of robbery in a federal district court and, although represented by counsel, failed to appeal within the statutory ten-day period. Three months later he filed a motion in the same court under section 2255 of the judicial code to vacate the sentence on the ground that the conviction, because it was based on a coerced confession, was unconstitutionally obtained without due process of law. The motion was denied and the denial affirmed, in the absence of any attempt to excuse the failure to appeal. On reargument, plaintiff attempted to excuse his failure to appeal by alleging that …


Criminal Law - Felony - Murder-Guilt Of Robber For The Justifiable Killing Of His Accomplice By A Policeman, Nick E. Yocca S.Ed. May 1958

Criminal Law - Felony - Murder-Guilt Of Robber For The Justifiable Killing Of His Accomplice By A Policeman, Nick E. Yocca S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the death of his co-felon resulting from a wound inflicted by a policeman while the felons were fleeing the scene of a robbery. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. For conviction in felony-murder, the killing must be done by the defendant or by one acting in furtherance of the felonious undertaking. One cannot be convicted for the consequences of lawful conduct of another person. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A. (2d) 472 (1958).


Criminal Law - Delay In Imposition Of Sentence As Destroying Jurisdiction Of Trial Court, M. Fred Mallender, Ii S.Ed. Mar 1955

Criminal Law - Delay In Imposition Of Sentence As Destroying Jurisdiction Of Trial Court, M. Fred Mallender, Ii S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Defendant was tried for burglary in April 1952. Before judgment was rendered, a petition for his commitment to the Indiana Village for Epileptics was granted, and the trial court entered judgment in July 1952 that it continue the matter under advisement so long as defendant remained in the Epileptic Village and complied with the rules and regulations. In September 1952 defendant escaped from the Epileptic Village and was later apprehended. He was brought to trial in April 1953. The court found that he had not complied with the judgment of July 1952, found him guilty as charged, and sentenced him …


Constitutional Law - Due Process - Coerced Confessions And The Stein Case, Marvin O. Young S.Ed. Jan 1954

Constitutional Law - Due Process - Coerced Confessions And The Stein Case, Marvin O. Young S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Stein v. People of State of New York, a coerced confession case decided by the Supreme Court last June, at first suggests some rather startling propositions about the effect of a denial of procedural due process. Since Brown v. Mississippi in 1936 it has been well settled that the admission of a coerced confession into evidence in a state criminal proceeding contravenes the due process guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the confession cases subsequently considered by the Supreme Court it has been consistently held that the admission of an extorted confession vitiates the entire proceeding and renders the …


Constitutional Law--Fifth Amendment--Privilege Against Self-Incrimination By Admission Of Occupation And Of Knowledge Of Whereabouts Of A Fugitive Witness, Lois Hambro Feb 1952

Constitutional Law--Fifth Amendment--Privilege Against Self-Incrimination By Admission Of Occupation And Of Knowledge Of Whereabouts Of A Fugitive Witness, Lois Hambro

Michigan Law Review

Petitioner, who was known as an underworld character and racketeer, was subpoenaed before a federal grand jury investigating federal crime and rackets and was asked his occupation and business and whether he had seen, talked to, or knew the whereabouts of a certain person upon whom a subpoena had been issued but not served requiring such fugitive person to appear before a federal grand jury. He refused to answer on the ground of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Petitioner was adjudged in contempt of court for refusal to answer the questions. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and the …


Criminal Law-Procedure-Right Of Defendant To Inspect Grand Jury Minutes, L. W. Larson, Jr. Apr 1949

Criminal Law-Procedure-Right Of Defendant To Inspect Grand Jury Minutes, L. W. Larson, Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Defendant was indicted for murder by a grand jury. The trial court denied a motion by defendant requesting that the district attorney be ordered to furnish him with a transcript of the evidence offered before the grand jury. On appeal, held, affirmed. It was within the discretion of the trial court to grant or refuse the motion. Commonwealth v. Galvin, (Mass. 1948) 80 N.E. (2d) 825.


Constitutional Law-Jury Trial-Validity Of The "Blue Ribbon" Jury, Edward S. Tripp S.Ed. Dec 1947

Constitutional Law-Jury Trial-Validity Of The "Blue Ribbon" Jury, Edward S. Tripp S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Defendants, labor union officers, were indicted for conspiracy and extortion. The state moved for a "blue ribbon" jury. Defendants objected to the "blue ribbon" panel on grounds of denial of due process and equal protection; first, because laborers and women were unlawfully excluded from the panel, and also because "blue ribbon" juries were more inclined to convict than common juries. Defendants later accepted each individual juror. Defendants were convicted and the New York appellate court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed. Defendants failed to show any intentional and purposeful exclusion which would be prejudicial to …


Constitutional Law-Due Process Clause-Right Of An Accused To Have Counsel Appointed By The Court, Frank H. Roberts Jun 1947

Constitutional Law-Due Process Clause-Right Of An Accused To Have Counsel Appointed By The Court, Frank H. Roberts

Michigan Law Review

On May 16, 1932, petitioner, then seventeen years of age, was arraigned, tried, convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner was without legal assistance throughout these proceedings, was never advised of his rights to counsel, was never informed of the consequences of a guilty plea and, as disclosed by the record, was considerably confused as to the effect of such plea. In 1945, he moved for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial in the court in which he was convicted, on the ground that there had been serious impairment of his …


Evidence-Two Witnesses Rule In Action For Perjury, Milton D. Solomon S.Ed. Dec 1945

Evidence-Two Witnesses Rule In Action For Perjury, Milton D. Solomon S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The petitioner was convicted of perjury. The trial judge refused to give the following instruction to the jury: "The government must establish the falsity of the statement alleged to have been made by the defendant under oath, by the testimony of two independent witnesses or one witness and corroborating circumstances. Unless that has been done, you must find the defendant not guilty." The petitioner was convicted and the circuit court of appeals affirmed the district court. Held, the refusal of the district judge to instruct the jury as requested was reversible error. Weiler v. United States, (U.S. 1945) …


Insurance - Legal Execution Of Insured As A Defense, G. Randall Price Feb 1940

Insurance - Legal Execution Of Insured As A Defense, G. Randall Price

Michigan Law Review

Insured was convicted of murder and legally executed by the state. Plaintiff is the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. Held, no recovery on the ground that the risk of legal execution was impliedly excepted in the policy as a matter of law. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Whitfield, (Ala. 1939) 190 So. 276.