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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Executive Compensation In Controlled Companies, Kobi Kastiel
Indiana Law Journal
Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common understanding by proposing a different view based on an agency problem paradigm. Controlling shareholders, this Article suggests, may in fact overpay managers in order to maximize controllers’ consumption of private benefits, due to their close social and business ties with professional managers or for other reasons, such as being captured by professional managers. This tendency to overpay managers is …
Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment, Adi Ayal, Uri Benoliel
Good-Cause Statutes Revisited: An Empirical Assessment, Adi Ayal, Uri Benoliel
Indiana Law Journal
One of the most vital debates in franchise law focuses on whether state or federal law should adopt “good-cause statutes” (GCSs), which require franchisors to show good cause before terminating contractual relations with a franchisee. The traditional law-and-economics analysis suggests that GCSs are inefficient. This inefficiency argument is based upon one central hypothesis: GCSs increase franchisee free riding since they limit the franchisor’s ability to terminate the franchise contract easily. The free-riding hypothesis has been significantly influential in the development of franchise law, as is evident in state and federal statutory regimes. To date, the majority of states and the …
Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, Jason Iuliano
Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, Jason Iuliano
Indiana Law Journal
Despite two hundred years of jurisprudence on the topic of corporate personhood, the Supreme Court has failed to endorse a philosophically defensible theory of the corporation. In this Article, I attempt to fill that void. Drawing upon the extensive philosophical literature on personhood and group agency, I argue that corporations qualify as persons in their own right. This leads me to answer the titular question with an emphatic yes. Contrary to how it first seems, that conclusion does not warrant granting expansive constitutional rights to corporations. It actually suggests the opposite. Using the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate as a …
Ceo Stock Ownership Policies: Rhetoric And Reality, Nitzan Shilon
Ceo Stock Ownership Policies: Rhetoric And Reality, Nitzan Shilon
Indiana Law Journal
This Article is the first academic endeavor to analyze the efficacy and transparency of stock ownership policies (SOPs) in U.S. public firms. SOPs generally require managers to hold some of their firms’ stock for the long term. Following the 2008 financial crisis, firms universally adopted these policies and cited them more than any other policy as a key element in their mitigation of risk. However, my analysis of the recent SOPs of S&P 500 CEOs disputes what firms claim about these policies. First, I find that SOPs are extremely ineffectual in making CEOs hold on to their firm’s stock; this …