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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Incompatible Treatment Of Majorities In Election Law And Deliberative Democracy, James A. Gardner
The Incompatible Treatment Of Majorities In Election Law And Deliberative Democracy, James A. Gardner
Journal Articles
Deliberative democracy offers a distinctive and appealing conception of political life, but is it one that might be called into service to guide actual reform of existing election law? This possibility seems remote because election law and deliberative democracy are built around different priorities and theoretical premises. A foundational area of disagreement lies in the treatment of majorities. Election law is structured, at both the legislative and constitutional levels, so as to privilege majorities and systematically to magnify their power, whereas deliberative democracy aims at privileging minorities (or at least de-privileging majorities). The main purpose of the election law now …
Collaborative Departmentalism, Matthew Steilen
Collaborative Departmentalism, Matthew Steilen
Journal Articles
This article examines the effect of departmentalism on presidential compliance with constitutional law. Most commentators agree that departmentalism weakens the influence of courts in the determination of constitutional meaning and the control of non-judicial actors. The article takes a different view. It defines “moderate departmentalism” as the authority of the President to refuse to adopt a constitutional interpretation announced by the Supreme Court. Drawing on ideas developed in the literature on “new governance” and administrative law, it then argues that moderate departmentalism increases the capacity of the federal courts to control presidential conduct.
Structural Overdelegation In Criminal Procedure, Anthony O'Rourke
Structural Overdelegation In Criminal Procedure, Anthony O'Rourke
Journal Articles
In function, if not in form, criminal procedure is a type of delegation. It requires courts to select constitutional objectives, and to decide how much discretionary authority to allocate to law enforcement officials in order to implement those objectives. By recognizing this process for what it is, this Article identifies a previously unseen phenomenon that inheres in the structure of criminal procedure decision-making.
Criminal procedure’s decision-making structure, this Article argues, pressures the Supreme Court to delegate more discretionary authority to law enforcement officials than the Court’s constitutional objectives can justify. By definition, this systematic “overdelegation” does not result from the …