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Full-Text Articles in Law
Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French
Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French
Journal Articles
In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …
Attorney Referral, Negligence, And Vicarious Liability, Bruce Ching
Attorney Referral, Negligence, And Vicarious Liability, Bruce Ching
Journal Articles
As a consequence of requests from clients or prospective clients, lawyers are often placed in a position of giving referrals, especially in situations of cross-specialty referrals (such as an estate planning attorney whose longtime client has become a party in a personal injury lawsuit) or cross-jurisdictional referrals (such as an attorney in Michigan who is contacted by a prospective client who must respond to a lawsuit that was filed in Ohio).
But if the lawyer who receives the referral commits malpractice in handling the case, can the lawyer who made the referral be held liable for the client's loss? This …
Promises, Trust, And Contract Law, Anthony J. Bellia
Promises, Trust, And Contract Law, Anthony J. Bellia
Journal Articles
The need for individuals to be able to trust that promises will be performed is central to justifying a law that renders certain promises enforceable. This Article argues that the legal enforcement of certain promises to meet this need does not necessarily diminish the personal relationships of trust in which such promises are made, as has been argued. Rather, this Article argues, the making and performance of legally enforceable promises can assist individuals in building relationships of trust, as it assists them in the pursuit of myriad goods.
"Money Can't Buy Me Love": A Contrast Between Damages In Family Law And Contract, Margaret F. Brinig
"Money Can't Buy Me Love": A Contrast Between Damages In Family Law And Contract, Margaret F. Brinig
Journal Articles
As my contribution to this symposium in David's honor, I submit the law and economics section of the damages chapter of our joint enterprise, Understanding Contracts. Because of David's failing health, my own involvement with the publisher never reached contract stage. The chapter concludes with a problem that illustrates some of the intricacies of mixing family law and contract. David and I grappled for some time with the answer to the problem, coming at it from our different points of view. On one occasion, David, with a twinkle, told me there was only one place where I was "absolutely wrong." …
Contracting With Electronic Agents, Anthony J. Bellia
Contracting With Electronic Agents, Anthony J. Bellia
Journal Articles
Established contract doctrine provides no clear answer to the question whether exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents are enforceable. This Article explores whether the law should enforce exchanges arranged by the interaction of electronic agents. It examine how normative theories of contractual obligation inform the issue, with an eye toward the strengths and weaknesses of each theory. The theories that most strongly support the enforcement of exchanges arranged by electronic agents, this Article explains, are those that ground contractual obligation in protecting the ability of individuals to pursue their reasonable objectives through reliable arrangements.
Covenant And Contract, Steven Nock, Margaret F. Brinig
Covenant And Contract, Steven Nock, Margaret F. Brinig
Journal Articles
In this article we ask, "What distinguishes a covenant from a mere contract, and what role does this distinction play for natural law?" Both of us have thought substantially about covenant over the past several years. The concept of covenant comes to us originally from religious sources, so we have paid explicit attention to what the Bible and organized religion have to say about covenant. We have also drawn from our own disciplines of law, economics, and sociology as they explain or draw from the initial concepts.
Covenant is a concept that takes us beyond contract. Indeed, the idea that …
A Maternalistic Approach To Surrogacy: Comment On Richard Epstein's Surrogacy: The Case For Full Contractual Enforcement, Margaret F. Brinig
A Maternalistic Approach To Surrogacy: Comment On Richard Epstein's Surrogacy: The Case For Full Contractual Enforcement, Margaret F. Brinig
Journal Articles
Many of the other participants in this Symposium have written extensively about surrogacy. Not only have they contributed to the debate, in some instances they have framed it. In some respects, therefore, I merely thank all of them and chime in. Unlike my fellow panelists, however, I do not think surrogacy merits an enthusiastic, positive response.
In this Comment, I propose to restate objections to specifically enforceable surrogacy contracts from a family-law perspective as well as from the philosophical or psychological roots of family law. I will then reexamine the problems of surrogacy from a contractarian, law-and-economics perspective, showing how …
Afterword: Contracts And Uncertainty, Walter F. Pratt
Afterword: Contracts And Uncertainty, Walter F. Pratt
Journal Articles
This symposium reveals an unexpected irony: The very innovations designed to deal with one type of uncertainty-economic-have themselves produced another type of uncertainty-that associated with resolving disputes. This new uncertainty sounds a discordant note in the traditional refrain that contracts are legal devices for allocating risks between parties. As an afterword, this article draws together evidence from the symposium and from history to emphasize that contract is not the ideal device for allocating risks at the very time that allocation is most desired-when uncertainty is greatest. The lesson can be put in starker terms: Contract is a legal relationship and …