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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Ministerial And Discretionary Official Acts, Edwin W. Patterson
Ministerial And Discretionary Official Acts, Edwin W. Patterson
Michigan Law Review
Two recent cases, one in Michigan and one in Iowa, bring up again the insistent question of judicial control over administrative action and the oft-repeated distinction between "ministerial" and "discretionary" official acts.
Social And Economic Interpretation Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Robert Eugene Cushman
Social And Economic Interpretation Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Robert Eugene Cushman
Michigan Law Review
For those who love precision and definiteness the question of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to social and economic problems remains an irritating enigma. The judicial construction of due process of law and the equal protection of the law has from the first discouraged systematic analysis and defied synthesis. More than one writer has emerged from the study of the problem with a neat and compact set of fundamental principles, only to have the Supreme Court discourteously ignore them in its next case. But paradoxical as it may seem, those who long for a wise and forward-looking solution of …
Book Reviews, Edwin W. Patterson, Edson R. Sunderland, C E. Griffin
Book Reviews, Edwin W. Patterson, Edson R. Sunderland, C E. Griffin
Michigan Law Review
The title of this brilliant little volume might, more accurately, have been, "The Spirits of the Common Law," for it depicts the common law as the battleground of many conflicting spirits, from which a few relatively permanent ideas and ideals have emerged triumphant. As a whole, the book is a pluralistic-idealistic interpretation of legal history. Idealistic, because Dean Pound finds that the fundamentals of the 'common law have been shaped by ideas and ideals rather than by economic determinism or class struggle; he definitely rejects a purely economic interpretation of legal history, although he demands a sociological one (pp. io-ii). …
Book Reviews, Nathan Isaacs, Horace Lafayette Wilgus, Arthur H. Basye, Leonard D. White, Victor H. Lane, Edwin D. Dickinson
Book Reviews, Nathan Isaacs, Horace Lafayette Wilgus, Arthur H. Basye, Leonard D. White, Victor H. Lane, Edwin D. Dickinson
Michigan Law Review
What does a judge do when he decides a case? It would be interesting to collect the answers ranging from those furnished by primitive systems of law in which the judge was supposed to consult the gods to the ultra-modern, rather profane system described to me recently by a retrospective judge: "I make up my mind which way the case ought to be decided, and then I see if I can't get some legal ground to make it stick." Perhaps the widespread impression is the curiously erroneous one lampooned by Gnaeus Flavius (Kantorowitz). The judge is supposed to sit at …
Net Income And Judicial Economics, Henry Rottschaefer
Net Income And Judicial Economics, Henry Rottschaefer
Michigan Law Review
A legal system does not function in a vacuum of abstractions. It is part of a general institutional framework of an organized society. Its content is determined by concrete individual and social needs and activities. Hence modern jurisprudence conceives of law as a means for securing interests. The appraisal of its rules and principles requires an evaluation of the significant elements of the situation to which they apply. A narrow, complacent formalism is the penalty of failure in this regard. No one would deny the emphasis modern society places upor its commercial and industrial interests, nor the many points of …