Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Process-Based Preemption, Bradford R. Clark
Process-Based Preemption, Bradford R. Clark
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The question of preemption arises because the Constitution establishes a federal system with two governments (one federal and one state) that have overlapping power to regulate the same matters involving the same parties in the same territory. To succeed, such a system requires a means of deciding when federal law displaces state law. The Founders chose the Supremacy Clause (reinforced by Article III) to perform this function. Although seemingly one-sided, the Clause actually incorporates several important political and procedural safeguards designed to preserve the proper balance between the governance prerogatives of the federal government and the states. It does this …
The Federal Common Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark
The Federal Common Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Courts and scholars have vigorously debated the proper role of customary international law in American courts: To what extent should it be considered federal common law, state law, or general law? The debate has reached something of an impasse, in part because various positions rely on, but also are in tension with, historical practice and constitutional structure. This Article describes the role that the law of nations actually has played throughout American history. In keeping with the original constitutional design, federal courts for much of that history enforced certain rules respecting other nations' "perfect rights" (or close analogues) under the …
A Collective Action Perspective On Ceiling Preemption By Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case Of Global Climate Change, Robert L. Glicksman, Richard E. Levy
A Collective Action Perspective On Ceiling Preemption By Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case Of Global Climate Change, Robert L. Glicksman, Richard E. Levy
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
In an era of regulatory skepticism, proponents of regulation in general and environmental regulation in particular face a number of new political and legal hurdles, particularly at the federal level. Frustrated with federal inaction or weak federal regulation, it is increasingly common for states and local governments to adopt environmental laws that seek to provide greater environmental protection. The critical question is when federal environmental law provides a ceiling, preempting such state regulatory programs. In this article, which is part of a forthcoming symposium on federal preemption in the Northwestern Law Review, Professors Glicksman and Levy develop a framework for …
Erie's Constitutional Source, Bradford R. Clark
Erie's Constitutional Source, Bradford R. Clark
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The constitutional rationale of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins has remained elusive for almost seventy years. Three decades ago, Paul Mishkin argued in a brief but influential article that Erie rests on "constitutional principles which restrain the power of the federal courts to intrude upon the states' determination of substantive policy in areas which the Constitution and Congress have left to state competence." Professor Mishkin wrote his article in response to John Hart Ely's insightful analysis of Erie published earlier the same year. Mishkin understood Erie as imposing a constitutional restraint on the federal courts, but read Ely as treating …
Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, And The Eighth Amendment, Bradford R. Clark
Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, And The Eighth Amendment, Bradford R. Clark
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The Supreme Court recently resolved a longstanding split in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence when it declared that the cruel and unusual punishments clause delegates to federal courts broad discretion to exercise independent judgment to evaluate the propriety of punishments authorized by state law. The Court claimed authority to displace a punishment - however widely employed - based on the Court's own assessment of the penological effectiveness of the punishment and the moral culpability of the particular class of offenders. Notably, the Court did not, and has not in the modern era, attempted to justify its approach in terms of either …