Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Revisiting The Influence Of Law Clerks On The U.S. Supreme Court's Agenda-Setting Process, Ryan C. Black, Christina L. Boyd, Amanda C. Bryan
Revisiting The Influence Of Law Clerks On The U.S. Supreme Court's Agenda-Setting Process, Ryan C. Black, Christina L. Boyd, Amanda C. Bryan
Marquette Law Review
Do law clerks influence U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ decisions in the Court’s agenda-setting stage? For those Justices responding to their own law clerks’ cert recommendations, we expect a high degree of agreement between Justice and clerk. For non-employing Justices, however, we anticipate that the likelihood of agreement between clerk and Justice will vary greatly based on the interplay among the ideological compatibility between a Justice and the clerk, the underlying certworthiness of the petition for review, and the clerk’s final recommendation. Relying on a newly collected dataset of petitions making the Court’s discuss list over the 1986 through 1993 Terms, …
Law Clerks As Advisors: A Look At The Blackmun Papers, Zachary Wallander, Sara C. Benesh
Law Clerks As Advisors: A Look At The Blackmun Papers, Zachary Wallander, Sara C. Benesh
Marquette Law Review
The Justices of the United States Supreme Court seek advice, by way of cert pool memos, when making their consequential agenda-setting decisions. There is some debate over the extent to which these law clerks actually influence the Justices. Focusing on the certiorari stage and on the information and advice provided to the Court via the cert pool memos, we ascertain the extent to which the contents of the memos drive the decision making of the Court. We find that information about conflict, amici, and the position of the United States does indeed influence the Court’s votes, but also that the …
Constitutional Conflict And Congressional Oversight, Andrew Mccanse Wright
Constitutional Conflict And Congressional Oversight, Andrew Mccanse Wright
Marquette Law Review
In matters of oversight, Congress and the President have fundamentally incompatible views of their institutional roles within the constitutional structure. This Article offers an explanation of divergent branch behavior and legal doctrine. Congress, much like a party to litigation, views itself as having fixed substantive rights to obtain desired information from the Executive and private parties. In contrast, the Executive views itself like a party to a business transaction, in which congressional oversight requests are the opening salvo in an iterative negotiation process to resolve competing interests between co-equal branches. In general, legislators want to litigate and executive officers want …