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Full-Text Articles in Law

Will Delaware Be Different? An Empirical Study Of Tc Heartland And The Shift To Defendant Choice Of Venue, Ofer Eldar, Neel U. Sukhatme Jan 2018

Will Delaware Be Different? An Empirical Study Of Tc Heartland And The Shift To Defendant Choice Of Venue, Ofer Eldar, Neel U. Sukhatme

Faculty Scholarship

Why do some venues evolve into litigation havens while others do not? Venues might compete for litigation for various reasons, such as enhancing their judges’ prestige and increasing revenues for the local bar. This competition is framed by the party that chooses the venue. Whether plaintiffs or defendants primarily choose venue is crucial because, we argue, the two scenarios are not symmetrical.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods illustrates this dynamic. There, the Court effectively shifted venue choice in many patent infringement cases from plaintiffs to corporate defendants. We use TC Heartland to empirically measure …


Enhanced Damages For Patent Infringement: A Normative Approach, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2017

Enhanced Damages For Patent Infringement: A Normative Approach, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper takes a normative approach to patent infringement damages. Its underlying premise is that the goal of a damages regime should be to maximize society's welfare. Patent damages should therefore balance society's interest in encouraging innovation against the need to regulate infringement incentives. This balancing approach generates an optimal standard for awarding enhanced damages and guidelines for determining the size of the damages multiplier. On the legal standard, the approach developed here illuminates the factors that should be taken into consideration in the enhancement analysis, and, more importantly, the reasons those factors should be considered. On the precise size …


Brief Of Amici Curiae 56 Professors Of Law And Economics In Support Of Petition Of Writ Of Certiorari, John R. Allison, Margo Bagley, James Bessen, Jeremy Bock, Daniel H. Brean, Michael A. Carrier, Michael W. Carroll, Bernard Chao, Tun-Jen Chiang, Colleen V. Chien, Andrew Chin, Robert Cook-Deegan, Md, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Dr. Dieter Ernst, Samuel F. Ernst, Robin C. Feldman, Lee Fleming, Brian Frye, William Gallagher, Shubha Ghosh, Eric Goldman, Bronwyn H. Hall, Yaniv Heled, Christian Helmers, Joachim Henkel, Susan Helper, Tim Holbrook, Herbert Hovenkamp, William Hubbard, Dr. Xavier Jaravel, Dennis S. Karjala, Peter Lee, Mark A. Lemley, David K. Levine, David S. Levine, Doug Lichtman, Yvette Joy Liebesman, Orly Lobel, Brian Love, Phil Malone, Michael J. Meurer, Dr. Shawn Miller, Matthew Mitchell, Susan Barbieri Montgomery, Sean Pager, Arti K. Rai, Jacob H. Rooksby, Jorge R. Roig, Matthew Sag, Pamela Samuelson, Ana Santos Rutschman, Lea Bishop Shaver, Toshiko Takenaka, John L. Turner, Jennifer Urban, Eric Von Hippel Jan 2016

Brief Of Amici Curiae 56 Professors Of Law And Economics In Support Of Petition Of Writ Of Certiorari, John R. Allison, Margo Bagley, James Bessen, Jeremy Bock, Daniel H. Brean, Michael A. Carrier, Michael W. Carroll, Bernard Chao, Tun-Jen Chiang, Colleen V. Chien, Andrew Chin, Robert Cook-Deegan, Md, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Dr. Dieter Ernst, Samuel F. Ernst, Robin C. Feldman, Lee Fleming, Brian Frye, William Gallagher, Shubha Ghosh, Eric Goldman, Bronwyn H. Hall, Yaniv Heled, Christian Helmers, Joachim Henkel, Susan Helper, Tim Holbrook, Herbert Hovenkamp, William Hubbard, Dr. Xavier Jaravel, Dennis S. Karjala, Peter Lee, Mark A. Lemley, David K. Levine, David S. Levine, Doug Lichtman, Yvette Joy Liebesman, Orly Lobel, Brian Love, Phil Malone, Michael J. Meurer, Dr. Shawn Miller, Matthew Mitchell, Susan Barbieri Montgomery, Sean Pager, Arti K. Rai, Jacob H. Rooksby, Jorge R. Roig, Matthew Sag, Pamela Samuelson, Ana Santos Rutschman, Lea Bishop Shaver, Toshiko Takenaka, John L. Turner, Jennifer Urban, Eric Von Hippel

Faculty Scholarship

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or has a regular and established place of business and has infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The result has been rampant …


Patents At Issue: The Data Behind The Patent Troll Debate, Jonathan H. Ashtor, Michael J. Mazzeo, Samantha Zyontz Jan 2014

Patents At Issue: The Data Behind The Patent Troll Debate, Jonathan H. Ashtor, Michael J. Mazzeo, Samantha Zyontz

Faculty Scholarship

The debate over "patent trolls"' is raging at full tilt and its fury is stoked by fundamental questions about patent assertion. Both sides are struggling to understand which patent assertion practices are consistent with the purpose of patent rights and which are abusive and result in net social costs. This Article addresses patent assertion concretely through empirical analysis of actual infringement awards. In particular, this Article studies all awards granted for findings of patent infringement in U.S. district courts between 1995 and 2011, and, with targeted analyses, focuses on cases involving patent assertion entities ("PAEs"). This Article specifically investigates certain …


