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Full-Text Articles in Law
Process-Based Preemption, Bradford R. Clark
Process-Based Preemption, Bradford R. Clark
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The question of preemption arises because the Constitution establishes a federal system with two governments (one federal and one state) that have overlapping power to regulate the same matters involving the same parties in the same territory. To succeed, such a system requires a means of deciding when federal law displaces state law. The Founders chose the Supremacy Clause (reinforced by Article III) to perform this function. Although seemingly one-sided, the Clause actually incorporates several important political and procedural safeguards designed to preserve the proper balance between the governance prerogatives of the federal government and the states. It does this …
Textualism And Jurisdiction, Peter J. Smith
Textualism And Jurisdiction, Peter J. Smith
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
Recent legislation has reinvigorated the scholarly debate over the proper relationship between Congress and the federal courts in matters of federal-court jurisdiction. The traditional view of jurisdiction-stripping is that Congress has virtually plenary power to determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Others have argued that there are substantial limits on Congress's authority to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over certain matters. A similar debate has raged over the obligation of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction that Congress ostensibly has conferred. Since the debate over Congress's role in crafting a jurisdictional regime last flared in full force, textualism has …
Judicial Interpretation In The Cost-Benefit Crucible, Jonathan R. Siegel
Judicial Interpretation In The Cost-Benefit Crucible, Jonathan R. Siegel
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
This article responds to Professor Adrian Vermeule's new book, Judging Under Uncertainty. Professor Vermeule argues that (1) no one can empirically determine whether judicial use of legislative history or other interpretive methods that go beyond simple enforcement of plain text has any positive net benefits, but (2) we do know that such interpretive methods impose costs, and therefore (3) courts should discard such interpretive methods. This article suggests that (1) it is far from clear how costly these interpretive methods are, (2) it is also not clear that discarding them would result in any cost savings, both because of costs …
Estoppel And Textualism, Gregory E. Maggs
Estoppel And Textualism, Gregory E. Maggs
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
How might judges who purport to adhere to textualism justify their use of estoppel to affect the application of statutes that say nothing about estoppel? This essay addresses this question. It considers six possible arguments that courts have made or might make to rationalize the recognition of unwritten exceptions to statutes in the name of estoppel. These arguments include the following: (1) Even though the statutory provision at issue says nothing about estoppel, some other legislation expressly authorizes courts to invoke equitable principles, including estoppel; (2) The legislation contains an implied term authorizing the application of estoppel principles; (3) Courts …
The Polymorphic Principle And The Judicial Role In Statutory Interpretation, Jonathan R. Siegel
The Polymorphic Principle And The Judicial Role In Statutory Interpretation, Jonathan R. Siegel
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The Supreme Court's statutory interpretation cases present an ongoing clash between mechanical, textualist, rule-based interpretive methods that seek to limit the role of judicial choice and more flexible methods that call upon courts to exercise intelligent judgment. In the recent case of Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005), the mechanical view of judging prevailed. The Court applied a purported canon of statutory construction that requires that a single phrase in a single statutory provision must always have a single meaning. The Court said that any other interpretive approach would be novel and dangerous. The Court is wrong on …
Patterns Of Drafting Errors In The Uniform Commercial Code And How Courts Should Respond To Them, Gregory E. Maggs
Patterns Of Drafting Errors In The Uniform Commercial Code And How Courts Should Respond To Them, Gregory E. Maggs
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
This article identifies eight recurring patterns of drafting in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). For each of these patterns, and for other idiosyncratic errors, the article recommends specific judicial responses. These responses take advantage of many of the UCC's unique characteristics. While the problem of drafting errors in the UCC may seem minor in light of the model code's high overall quality, the suggested responses can lead to a more efficient and effective application of the statute.