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Full-Text Articles in Law
Federalism And The Limits Of Subnational Political Heterogeneity, James A. Gardner
Federalism And The Limits Of Subnational Political Heterogeneity, James A. Gardner
Journal Articles
With an epidemic of democratic backsliding now afflicting many of the world’s democracies, including the United States, some scholars have suggested that federalism might serve as a useful defense for liberal democracy by impeding the ability of an authoritarian central government to stamp it out at the subnational level. In this Essay, I dispute that contention. An examination of both federal theory on one hand and the behavior and tactics of central control employed by ancient and early modern empires on the other leads to the conclusion that the protective value of federalism against the effects of national authoritarianism is …
The Illiberalization Of American Election Law: A Study In Democratic Deconsolidation, James A. Gardner
The Illiberalization Of American Election Law: A Study In Democratic Deconsolidation, James A. Gardner
Journal Articles
For many years, the dominant view among American election law scholars has been that the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of democratic practice got off to a promising start during the mid-twentieth century but has since then slowly deteriorated into incoherence. In light of the United States’ recent turn toward populist authoritarianism, that view needs to be substantially revised. With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that the Supreme Court has functioned, in its management of the constitutional jurisprudence of democracy, as a vector of infection—a kind of super-spreader of populist authoritarianism.
There is, sadly, nothing unusual these days …
Illiberalism And Authoritarianism In The American States, James A. Gardner
Illiberalism And Authoritarianism In The American States, James A. Gardner
Journal Articles
Federalism contemplates subnational variation, but in the United States the nature and significance of that variation has long been contested. In light of the recent turn, globally and nationally, toward authoritarianism, and the concurrent sharp decline in public support not merely for democracy but for the philosophical liberalism on which democracy rests, it is necessary to discard or to substantially revise prior accounts of the nature of state-to-state variation in the U.S. All such accounts implicitly presuppose a common commitment, across the political spectrum, to the core tenets of democratic liberalism, and consequently that subnational variations in policy preferences and …
Constitutional Courts As Majoritarian Instruments, Jorge M. Farinacci Fernós
Constitutional Courts As Majoritarian Instruments, Jorge M. Farinacci Fernós
Journal Articles
Constitutional courts are portrayed as counter-majoritarian institutions empowered to strike down ordinary legislation that is inconsistent with the constitution. This power is to be used sparingly, since it is seen as being in tension with basic democratic principles. Judicial review in these circumstances should be limited to minority rights protection and the enforcement of structural limitations that prevent majority rule excess. But this is only half the story. Depending on the democratic credentials of the particular constitution, courts that strike down legislation as inconsistent with the constitution can also be said to be engaging in majoritarian action. The characterization of …