Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Can The Law Track Scientific Risk And Technological Innovation?: The Problem Of Regulatory Definitions And Nanotechnology, David A. Dana
Can The Law Track Scientific Risk And Technological Innovation?: The Problem Of Regulatory Definitions And Nanotechnology, David A. Dana
Faculty Working Papers
The functioning of a regulatory regime often turns on what is defined to be included in the scope of regulation and what is defined to be outside. In constructing the definitions of what is regulated, two key challenges are to align the defintions with the risks that motivated the establishment of the regulatory regime and to build in dynamism into the defintions so that they adapt to changes in scientific understanding and technology. This Chapter of a forthcoming book from Cambridge University Press (David Dana, ed., The Nanotechnology Challenge), explores these challnegs in the context of nanotechnology.
Fcc Regulation And Increased Ownership Concentration In The Radio Industry, Peter Dicola
Fcc Regulation And Increased Ownership Concentration In The Radio Industry, Peter Dicola
Faculty Working Papers
In 1996, Congress increased the limits on how many radio stations one firm can own within a single "radio market." To enforce these limits, the FCC used an idiosyncratic method of defining radio markets, based on the complex geometry of the signal contour patterns of radio stations' broadcasts. Using a unique geographic data set, this paper provides the first calculations of the pre- and post-1996 limits on local radio ownership as actually implemented by the FCC. The limits are surprisingly permissive and vary considerably from city to city. While the limits were seldom binding on radio firms, I find a …
Selection Neglect In Mutual Fund Advertisements, Jonathan Koehler, Molly Mercer
Selection Neglect In Mutual Fund Advertisements, Jonathan Koehler, Molly Mercer
Faculty Working Papers
Mutual fund companies selectively advertise their better-performing funds. However, investors respond to advertised performance data as if those data were unselected (i.e., representative of the population). We identify the failure to discount selected or potentially selected data as selection neglect. We examine these phenomena in an archival study (Study 1) and two controlled experiments (Studies 2 and 3). Study 1 identifies selection bias in mutual fund advertising by showing that the median performance rank for advertised funds is between the 79th and 100th percentile. Study 2 finds that both novice investors and financial professionals fall victim to selection neglect in …
When Less Liability May Mean More Precaution: The Case Of Nanotechnology, David A. Dana
When Less Liability May Mean More Precaution: The Case Of Nanotechnology, David A. Dana
Faculty Working Papers
The heart of the Article is an exploration of the possible role of common law tort liability in both encouraging and deterring voluntary, precautionary study of new products generally and nanotechnology products in particular. A key variable in considering liability's role as an incentive or deterrent to testing is the manufacturer's subjective assessment of the probability that any injuries from its product would be detected by the injured parties and successfully attributed to the product absent research by the manufacturer itself on the adverse effects of the product. Another key variable is the legal standard for tort liability, and specifically …
The Contextual Rationality Of The Precautionary Principle, David A. Dana
The Contextual Rationality Of The Precautionary Principle, David A. Dana
Faculty Working Papers
This article defines the precautionary principle (PP) primarily based on what it is not: it is not quantitative cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or cost-cost analysis of the sort we associate with the Office of Management and Budget in the United States and U.S. policymaking and policy discourse generally. In this definition, the PP is a form of analysis in which the costs of a possible environmental or health risk are not quantified, or if they are, any quantification is likely to be inadequate to capture the full extent of the costs of not taking regulatory measures to mitigate or avoid the …
A Single-License Approach To Regulating Insurance, Henry N. Butler, Larry E. Ribstein
A Single-License Approach To Regulating Insurance, Henry N. Butler, Larry E. Ribstein
Faculty Working Papers
State regulation of insurance companies has been criticized for many years because of the burden imposed on insurers by having to comply with the laws of many jurisdictions. These higher costs are passed on to consumers. The problems with the current regulatory structure are prompting calls for increased federal regulation of insurance. However, all proposals to federalize insurance regulation create opportunities for abuse at the hands of the federal government and fail to utilize the benefits of a federal system. This article shows how many of the problems of the current system can be addressed without resorting to a large …
Gatekeeper Incentive Compensation, Sharon Hannes
Gatekeeper Incentive Compensation, Sharon Hannes
Faculty Working Papers
A massive wave of corporate fraud at the beginning of the twenty first century exposed the failure of corporate gatekeepers. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation accordingly targeted gatekeepers, primarily auditors, by imposing strict regulation and enhanced independence guidelines. This legislative remedy is of disputable benefit while its costs have been huge. This paper maintains that a certain type of auditor incentive compensation could work better than regulation. Under such an alternative scheme, auditors would defer a portion of the payment they receive from the client firm, which would be used to purchase shares in the client after their tenure as auditor has …