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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Snapchat's Gift: Equity Culture In High-Tech Firms, Amy Deen Westbrook, David A. Westbrook
Snapchat's Gift: Equity Culture In High-Tech Firms, Amy Deen Westbrook, David A. Westbrook
Journal Articles
Snap, Inc., the company that owns the platform Snapchat, controversially offered nonvoting common shares to the public in 2017. This Article asks what it means to invest in Snap or other (mostly technology-based) companies in which common shareholders collectibely have little or no power to influence corporate policy. In particular, why do such investors expect to be compensated? This Article explores the familiar rationales for equity investing, including stock appreciation and dividends, and the logical shortcomings of those rationales in these circumstances. Adopting Henry Manne's "two systems" approach to corporate affairs through both law and economics, we show that corporation …
Wage-Setting Institutions And Corporate Governance, Matthew Dimick, Neel Rao
Wage-Setting Institutions And Corporate Governance, Matthew Dimick, Neel Rao
Journal Articles
Why do corporate governance law and practice differ across countries? This paper explains how wage-setting institutions influence ownership structures and investor protection laws. In particular, we identify a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the level of ownership concentration and investor protection laws. As wage setting becomes more centralized, ownership concentration within firms at first becomes more, and then less, concentrated. In addition, the socially optimal level of investor protection laws is decreasing in ownership concentration. Thus, as wage-setting institutions become more centralized, investor protection laws become less and then more protective. This explanation is …
Introduction: Unsettling Questions, Disquieting Stories, Mae Kuykendall, David A. Westbrook
Introduction: Unsettling Questions, Disquieting Stories, Mae Kuykendall, David A. Westbrook
Journal Articles
The Business Law and Narrative Symposium, held at Michigan State University on September 10-11, 2009, brought together nationally known legal scholars, and scholars from other disciplines, to discuss whether and how the institution of the corporation was embedded in social narratives, public stories. This introductory essay reviews the responses of these scholars to the thesis of Kuykendall's article, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in Corporate Law. The authors conclude with a hope that corporate law might offer a more literary sensibility by which to make our lives in global capitalism more comprehensible.
Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility Of A Capitalist Reimagination, David A. Westbrook
Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility Of A Capitalist Reimagination, David A. Westbrook
Journal Articles
No abstract provided.
The Definition Of Voting Stock And The Computation Of Voting Power Under Sections 368(C) And 1504(A): Recent Developments And Tax Lore, Stuart G. Lazar
The Definition Of Voting Stock And The Computation Of Voting Power Under Sections 368(C) And 1504(A): Recent Developments And Tax Lore, Stuart G. Lazar
Journal Articles
Although the concepts of "voting stock" and "voting power" are pervasive throughout the Code, until recently, courts, commentators and the Service have devoted minimal energy to demystifying the confusion surrounding the definition of voting stock and even less to expanding upon the methodology of computing voting power. Recent developments, however, may prompt practitioners to take a second look at these terms. While a 1995 decision by the Tax Court adds little to the existing body of authority with respect to the determination of the owner of voting stock, the Service's analysis of the voting power requirement in a 1994 private …