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Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Corporate Governance Beyond Economics, Elizabeth Pollman Jan 2019

Corporate Governance Beyond Economics, Elizabeth Pollman

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In recent years, changes to state and federal law have increased pressure on corporate law to serve as an ordering mechanism for interests and values beyond economics. On the federal front, two U.S. Supreme Court cases have put existing corporate law in a new quasi-constitutional light. In the landmark decisions of Citizens United v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court has pointed to state corporate law as the mechanism for ordering political and religious activity. In addition, Congress, the SEC, and federal courts have been embroiled in battles about the scope and appropriateness of ...


Corporate Disobedience, Elizabeth Pollman Jan 2019

Corporate Disobedience, Elizabeth Pollman

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Corporate law has long taken a dim view of corporate lawbreaking. Corporations can be chartered only for lawful activity. Contemporary case law characterizes intentional violations of law as a breach of the fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty. While recognizing that rule breaking raises significant social and moral concerns, this Article suggests that corporate law and academic debate have overlooked important aspects of corporate disobedience. This Article provides an overview of corporate disobedience and illuminates the role that it has played in entrepreneurship and legal change. Corporations violate laws for a variety of reasons, including as part of efforts ...


Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, Elizabeth Pollman Jan 2016

Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, Elizabeth Pollman

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Supreme Court has recently decided some of the most important and controversial cases involving the federal rights of corporations in over two hundred years of jurisprudence. In rulings ranging from corporate political spending to religious liberty rights, the Court has dramatically expanded the zone in which corporations can act free from regulation. This Article argues these decisions represent a doctrinal shift, even from previous cases granting rights to corporations. The modern corporate rights doctrine has put unprecedented weight on state corporate law to act as a mechanism for resolving disputes among corporate participants regarding the expressive and religious activity ...


A Corporate Right To Privacy, Elizabeth Pollman Jan 2014

A Corporate Right To Privacy, Elizabeth Pollman

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The debate over the scope of constitutional protections for corporations has exploded with commentary on recent or pending Supreme Court cases, but scholars have left unexplored some of the hardest questions for the future, and the ones that offer the greatest potential for better understanding the nature of corporate rights. This Article analyzes one of those questions — whether corporations have, or should have, a constitutional right to privacy. First, the Article examines the contours of the question in Supreme Court jurisprudence and provides the first scholarly treatment of the growing body of conflicting law in the lower courts on this ...


Lyondell: A Note Of Approbation, William W. Bratton Jan 2010

Lyondell: A Note Of Approbation, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter Jan 2008

Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle And The Modern Corporation, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William W. Bratton Jan 2008

Private Equity's Three Lessons For Agency Theory, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2008

On Beyond Calpers: Survey Evidence On The Developing Role Of Public Pension Funds In Corporate Governance, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look At The Financial Accounting Standards Board, William W. Bratton Jan 2007

Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look At The Financial Accounting Standards Board, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”) presents a puzzle: How has this private standard setter managed simultaneously (1) to remain independent, (2) to achieve institutional stability and legitimacy, and (3) to operate in a politicized context in the teeth of op-position from its own constituents? This Article looks to governance design to account for this institutional success. The FASB’s founders made a strategic choice to create a regulatory agency that sought independence rather than political responsiveness. The FASB also set out a coherent theory of accounting, the “Conceptual Framework,” to contain and direct its decisions. The Conceptual Framework ...


Fiduciary Duties And The Analyst Scandals, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2007

Fiduciary Duties And The Analyst Scandals, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2007

Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2007

Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Regulators responded to the analyst scandals of the late 1990s by imposing extensive new rules on the research industry. These rules include a requirement forcing financial firms to separate investment banking operations from research. Regulators argued, with questionable empirical support, that the reforms were necessary to eliminate analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of sell-side research.

By eliminating investment banking revenues as a source for funding research, the reforms have had substantial effects. Research coverage of small issuers has been dramatically reduced—the vast majority of small capitalization firms now have no coverage at all. The market for ...


Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role Of Shareholder Primacy, Jill E. Fisch Apr 2006

Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role Of Shareholder Primacy, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth. Law and economics scholars have incorporated the shareholder primacy norm into their empirical analyses of regulatory efficiency. An increasingly influential body of scholarship uses empirical methodology to evaluate legal rules that allocate power within the corporation. By embracing the shareholder primacy norm, empirical scholars offer normative assessments about regulatory choices based on the effect of legal rules on measures of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits, and Tobin’s Q.

This Article challenges the foundations of using the shareholder primacy norm to judge ...


The Equilibrium Content Of Corporate Federalism, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Jan 2006

The Equilibrium Content Of Corporate Federalism, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The "Bad Man" Goes To Washington: The Effect Of Political Influence On Corporate Duty, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2006

The "Bad Man" Goes To Washington: The Effect Of Political Influence On Corporate Duty, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton Jan 2005

Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Commment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2005

Institutional Competition To Regulate Corporations: A Commment On Macey, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


How Do Corporations Play Politics? The Fedex Story, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2005

How Do Corporations Play Politics? The Fedex Story, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton Jan 2005

The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey Jan 2004

The Role Of Government In Corporate Governance, Cary Coglianese, Elizabeth K. Keating, Michael L. Michael, Thomas J. Healey

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Numerous corporate scandals in the past several years have fueled widespread debate over proposals for government action. The central challenge for government is how to restore corporate integrity and market confidence without overreacting and stifling the dynamism that underlies a strong economy. To examine this challenge, the Center for Business and Government's Regulatory Policy Program organized a conference in May 2004 on The Role of Government in Corporate Governance. The conference brought together government officials, business leaders, and academic researchers to discuss three fundamental public policy issues raised by recent corporate abuses. First, who should regulate corporate management - government ...


The New Federal Regulation Of Corporate Governance, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2004

The New Federal Regulation Of Corporate Governance, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen Jan 2003

Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.

This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the ...


How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal For Securities Intermediaries, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2003

How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal For Securities Intermediaries, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile Jan 2003

The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.


Aggregation, Auctions, And Other Developments In The Selection Of Lead Counsel Under The Pslra, Jill E. Fisch Apr 2001

Aggregation, Auctions, And Other Developments In The Selection Of Lead Counsel Under The Pslra, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Berle And Means Reconsidered At The Century's Turn, William W. Bratton Apr 2001

Berle And Means Reconsidered At The Century's Turn, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, And The Role Of The Plaintiff, Jill E. Fisch Oct 1997

Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, And The Role Of The Plaintiff, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Jan 1997

An Inquiry Into The Efficiency Of The Limited Liability Company: Of Theory Of The Firm And Regulatory Competition, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton Jan 1993

Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Frankenstein's Monster Hits The Campaign Trail: An Approach To Regulation Of Corporate Political Expenditures, Jill E. Fisch Jan 1991

Frankenstein's Monster Hits The Campaign Trail: An Approach To Regulation Of Corporate Political Expenditures, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.