Law Commons^™

An Economic Approach To Religious Exemptions, Stephanie H. Barclay

Journal Articles

Externalities caused by religious exemptions have been getting the spotlight again in light a case the U.S. Supreme Court will hear this term: Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. Some argue that religious individuals should be required to internalize the costs they impose on third parties and thus should be denied the right to practice that harmful behavior. These new progressive theories about harm trade on rhetoric and normative intuitions regarding externalities and costs. But curiously, these theories also largely ignore an influential theoretical movement that has studied externalities and costs for the last fifty years: law and economics.

This Article …

The Aftermath Of Catastrophes: Valuing Business Interruption Insurance Losses, Chris French

Journal Articles

With the onslaught of tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods in recent years, business interruption losses have been staggering. Many businesses do not survive such catastrophes. Even business owners that purchased business interruption insurance, which is intended to ensure that a business’s revenue stream continues during an interruption in its operations, often find that their insurers have dramatically different views regarding the amount of the losses that should be reimbursed. The reason for this disparity in views is that the loss valuation provisions in business interruption insurance policies provide very little guidance regarding how business interruption losses should be calculated. Thus, disputes …

The “Ensuing Loss” Clause In Insurance Policies: The Forgotten And Misunderstood Antidote To Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, Chris French

Journal Articles

As a result of the 1906 earthquake and fire in San Francisco which destroyed the city, a clause known as the “ensuing loss” clause was created to address concurrent causation situations in which a loss follows both a covered peril and an excluded peril. Ensuing loss clauses appear in the exclusions section of such policies and in essence they provide that coverage for a loss caused by an excluded peril is nonetheless covered if the loss “ensues” from a covered peril. Today, ensuing loss clauses are found in “all risk” property and homeowners policies, which cover all losses except for …

Aging America, Thomas L. Shaffer

Journal Articles

Professor Sarah Harper's assessment of the legal, political, medical, and economic issues associated with old age in the United States heralded the theme for this Symposium, "Aging America." Her analysis turns, as she puts it, on "a fundamental shift in the demographic structure of society. No longer will it be the norm to have large numbers of young and small numbers of old,"1 as it was when I was a boy (age 11 on V.J. Day, 1945).

"Rather, we are entering a world where age groups will be distributed more or less equally across society-an age-symmetric society."

2 Soon, America …

Ranks And Rivals: A Theory Of Competition, Avishalom Tor, Stephen M. Garcia, Richard Gonzalez

Journal Articles

Social comparison theories typically assume a comparable degree of competition between commensurate rivals on a mutually important dimension. In contrast, however, the following set of studies reveals that the degree of competition between such rivals depends on their proximity to a standard. Studies 1-3 test the prediction that individuals become more competitive and less willing to maximize profitable joint gains when they and their commensurate rivals are highly ranked (e.g., #2 vs. #3) than when they are not (e.g., #202 vs. #203). Studies 4-6 then generalize these findings, showing that the degree of competition increases not only for high ranks …

Book Review, G. Marcus Cole

Journal Articles

G. Marcus Cole provides a thorough review of Towards a Post-Apartheid Future: Political & Economic Relations in Southern Africa by Gavin Maasdorp & Alan Whiteside (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

Afterword: Contracts And Uncertainty, Walter F. Pratt

Journal Articles

This symposium reveals an unexpected irony: The very innovations designed to deal with one type of uncertainty-economic-have themselves produced another type of uncertainty-that associated with resolving disputes. This new uncertainty sounds a discordant note in the traditional refrain that contracts are legal devices for allocating risks between parties. As an afterword, this article draws together evidence from the symposium and from history to emphasize that contract is not the ideal device for allocating risks at the very time that allocation is most desired-when uncertainty is greatest. The lesson can be put in starker terms: Contract is a legal relationship and …