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Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility Of A Capitalist Reimagination, David A. Westbrook
Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility Of A Capitalist Reimagination, David A. Westbrook
Journal Articles
No abstract provided.
Making Sense Of Successor Liability, Marie T. Reilly
Making Sense Of Successor Liability, Marie T. Reilly
Journal Articles
A firm that buys assets from another firm ordinarily does not acquire liability to the seller's creditors simply by buying its assets. This ordinary rule is subject to important exceptions. The buyer's consent triggers an exception. If a buyer agrees to assume the seller's liability to third parties, it is for that reason liable. This article considers a more controversial exception - successor liability. When a court decides that an asset acquirer should be treated as a "successor" to the transferor, it is liable for the transferor's debts as though it were the transferor.
Just Do It: An Antidote To The Poison Pill, Julian Velasco
Just Do It: An Antidote To The Poison Pill, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
The poison pill is the most powerful defense against hostile takeovers. It can render a company takeover-proof, or nearly so. Efforts at developing an antidote have focused largely on shareholder-adopted bylaws, but the legality of such proposals has been questioned by many. In any event, shareholder-adopted bylaws have not been very successful in eliminating poison pills thus far. In order to effect takeovers, hostile bidders cannot rely on the courts or the target company's shareholders; they can rely only on themselves. In this article, I propose a strategy for hostile bidders to counteract the poison pill and to consummate hostile …
Focusing Failures In Competitive Environments: Explaining Decision Errors In The Monty Hall Game, The Acquiring A Company Problem, And Multiparty Ultimatums, Avishalom Tor, Max Bazerman
Focusing Failures In Competitive Environments: Explaining Decision Errors In The Monty Hall Game, The Acquiring A Company Problem, And Multiparty Ultimatums, Avishalom Tor, Max Bazerman
Journal Articles
This paper offers a unifying conceptual explanation for failures in competitive decision-making across three seemingly unrelated tasks: the Monty Hall game (Nalebuff, 1987), the Acquiring a Company problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985), and multiparty ultimatums (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997). We argue that the failures observed in these three tasks have a common root. Specifically, due to a limited focus of attention, competitive decision-makers fail properly to consider all of the information needed to solve the problem correctly. Using protocol analyses, we show that competitive decision-makers tend to focus on their own goals, often to the exclusion of the decisions …