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When, What, And Why Do States Choose To Delegate?, Barbara Koremenos
When, What, And Why Do States Choose To Delegate?, Barbara Koremenos
Law and Contemporary Problems
Koremenos demonstrates that international delegation is an important and nontrivial empirical phenomenon. Using an extensive data set created from the United Nations Treaty Series, she finds that almost half of all international agreements involve delegation of some kind. By exploring the institutional design choices of international delegation, she finds that dispute resolution is the most commonly delegated function and often involves externally delegating authority to an existing arbitration tribunal or an international court. Furthermore, she finds that external delegation in particular increases with the existence of complex cooperation problems such as enforcement and uncertainty and with the heterogeneity and number …
Sovereignty And Delegation In International Organizations, David Epstein, Sharyn O'Halloran
Sovereignty And Delegation In International Organizations, David Epstein, Sharyn O'Halloran
Law and Contemporary Problems
No abstract provided.
The Globalization Of Health And Safety Standards: Delegation Of Regulatory Authority In The Sps Agreement Of The 1994 Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, Tim Buthe
Law and Contemporary Problems
Buthe examines why states delegated regulatory authority in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, an integral part of the founding treaty of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Buthe argues that, to explain this case of international delegation, principal-agent theory must be complemented by an analysis of cost-benefit calculations of the relevant domestic interest groups. Given these domestic interests, governments decided to institutionalize international cooperation on SPS measures outside of the WTO because they believed that such delegation would minimize the political costs of the loss of policymaking autonomy. Buthe notes, however, that in retrospect it …