A Unified Framework For Competition Policy And Innovation Policy, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2014

A Unified Framework For Competition Policy And Innovation Policy, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

I describe a model of competition law enforcement that treats competition and innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to be. The enforcement authority determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it sets the penalty too high it will reduce firms’ incentives to invest in innovation, and if firms do not invest, new goods and new markets will not be created. The authority therefore moderates the penalty in order to maintain innovation incentives. The implications of this framework for competition policy and for innovation policy are quite different from what is commonly observed today. I discuss implications for competition …


Do Npes Matter? Non-Practicing Entities And Patent Litigation Outcomes, Samantha Zyontz, Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan H. Ashtor Nov 2013

Do Npes Matter? Non-Practicing Entities And Patent Litigation Outcomes, Samantha Zyontz, Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan H. Ashtor

Faculty Scholarship

It is widely argued that so-called “patent trolls” are corrupting the U.S. patent system and endangering technology innovation and commercialization at large. For example, a recent White House report argued that “trolls” hurt firms of all sizes and advocated for specific policies aimed at curtailing practices thought to be particularly harmful. Yet the existence and extent of any systematic effects of so-called “troll-like” behavior, and the implications of modern patent assertion practices by Non-Practicing Entities (“NPEs”), remains unclear. This article develops novel empirical evidence to inform the debate over NPEs on patent litigation. Specifically, we conduct a large-scale empirical analysis …


Injunctive And Reverse Settlements In Competition-Blocking Litigation, Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho Oct 2013

Injunctive And Reverse Settlements In Competition-Blocking Litigation, Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho

Faculty Scholarship

We distinguish standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, which prohibit the defendant's activity. The reverse (payment) settlement is a special type of injunctive settlement. We examine the divergence between private and social incentives to settle and policies that would minimize socially undesirable injunctive and reverse settlements (e.g., banning reverse settlements). The results are applied to competition-blocking litigation, such as patent infringement and antidumping.


Explaining The ‘Unpredictable’: An Empirical Analysis Of U.S. Patent Infringement Awards, Samantha Zyontz, Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan Hillel Aug 2013

Explaining The ‘Unpredictable’: An Empirical Analysis Of U.S. Patent Infringement Awards, Samantha Zyontz, Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan Hillel

Faculty Scholarship

Patent infringement awards are commonly thought to be unpredictable, which raises concerns that patents can lead to unjust enrichment and impede the progress of innovation. We investigate the unpredictability of patent damages by conducting a large-scale econometric analysis of award values. We begin by analyzing the outcomes of 340 cases decided in US federal courts between 1995 and 2008 in which infringement was found and damages were awarded. Our data include the amount awarded, along with information about the litigants, case specifics and economic value of the patents-at-issue. Using these data, we construct an econometric model that explains over 75% …


The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, Paul Gugliuzza May 2013

The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, Paul Gugliuzza

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals and, as a consequence, the last word on many legal issues important to innovation policy. This Article shows how the Federal Circuit augments its already significant power by impeding other government institutions from influencing the patent system. Specifically, the Federal Circuit has shaped patent-law doctrine, along with rules of jurisdiction, procedure, and administrative law, to preserve and expand the court’s power in four interinstitutional relationships: the court’s federalism relationship with state courts, its separation of powers relationship with the executive and legislative branches, its vertical …


The Private Costs Of Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer Oct 2012

The Private Costs Of Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This paper estimates the total cost of patent litigation to alleged infringers. We use a large sample of stock market event studies around the date of lawsuit filings for US public firms from 1984-99. We find that the total costs of litigation are much greater than legal fees and costs are large even for lawsuits that settle. Lawsuits cost alleged infringers about $28.7 million ($92) in the mean and $2.9 million in the median. Moreover, infringement risk rose sharply during the late 1990s to over 14% of R&D spending. Small firms have lower risk relative to R&D.


The Economics Of Injunctive And Reverse Settlements, Keith N. Hylton Apr 2010

The Economics Of Injunctive And Reverse Settlements, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper extends the economic literature on settlement and draws some practical insights on reverse payment settlements. The key contributions follow from the distinction drawn between standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, w and under which reverse settlements will be observed among injunctive settlements. Reverse settlements are likely when the stakes associated with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation costs. The analysis has broader implications for efficient remedies and legal rules. (JEL Kl0, K40, K41, D24, 034).


Our Uniform Patent System, Clarisa Long Jan 2008

Our Uniform Patent System, Clarisa Long

Faculty Scholarship

Patent reform arouses passions among the affected industries, whether they are plaintiffs or defendants, willing users or unwilling participants in the patent system. The key question, therefore, is: How should we structure the patent system in order to best promote innovation in the U.S. economy?


Contractual Expansion Of The Scope Of Patent Infringement Through Field-Of-Use Licensing, Mark R. Patterson Jan 2007

Contractual Expansion Of The Scope Of Patent Infringement Through Field-Of-Use Licensing, Mark R. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

Patentees sometimes license their inventions through field-of-use licenses, which permit licensees to use the inventions, but only in specified ways. Field-of-use licensing is often procompetitive, because the ability to provide different licensing terms for different users can encourage broader licensing of inventions. But in recent United States cases, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and lower courts have upheld field-of-use licenses prohibiting activities that licensees would otherwise have been permitted by patent law, such as the repair and resale of patented products. The recent cases rely on the Federal Circuit's decision in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., where the court …