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Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial Planning Device Or The Last Refuge Of A Scoundrel?, Richard C. Ausness

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In recent years, a large number of Americans have established "asset protection trusts" in foreign countries. An asset protection trust is a self-settled spendthrift trust which is created in order to protect the settlor's property from the claims of creditors. Virtually all American jurisdictions recognize spendthrift trusts, which prohibit both voluntary and involuntary alienation of a third party beneficiary's interest in a trust; however, most do not allow a settlor who has retained a beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust to protect that interest from the claims of creditors. A growing number of present and former British possessions, however, have …