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Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Contractual consent

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...And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1994

...And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Part I, the author contends that when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractual consent, they are missing the crucial problem of legitimacy. In Parts II and IV, he responds to the criticisms of his consent theory of contract advanced by Jay Feinman and Dennis Patterson. Both Feinman and Patterson object to the enterprise in which the author and others are engaging, and he explains why each is wrong to dismiss the current debate over default rules. Finally, in contrast, in Part III the author shows how Steven Burton's theory of default rules, which he finds most congenial, is …


The Power Of Presumptions, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1994

The Power Of Presumptions, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Once you start to notice it, you see it everywhere. Burden-shifting is pervasive.The author began to notice the power of presumptions when examining how to protect the rights "retained by the people" referred to in the Ninth Amendment without having to enumerate each one. He proposed the creation of a "presumption of liberty" that would extend the same protective presumption now accorded freedom of speech to all other rightful exercises of liberty. This presumption would shift the burden to the government to justify as necessary and proper any restriction on the rightful exercise of any liberty.


The Sound Of Silence: Default Rules And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1992

The Sound Of Silence: Default Rules And Contractual Consent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of "gap-filling in the absence of consent" by showing how the concept of default rules bolsters the theoretical importance of consent. He accomplishes this by expanding and refining his analysis of a "consent theory of contract." The author proposes that the concept of default rules reveals consent to be operating at two distinct levels of contract theory. First, the presence of consent to be legally bound is essential to justify the legal enforcement of any default rules. Second, nested within this overall consent to be legally bound, consent also operates to …