Law Commons^™

Learned Hand's Copyright Law, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Learned Hand is often described as the greatest copyright judge to have ever sat on the bench. By the 1950s, the most important parts of U.S. copyright law had been his creation, all from his time as a judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Despite all of this, there has been little systematic analysis of Hand’s approach to copyright and of the reasons why his jurisprudence in multiple areas of copyright law have survived the test of time. This Article argues that the longevity, influence and canonical status of Hand’s contributions to copyright are closely tied to his …

The Classic Arguments For Free Speech 1644-1927, Vincent A. Blasi

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter examines the classic arguments for freedom of speech. It traces the first comprehensive argument for freedom of speech as a limiting principle of government to John Milton’s Areopagitica, a polemic against censorship by a requirement of prior licensing in which Milton develops an argument for the pursuit of truth through exposure to false and heretical ideas rather than the passive reception of orthodoxy. Despite Milton’s belief in the advancement of understanding through free inquiry, he was far from liberal in the modern sense of that term and he did not, for instance, extend the tolerance he advocated to …

Learned Hand On Statutory Interpretation: Theory And Practice, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

It is a great honor to take part in the celebration of the Second Circuit’s 125th anniversary and in particular to present the Hands Lecture. The Second Circuit in the 1930s and 1940s came to be called the “Hand Court,” and during those years it established its reputation as the most admired of the U.S. circuit courts of appeals. It was called the Hand Court because two of its judges, who often formed the majority on three-judge panels, bore the surname Hand. They were cousins. Augustus Hand was a few years older than Learned Hand but was appointed to the …

Traynor (Drennan) Versus Hand (Baird): Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Most Contracts casebooks feature either Baird v. Gimbel or Drennan v. Star Paving to illustrate the limits on revocability of an offer. In this article an analysis of the case law yields three major conclusions. First, as is generally known, in the contractor-subcontractor cases Drennan has prevailed. However, both it and its spawn, Restatement 2d E 87(2), have had almost no impact outside that narrow area. Moreover, almost all the cases involve public construction projects – private projects account for only about ten percent of the cases. This suggests that private parties have managed to resolve the problem contractually. Public …

Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, And Tradeoffs: A Closer Look At The Controversy, Kenneth Simons

Faculty Scholarship

What is the proper role of cost-benefit analysis in understanding the tort concept of negligence or reasonable care? A straightforward question, you might think. But it is a question that manages to elicit groans of exasperation from those on both sides of the controversy.

For most utilitarians and adherents to law and economics, the answer is obvious: to say that people should not be negligent is to say that they should minimize the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of preventing accidents. Under the economic formulation of the famous Learned Hand test, they should take a precaution …

Civil Rights And Civil Liberties: Whose “Rule Of Law”?, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Studying Deck Chairs On The Titanic, William L. Reynolds, William M. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Elitism, Expediency, And The New Certiorari: Requiem For The Learned Hand Tradition, William M. Richman, William L. Reynolds

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Paradoxes In Legal Thought, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

Traditional legal thought has generated few anomalies, antinomies, and paradoxes. These factual and logical tensions arise only when theorists press for a complete and comprehensive body of thought. Discrete, unconnected solutions to problems and particularized precedents spare us the logical tensions that have troubled scientific inquiry.

Anomalies arise from data that do not fit the prevailing scientific theory. Paradoxes and antinomies, on the other hand, reflect problems of logical rather than factual consistency. To follow Quine's definitions, paradoxes are contradictions that result from overlooking an accepted canon of consistent thought. They are resolved by pointing to the fallacy that generates …