Law Commons^™

Dissenting From The Bench, Christine Venter

Journal Articles

This paper examines the oral dissents of Justices Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg from the year 2000 to the times of their respective deaths. It explores the concept and purpose of oral dissent and details the kinds of cases in which each justice was more likely to orally dissent. The paper analyzes the kinds of rhetoric that each justice used to refer to their subject matter, and argues that Scalia's rhetoric evinces a view of the law as "autonomous", operating independently of the facts of the case. In contrast, Ginsburg's view espouses a view of the law as responsive …

Untangling Entanglement, Stephanie H. Barclay

Journal Articles

The Court has increasingly signaled its interest in taking a more historical approach to the Establishment Clause. And in its recent American Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the three-prong Lemon test is essentially dead letter. Such a result would make sense for the first two prongs of the Lemon test about secular purpose and the effects. Many scholars have observed that these aspects of the prong are judicial creations far afield of the Establishment Clause history. But what of the entanglement prong of the test? If we rejected all applications of this prong of the analysis, would …

Precedent And Constitutional Structure, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

The Constitution does not talk about precedent, at least not explicitly, but several of its features suggest a place for deference to prior decisions. It isolates the judicial function and insulates federal courts from official and electoral control, promoting a vision of impersonality and continuity. It charges courts with applying a charter that is vague and ambiguous in important respects. And it was enacted at a time when prominent thinkers were already discussing the use of precedent to channel judicial discretion. Taken in combination, these features make deference to precedent a sound inference from the Constitution’s structure, text, and historical …

Why Federal Courts Apply The Law Of Nations Even Though It Is Not The Supreme Law Of The Land, Anthony J. Bellia, Bradford R. Clark

Journal Articles

We are grateful to the judges and scholars who participated in this Symposium examining our book, The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution. One of our goals in writing this book was to reinvigorate and advance the debate over the role of customary international law in U.S. courts. The papers in this Symposium advance this debate by deepening understandings of how the Constitution interacts with customary international law. Our goal in this Article is to address two questions raised by this Symposium that go to the heart of the status of the law of nations under the Constitution. …

Proximate Vs. Geographic Limits On Patent Damages, Stephen Yelderman

Journal Articles

The exclusive rights of a U.S. patent are limited in two important ways. First, a patent has a technical scope—only the products and methods set out in the patent’s claims may constitute infringement. Second, a patent has a geographic scope—making, using, or selling the products or methods described in the patent’s claims will only constitute infringement if that activity takes place in the United States. These boundaries are foundational features of the patent system: there can be no liability for U.S. patent infringement without an act that falls within both the technical and geographic scope of the patent.

Religious Freedom And Recycled Tires: The Meaning And Implications Of Trinity Lutheran, Richard W. Garnett, Jackson C. Blais

Journal Articles

The Supreme Court's decision in Trinity Lutheran clearly affirmed a First Amendment rule against anti-religious discrimination. At the same time, it raised or left open a number of important and interesting questions about education reform, the relevance of anti-Catholic bias to states' so-called Blaine Amendments, and the sharpening tension between religious freedom and the application of antidiscrimination laws.

Discretionary Dockets, Randy J. Kozel, Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

The Supreme Court’s workload and its method for selecting cases have drawn increasing critical scrutiny. Similarly, and separately, recent commentary has focused on the disparate approaches the Court has taken to resolving cases on its (historically small) docket. In this Essay we draw these two lines of inquiry together to argue that the Court’s case selection should align with its approach to constitutional adjudication. In doing so, we discuss four modes of constitutional decisionmaking and then examine the interplay between those modes, the Court’s management of its docket, and its sense of institutional role. The Court, we argue, has neither …

The Court-Packing Plan As Symptom, Casualty, And Cause Of Gridlock, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

This essay, prepared for the Notre Dame Law Review's Symposium, “The American Congress: Legal Implications of Gridlock,” considers three ways in which President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing bill was related to the phenomenon of gridlock in the 1930s. First, as FDR's public remarks on the subject demonstrate, he believed that the early New Deal was a victim of partisan gridlock between the Democrat-controlled political branches and the Republican-controlled judiciary. Moreover, he did not believe that the impasse could be overcome through an amendment to the Constitution, for he regarded Article V's supermajority requirements as virtually encoding gridlock into the …

Court-Packing And Compromise, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing bill would have permitted him to appoint six additional justices to the Supreme Court, thereby expanding its membership to fifteen immediately. Throughout the ultimately unsuccessful campaign to enact the measure, Roosevelt was presented with numerous opportunities to compromise for a measure authorizing the appointment of fewer additional justices. The President rejected each of these proposals, and his refusal to compromise often has been attributed to stubbornness, overconfidence, or hubris. Yet an examination of the papers of Attorney General Homer S. Cummings reveals why FDR and his advisors believed that he required no fewer than …

A Hands-Off Approach To Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

At the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, the program organized by the Section on Law and Religion presented for consideration the claim that “the United States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and belief.” The Court, it was proposed, is — more and more — taking a “hands-off approach to religious doctrine.”

