Law Commons^™

Altering The Balance Between State Sovereignty And Competition: The Impact Of Seminole Tribe On The Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine, Susan Beth Farmer

Journal Articles

In the post-Seminole Tribe world, the legal analysis in situations where states have chosen regulation over competition, supplanting the free functioning of markets, will diverge depending upon the identity of the defendant. If a state, its agencies, or departments are the named defendants, the broader Eleventh Amendment analysis controls and claims for damages against government entities must be dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity. If the defendant is a private firm, the narrower State Action Doctrine, which has been crafted to balance true exercise of state sovereignty against the goal of competition, provides immunity for private defendants. As …

Balancing State Sovereignty And Competition: An Analysis Of The Impact Of Seminole Tribe On The Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine, Susan Beth Farmer

Journal Articles

The great impact of the Seminole Tribe v. Florida decision will likely be felt in the range of federal causes of action that have exclusive remedies in federal court. Antitrust cases are among such causes of action. In seeking to avoid antitrust liability, defendants have invoked the protections of the antitrust state action doctrine, which immunizes only that anticompetitive activity imposed and supervised by states. This immunity bars suits against state and private actors alike. After Seminole Tribe, state defendants will escape all antitrust liability, whether or not the traditional requirements of the state action doctrine have been met. …

The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, And The Antitrust Laws, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

The baseball strike and the ongoing hostilities between the players' association and owners have evoked criticism and frustration among fans and others. Although the players successfully defeated the owners' most recent attempts to reduce major league competition, the threat of future imposition of competitive restraints by the owners remains. In this article Professor Stephen F. Ross argues that blanket restraints on the market for players affirmatively inhibit on-the-field competition and consequently offend the Sherman Act.

The article begins with the proposition that monopsony - price-fixing behavior by buyers', rather than sellers' cartels - implicates the Sherman Act. Restraints on competition …