Law Commons^™

This article discusses what it means for a decision-maker to have a reason for a decision and to give that reason as a justification for the decision. Indeed, if the relationship is difficult to sort out at the individual, private level, it becomes even more complicated when we move to complex collective entities like public institutions. This is why we need to know under what conditions public institutions may 'have' reasons for their decisions. The article explores the hypothesis that proper ascriptions of reasons to institutions depend on whether they have formally adopted a common set of reasons. I contend …

This paper argues that in contemporary legal thinking, the concept of the rule of law has become inseparable from the idea that legal decision-makers should give reasons to justify their decisions. Yet, how far can the concept of the rule the law be understood as establishing a rule of reasons? I examine whether reason giving is necessarily connected with the rule of law in the sense that a legal system would not conform to the rule of law if its decisions were not supported by publicly articulated reasons. I proceed by arguing that the focus on reason giving vindicates both …

This chapter examines some popular justifications for public reason-giving common in liberal political thought. An obvious way of arguing in favor of the duty to give reasons is to point out that publicly substantiating decisions is an intrinsically valuable practice. Giving reasons simply makes for better decision-making. Yet in liberal democracies reasons are increasingly defended on “instrumental” grounds. Giving reasons is valuable because some other value will thereby be realized. Reasons are used for (other) reasons. Reasons become proxies for democratic values. The giving reasons requirement results in getting credit, not so much for increasing the quality of the underlying …

This paper argues that in contemporary legal thinking, the concept of the rule of law has become inseparable from the idea that legal decision-makers should give reasons to justify their decisions. Yet, how far can the concept of the rule the law be understood as establishing a rule of reasons? I examine whether reason giving is necessarily connected with the rule of law in the sense that a legal system would not conform to the rule of law if its decisions were not supported by publicly articulated reasons. I proceed by arguing that the focus on reason giving vindicates both …