Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Law

“Whimsy Little Contracts” With Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis Of Consumer Understanding Of Arbitration Agreements, Jeff Sovern Feb 2015

“Whimsy Little Contracts” With Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis Of Consumer Understanding Of Arbitration Agreements, Jeff Sovern

Jeff Sovern

Arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous in consumer contracts. These arbitration clauses require consumers to waive the constitutional right to a civil jury, access to court, and, increasingly, the procedural remedy of class representation. Because those rights cannot be divested without consent, the validity of arbitration agreements rests on the premise of consent. Consumers who do not want to arbitrate or waive their class rights can simply decline to purchase the products or services covered by an arbitration agreement. But the premise of consent is undermined if consumers do not understand the effect on their procedural rights of clicking a box …


Law Student Laptop Use In Class For Non-Class Purposes: Temptation V. Incentives, Jeff Sovern May 2012

Law Student Laptop Use In Class For Non-Class Purposes: Temptation V. Incentives, Jeff Sovern

Jeff Sovern

LAW STUDENT LAPTOP USE DURING CLASS FOR NON-CLASS PURPOSES: TEMPTATION v. INCENTIVES Jeff Sovern St. John’s University School of Law This article reports on how law students use laptops, based on observations of 1072 laptop users (though there was considerable overlap among those users from one class to another) during 60 sessions of six law school courses. Some findings: • More than half the upper-year students seen using laptops employed them for non-class purposes more than half the time, raising serious questions about how much they learned from class. By contrast, first-semester Civil Procedure students used laptops for non-class purposes …


Law Student Laptop Use During Class For Non-Class Purposes: Temptation V. Incentives, Jeff Sovern Mar 2012

Law Student Laptop Use During Class For Non-Class Purposes: Temptation V. Incentives, Jeff Sovern

Jeff Sovern

ABSTRACT LAW STUDENT LAPTOP USE DURING CLASS FOR NON-CLASS PURPOSES: TEMPTATION v. INCENTIVES Jeff Sovern St. John’s University School of Law This article reports on how law students use laptops, based on observations of 1072 laptop users (though there was considerable overlap among those users from one class to another) during 60 sessions of six law school courses. Some findings: • More than half the upper-year students seen using laptops employed them for non-class purposes more than half the time, raising serious questions about how much they learned from class. By contrast, first-semester Civil Procedure students used laptops for non-class …


Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law Or How The Truth In Lending Act Failed The Subprime Borrowers, Jeff Sovern Mar 2012

Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law Or How The Truth In Lending Act Failed The Subprime Borrowers, Jeff Sovern

Jeff Sovern

This paper argues that one cause of the current economic crisis was that the federal Truth in Lending Act failed to provide mortgage borrowers with the tools to determine whether they would be able to meet their loan obligations, and that as a result many borrowers assumed loans on which they would later default. The paper first explores the disclosures for adjustable rate mortgages—which were commonly used for subprime loans—and explains how those disclosures misled borrowers about their monthly payments. Next, the paper reports on a survey of mortgage brokers conducted in July of 2009. The brokers were nearly unanimous …


Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law Or How The Truth In Lending Act Failed The Subprime Borrowers, Jeff Sovern Mar 2012

Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law Or How The Truth In Lending Act Failed The Subprime Borrowers, Jeff Sovern

Jeff Sovern

This paper argues that one cause of the current economic crisis was that the federal Truth in Lending Act failed to provide mortgage borrowers with the tools to determine whether they would be able to meet their loan obligations, and that as a result many borrowers assumed loans on which they would later default. The paper first explores the disclosures for adjustable rate mortgages—which were commonly used for subprime loans—and explains how those disclosures misled borrowers about their monthly payments. Next, the paper reports on a survey of mortgage brokers conducted in July of 2009. The brokers were nearly unanimous …


The Coase Theorem And The Power To Increase Transaction Costs, Jeff Sovern Feb 2009

The Coase Theorem And The Power To Increase Transaction Costs, Jeff Sovern

Jeff Sovern

The Coase Theorem maintains that in the absence of transaction costs, in Francesco Parisi's words, "regardless of the initial allocation of property rights and choice of remedial protection, the market will determine ultimate allocations of legal entitlements, based on their relative value to different parties." The paper explores the consequences for Coase's Theorem when a party without the initial allocation of a property right can manipulate the transaction costs of the party with the initial allocation in asserting that right. A party wishing to obtain the ultimate entitlement may find it preferable not to purchase the entitlement but to increase …


Rankings: A Dramatization Of The Incentives Created By Ranking Law Schools, Jeff Sovern Jun 2008

Rankings: A Dramatization Of The Incentives Created By Ranking Law Schools, Jeff Sovern

Jeff Sovern

Rankings: A Dramatization of the Incentives Created by Ranking Law Schools Sellers in a competitive market shift resources from attributes buyers don't care about to attributes buyers do care about. In markets in which buyers rely on imperfect signals for quality, sellers move resources away from improving the quality of their product to enhancing the illusion of quality. For example, before freshness dating, when consumers tested the freshness of bread by squeezing it, bakers reportedly added chemicals to bread to preserve its softness longer, thereby creating the illusion of freshness. Similarly, law school rankings encourage schools to shift resources away …


Rankings: A Dramatization Of The Incentives Created By Ranking Law Schools, Jeff Sovern Mar 2008

Rankings: A Dramatization Of The Incentives Created By Ranking Law Schools, Jeff Sovern

Jeff Sovern

Rankings: A Dramatization of the Incentives Created by Ranking Law Schools Sellers in a competitive market shift resources from attributes buyers don't care about to attributes buyers do care about. In markets in which buyers rely on imperfect signals for quality, sellers move resources away from improving the quality of their product to enhancing the illusion of quality. For example, before freshness dating, when consumers tested the freshness of bread by squeezing it, bakers reportedly added chemicals to bread to preserve its softness longer, thereby creating the illusion of freshness. Similarly, law school rankings encourage schools to shift resources away …