Law Commons^™

Russia’S Contract Arbitrage, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Ukraine is poised to restructure its debt, but Russia may hold the best cards in the negotiation. Russia bought $3 billion in Ukrainian Eurobonds in late 2013 to prop up a political ally, since-deposed. As Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has pointed out, these bonds have unique terms that let Russia call for early repayment, putting it ahead of Ukraine’s private creditors. Meanwhile, Russia and its proxies hold enough bonds to block a restructuring vote or hold out, sticking more losses on other creditors. Russia has refused to restructure the bonds in the Paris Club of government-to-government creditors, claiming that …

Overrides: The Super-Study, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Overrides should be of interest to a far larger group of scholars than statutory interpretation enthusiasts. We have, in overrides, open inter branch encounters between Congress and the Courts far more typically found in the shadows of everyday Washington politics. Interestingly, Christiansen and Eskridge posit the court-congress relationship as more triadic than dyadic given the role played by agencies. One of their more interesting conclusions is that agencie are the big winners in the override game: agencies were present in seventy percent of the override cases and the agency view prevailed with Congress and against the Supreme Court in three-quarters …

Bond V. United States: Concurring In The Judgment, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Bond v. United States presented the deep constitutional question of whether a treaty can increase the legislative power of Congress. Unfortunately, a majority of the Court managed to sidestep the constitutional issue by dodgy statutory interpretation. But the other three Justices—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—all wrote important concurrences in the judgment, grappling with the constitutional issues presented. In particular, Justice Scalia’s opinion (joined by Justice Thomas), is a masterpiece, eloquently demonstrating that Missouri v. Holland is wrong and should be overruled: a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress.

The Constitution And Legislative History, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this article, the author provides an extended analysis of the constitutional claims against legislative history, arguing that, under textualists’ own preference for constitutional text, the use of legislative history should be constitutional to the extent it is supported by Congress’s rulemaking power, a constitutionally enumerated power.

This article has five parts. In part I, the author explains the importance of this question, considering the vast range of cases to which this claim of unconstitutionality could possibly apply—after all, statutory interpretation cases are the vast bulk of the work of the federal courts. She also explains why these claims should …

The Judicial Duty To Scrutinize Legislation, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Declaration of Independence famously declared, “[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.” It then affirmed “[t]hat to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.” This last sentence has proven to be problematic.

If “consent of the governed” means the consent of a majority of “We the people,” then the “consent of the governed” can be used to violate the unalienable …

Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent And History, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article argues that theorists and practitioners of statutory interpretation should rethink two very basic concepts—legislative intent and legislative history. Textualists urge that to look to legislative history is to seek an intent that does not exist. This article argues we should put this objection to bed because, even if groups do not have minds, they have the functional equivalent of intent: they plan by using internal sequential procedures allowing them to project their collective actions forward in time. What we should mean by legislative “intent” is legislative “context.” For a group, context includes how groups act—their procedures. Once one …