This proposal was, and remains, timely and important, as is illustrated by — to mention just a few, diverse examples — the ongoing property-ownership dispute between several “breakaway” Episcopal …

Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

At the Federalist Society's 2008 National Student Symposium, a panel of scholars was asked to consider the question, does pervasive judicial review threaten to destroy local identity by homogenizing community norms? The answer to this question is yes, pervasive judicial review certainly does threaten local identity, because such review can homogenize[e] community norms, either by dragging them into conformity with national, constitutional standards or (more controversially) by subordinating them to the reviewers' own commitments. It is important to recall, however, that while it is true that an important feature of our federalism is local variation in laws and values, it …

William H. Rehnquist: A Life Lived Greatly, And Well, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

Chief Justice Rehnquist leaves behind a formidable and important legacy in constitutional law. His work on the Court was animated and guided by the view that We the People, through our Constitution, have authorized our federal courts, legislators, and administrators to do many things - but not everything. Because the Nation's powers are few and defined, Congress may not pursue every good idea or smart policy, nor should courts invalidate every foolish or immoral one. However, for those of us who knew, worked with, learned from, and cared about William Rehnquist, it is his unassuming manner, the care he took …

The Rehnquist Court And The Groundwork For Greater First Amendment Scrutiny Of Intellectual Property, Mark P. Mckenna

Journal Articles

This contribution to the Washington University School of Law conference on the Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment addresses the Rehnquist Court's view of the role of the First Amendment in intellectual property cases. It argues that, while the Rehnquist Court was not eager to find a conflict between intellectual property laws and the First Amendment, there is reason to believe that it set the stage for greater First Amendment scrutiny of intellectual property protections. At the very least, the Court left that road open to future courts, which might be inclined to view intellectual property more skeptically.

The Lame Ducks Of Marbury, John C. Nagle

Journal Articles

The election of 1800 was one of the most contested - and important - in American history. After it became clear that neither President John Adams nor a Federalist majority in Congress had been reelected, they acted during the lame-duck period to preserve their influences far into the future. They did so by appointing John Marshall as Chief Justice, ratifying the Treaty with France, creating numerous new federal judicial positions, and filling many of those positions with friends, family, and Federalists (including William Marbury). Not surprisingly, Jefferson and his supporters protested these actions as contrary to the will of the …

The Supreme Court's Impact On Marriage, 1967-90, Margaret F. Brinig

Journal Articles

In the twenty years following Loving, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases dealing with the family. Although the Court reasoned that it was protecting marriage and extending such protection to other forms of families, the perverse effect of these decisions was to weaken the most traditional family type of all, the nuclear family. Adults, and particularly pregnant women and unwed fathers, triumphed in this move towards autonomy and rights. The vanquished included those who depended upon the family for love and sustenance: minor children, elderly adults, and longtime homemakers.

This paper discusses these cases from a family law …

Review Essay: Liberalism And The Supreme Court, Donald P. Kommers

Journal Articles

In Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, Rogers M. Smith of Yale University takes stock of the American liberal tradition and its impact on the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. It argues that the tradition's political vision lacks philosophical coherence and that our constitutional law, by reflecting this incoherence, has failed to provide the legal community with a public philosophy suited to the needs of American society in the late twentieth century.His goal is to demonstrate the superiority of "rational liberty," both as a philosophical theory and practical guide to constitutional policymaking, over three major competing versions of liberal constitutionalism. To wit: …

Imagining The Past And Remembering The Future: The Supreme Court's History Of The Establishment Clause, Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

Our Framers through the Establishment Clause sought to prevent the government from preferring one religious sect to another. However, the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education abandoned that meaning of nonestablishment and created a general prohibition on all nondiscriminatory aid to religion, a decision later reinforced in Lemon v. Kurtzman. This Article discusses the Founder’s worldview and looks at other Establishment Clause cases to illustrate that the historical evidence is inconsistent with Everson. Rather, the founders intended to assure that religion would be aided only on a nondiscriminatory, or sect-neutral, basis and does not stand for …

The Supreme Court And The Constitution: The Continuing Debate On Judicial Review, Donald P. Kommers

Journal Articles

The three books reviewed in this essay are recent contributions to the growing literature of constitutional theory (Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Ha- ven: Yale University Press, 1982); Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); and John Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). They explore important questions about the role of the Supreme Court and the meaning of the Constitution.

Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, And Limitations, Nell Jessup Newton

Journal Articles

Judicial deference to federal legislation affecting Indians is a theme that has persisted throughout the two-hundred-year history of American Indian law. The Supreme Court has sustained nearly every piece of federal legislation it has considered directly regulating Indian tribes, whether challenged as being beyond federal power or within that power but violating individual rights.' This judicial deference often has been justified by invoking federal plenary power to regulate Indian affairs and the political question doctrine's requirement of deference to the political branches. Indeed, not until 1977 did the Court explicitly repudiate use of the political question doctrine to bar equal …

Symposium Proceedings: Congressional Limits On Federal Court Jurisdiction, Charles E. Rice

Journal Articles

Judge Sloviter: Professor Rice, your view of the constitutional scheme is that Congress has the power to make surgical excisions to the jurisdictions of the federal courts. I wonder if you would comment on what one of my colleagues might call the worst case scenario. That is, whether Congress could by legislation abolish all inferior federal courts and eliminate all Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. What then would remain of the judicial power?

Congress And The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction, Charles E. Rice

Journal Articles

When a ruling of the supreme court meets with Congressional disfavor there are several remedies available to Congress. If the decision is not on a constitutional level, a later statutory enactment will suffice to reverse or modify the ruling. If, however, the Court's decision is an interpretation of a constitutional mandate, such as the requirement of the fourteenth amendment that legislative districts be apportioned according to population, then a statute could not reverse the decision because the statute itself would be subject to that constitutional mandate as defined by the Court.

The obvious method of reversing a Supreme Court interpretation …

Aussergesetzliche Masstabe In Der Rechtspreching Des Supreme Court Der Vereinigten Staaten, Donald P. Kommers, Kenneth Ripple

Journal Articles

Zweck der folgenden Ausführungen ist die Darlegung der Bedeutung außergesetz licher Urteilsmaßstäbe in der amerikanischen Verfassungsrechtsprechung. Dabei sollen vor allem diejenigen Urteilskriterien untersucht werden, die den größten Einfluß auf das amerikanische Verfassungsrecht haben dürften; sie sollen im Kontext des gegen wärtigen case law untersucht werden.

Some Observations On The Supreme Court's Use Of Property Concepts In Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, Fernand N. Dutile

Journal Articles

There is a tendency among lawyers and laymen alike to consider "property rights" wholly distinct from "human rights", and to disparage the former in favor of the latter. To a large extent the tendency has been appropriate. One of the happiest chapters of recent times has been the effort to champion human values even at the expense of restricting the individual's use of his "own" property. The public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the increase in aesthetic zoning, the extension of landlords' responsibilities with respect to leased properties and the expansion of consumer protection highlight the law's …

Professor Kurland, The Supreme Court And Political Science, Donald P. Kommers

Journal Articles

IN A SYMPOSIUM held at the Notre Dame Law School on February 29, 1964, on several constitutional amendments designed to limit the power of the Supreme Court, Professor Philip B. Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School read a terse and delightfully witty paper in which he compared the Supreme Court to Caesar, sieged on the one side by the modem forces of Brutus, and championed on the other side by the contemporary Mark Antonys. There was no doubt in Professor Kurland's mind that the efforts of conspirators like the Council of State Governments, not to mention its less …

Obscenity In The Supreme Court: A Note On Jacobellis V. Ohio, Thomas L. Shaffer, Joseph O'Meara

Journal Articles

This article suggests that the determination of "obscenity" in cases should be sent to the jury to determine under proper instructions rather than judges because the jury reflects the community's morals and mores more truly than even the wisest of judges. The jury is the mechanism provided by the common law for determination of questions involving the presence or absence of due care, reasonableness, prudence, decency and other concepts reflecting the common sense and/or conscience of a community. Specifically, this article argues that the obscenity determination should be determined with reference to the time and place of the community of …

The Supreme Court, Politics, And Modern Society, Donald P. Kommers

Journal Articles

Donald P. Kommers reviews Charles S. Hyneman's The Supreme Court on Trial (New York: Atherton Press, 1963).

Due Process And Social Legislation In The Supreme Court--A Post Mortem, Robert E. Rodes

Journal Articles

Nowadays, there is no more discredited era in our judicial history than that represented by such cases as Lochner v. New York.' During this era, we are told, our ancestors were so benighted economically as to embrace economic principles incapable of producing the good life, and so benighted judicially as to read their economics into the Constitution. We have barely left behind us the bulk of the advocates and judges whose role in history it was to slay the giant laissez-faire, so it is not surprising that we should have no picture of their adversary but the dne that was …