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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Law
Bankruptcy On The Side, Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, David A. Skeel Jr.
Bankruptcy On The Side, Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, David A. Skeel Jr.
Kenneth Ayotte
This article provides a framework for analyzing side agreements in corporate bankruptcy, such as intercreditor and “bad boy” agreements. These agreements are controversial because they commonly include a promise by one party to remain silent – to waive some procedural right they would otherwise have under the Bankruptcy Code – at potentially crucial points in the reorganization process. Using simplified examples, we show that side agreements create benefits in some instances, but parties to a side agreement may have incentive to contract for specific performance or excessive stipulated damages that impose negative externalities on non-parties to the agreement. A promise …
Creditor Control And Conflict In Chapter 11, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison
Creditor Control And Conflict In Chapter 11, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison
Kenneth Ayotte
We analyze a sample of large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions during 2001. We find pervasive creditor control. In contrast to traditional views of Chapter 11, equity holders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process. 70 percent of CEOs are replaced in the two years before a bankruptcy filing, and few reorganization plans (at most 12 percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule to distribute value to equity holders. Senior lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants, such as line-item budgets, in loans extended to firms in bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors …
Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.
Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.
Kenneth Ayotte
No abstract provided.
Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis Of Venue Choice In Bankruptcy , Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.
Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis Of Venue Choice In Bankruptcy , Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.
Kenneth Ayotte
We analyze a sample of large Chapter 11 cases to determine which factors motivate the choice of filing in one court over another when a choice is available. We focus in particular on the Delaware court, which became the most popular venue for large corporations in the 1990s. We find no evidence of agency problems governing the venue choice or affecting the outcome of the bankruptcy process. Instead, firm characteristics and court characteristics, particularly a court's level of experience, are the most important factors. We find that court experience manifests itself in both a greater ability to reorganize marginal firms …
An Efficiency-Based Explanation For Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.
An Efficiency-Based Explanation For Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.
Kenneth Ayotte
No abstract provided.
Bankruptcy Law As A Liquidity Provider, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Bankruptcy Law As A Liquidity Provider, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Kenneth Ayotte
Since the outset of the recent financial crisis, liquidity problems have been cited as the cause behind the bankruptcies and near bankruptcies of numerous firms, ranging from Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008 to Kodak more recently. This paper expands the prevailing normative theory of corporate bankruptcy — the Creditors’ Bargain theory — to include a role for bankruptcy as a provider of liquidity. The Creditors’ Bargain theory argues that bankruptcy law should be limited to solving problems caused by multiple, uncoordinated creditors, but focuses almost exclusively on the problem of creditor runs. We argue that two well-known problems …
Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel
Kenneth Ayotte
The usual reaction if one mentions bankruptcy as a mechanism for addressing a financial institution’s default is incredulity. Those who favor the rescue of troubled financial institutions, and even those who prefer that their assets be promptly sold to a healthier institution, treat bankruptcy as anathema. Everyone seems to agree that nothing good can come from bankruptcy. Indeed, the Chapter 11 filing by Lehman Brothers has been singled out by many the primary cause of the severe economic and financial contraction that followed, and proof that bankruptcy is disorderly and ineffective. As a result, ad-hoc rescue lending to avoid bankruptcy …
Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann
Legal Entities As Transferable Bundles Of Contracts, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry Hansmann
Kenneth Ayotte
The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a complex cluster of hundreds of corporate subsidiaries under the common control of a single corporate parent. Our Article provides new theory and supportive evidence to help explain this structure. We focus, in particular on the advantages of subsidiary entities in providing the option to transfer some or all of the firm's contractual rights and obligations in the future. The theory not only sheds light on corporate subsidiaries but also illuminates a basic function of all types of legal entities, from partnerships to nonprofit corporations. We show that when, as is …
The Double-Edged Sword Of Withdrawal Rights, Kenneth M. Ayotte
The Double-Edged Sword Of Withdrawal Rights, Kenneth M. Ayotte
Kenneth Ayotte
No abstract provided.
Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, Lee Fennell, Kenneth Ayotte
Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, Lee Fennell, Kenneth Ayotte
Kenneth Ayotte
No abstract provided.