Law Commons^™

Abandoning Animus, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay presents a preliminary set of arguments against the legal concept of animus grounded in actual practice. After considering the major reasons advanced in support of the animus approach as well as the main objections, I argue that the end of animus may come once we confront the limits of judicial capacity. First, judges have not been willing or able to resort to the animus rationale to call out bigotry where the evidence of hostility is robust. These failures suggest that projects founded upon judicial review to reduce hateful motivations may be overly optimistic. Second, on the occasions the …

Interpretation, Remedy, And The Rule Of Law: Why Courts Should Have The Courage Of Their Convictions, Jack M. Beermann, Ronald A. Cass

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex opens a window on a set of issues debated in different contexts for decades. These issues—how to interpret statutes and constitutional provisions, what sources to look to, whether so far as possible to adopt interpretations that avoid declaring actions of coordinate branches unconstitutional, and where such actions are deemed to have been unconstitutional whether to provide remedies that cabin the most significant implications of such a declaration—go to the heart of the judicial role and the division of responsibilities among the branches of government.

Our principal focus, however, is on the …

Why Judges Can't Save Democracy, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

In The Specter of Dictatorship,¹ David Driesen has written a learned, lively book about the dangers of autocracy, weaving together incisive observations about democratic backsliding in other countries with a piercing critique of American teetering on the brink of executive authoritarianism at home. Driesen draws deeply and faithfully on the extant literature on comparative constitutionalism and democracy studies. He also builds on the work of scholars of the American political system who have documented the largely one-way transfer of power over foreign affairs to the executive branch. Driesen's thesis has a slight originalist cast, holding that "the Founders aimed …

Shifting Standards Of Judicial Review During The Coronavirus Pandemic In The United States, Wendy K. Mariner

Faculty Scholarship

Emergencies are exceptions to the rule. Laws that respond to emergencies can create exceptions to rules that protect human rights. In long lasting emergencies, these exceptions can become the rule, diluting human rights and eroding the rule of law. In the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted states to change rules governing commercial and personal activities to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. Many governors’ executive orders were challenged as violations of the constitutionally protected rights of those affected. Judges are deciding whether emergencies can justify more restrictions than would be permitted in normal circumstances and whether some rights deserve …

Presidential Removal: The Marbury Problem And The Madison Solutions, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Marbury v. Madison is not just a puzzling judicial review precedent. It is also a puzzle about presidential removal. Why was it not taken for granted that Jefferson, Secretary of State Madison, or another executive official could simply fire Marbury? Why did Chief Justice Marshall also conclude in the unanimous decision that Marbury could not be removed?

This symposium essay summarizes recent research (especially by Jane Manners and Lev Menand) to solve this problem: an office appointed to a term of years restricted removal in the Anglo-American tradition, demonstrating that presidential removal was not a default rule. This essay also …

Chevron At The Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

This article looks at how Chevron deference has fared at the Supreme Court since John G. Roberts became Chief Justice. The article looks at Chevron deference at the Roberts Court from three distinct angles. First, the voting records of individual Justices in cases citing Chevron are examined to shed light on the strength of each Justice’s commitment to deference to agency statutory construction. Second, a select sample of opinions citing Chevron are qualitatively examined to see whether the Roberts Court has been any more successful than its predecessor in constructing a coherent Chevron doctrine. Third, the article looks closely at …

Liberty, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

"To secure the blessings of liberty," the Preamble to the US Constitution proclaims, "We the People . . . ordain and establish this Constitution." The Constitution is said to secure liberty through three principal strategies: the design of the Constitution as a whole; structural arrangements, most notably separation of powers andfederalism; and protection of rights. This chapter focuses on this third strategy of protecting liberty, in particular, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We first examine the several approaches taken to the "Incorporation" of certain basic liberties "enumerated" in the Bill of Rights to apply to the state governments. We …

Common Law And Statute Law In Administrative Law, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The largely statutory appearance of U.S. administrative law be surprising in light of the existence of the federal A Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).1 The APA, including its a amendments, is a relatively comprehensive guide to much of law in the United States. It contains the procedures agencies to follow in both rulemaking and adjudication and provisions on the availability and scope of judicial review of agency action. As includes open meeting and open file requirements as well as negotiated rulemaking and legislative review of agency rules generally held view that federal courts should not make com should act only …

End The Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed And Why It Can And Should Be Overruled, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, decided in 1984, the Supreme Court announced a startling new approach to judicial review of statutory interpretation by administrative agencies, which requires courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Although it was perhaps hoped that Chevron would simplify judicial review and increase deference to agency interpretation, the opposite has occurred. Chevron has complicated judicial review and at best it is uncertain whether it has resulted in increased deference to agency interpretation. In fact, for numerous reasons, Chevron has been a failure on any reasonable measure and should be overruled. Further, overruling Chevron …

Judicial Control Of The National Labor Relations Board's Lawmaking In The Age Of Chevron And Brand X, Michael C. Harper

Faculty Scholarship

This article analyzes and applies to Labor Board decision making the Court’s oft-cited 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The article argues that judicial review of Board decision making under Chevron, though limited, can still be sufficiently meaningful to control excessive shifts in Board lawmaking criticized by many commentators. The article explains why recent Supreme Court decisions reject any distinction between two theoretically distinct forms of agency discretionary lawmaking – (1) lawmaking through construction of the direct force of an ambiguous statute: and (2) lawmaking through the elaboration of law beyond that which is embodied in …

The Supreme Common Law Court Of The United States, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Supreme Court's primary role in the history of the United States, especially in constitutional cases (and cases hovering in the universe of the Constitution), has been to limit Congress's ability to redefine and redistribute rights in a direction most people would characterize as liberal. In other words, the Supreme Court, for most of the history of the United States since the adoption of the Constitution, has been a conservative force against change and redistribution. The Court has used five distinct devices to advance its control over the law. First, it has construed rights-creating constitutional provisions narrowly when those …

Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, Jack M. Beermann, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Supreme Court unanimously and stridently chastised the D.C. Circuit for forcing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to employ procedures such as discovery and cross-examination in a notice-and-comment rulemaking when no organic statute, regulation, or constitutional provision required it. Vermont Yankee is almost universally regarded as one of the most important administrative law decisions issued by the Supreme Court. For the past three decades, various scholars, most notably Paul Verkuil and Richard Pierce, have been anticipating, and urging, a "Vermont Yankee II," in which the Court would similarly invalidate …

Iredell Reclaimed: Farewell To Snowiss's History Of Judicial Review, Gerald F. Leonard

Faculty Scholarship

Even after the publication of Larry Kramer's The People Themselves, the early history of judicial review suffers from the unfortunate influence of Sylvia Snowiss's Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution. Snowiss misread, among other things, James Iredell's foundational argument in 1786 for the inevitability and necessity of judicial review. Snowiss claimed that early understandings of judicial review conceptualized it not as a legal doctrine but as a doctrine of political and revolutionary resistance. In fact, however, Iredell argued for judicial review as a straightforward, legalistic consequence of popular sovereignty. In Iredell's influential account, the transition from the British …

Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking The Constitution Seriously Outside The Courts, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Larry Sager and Larry Kramer have written important books that, in quite different ways, call for taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts. Sager's Justice in Plainclothes' and Kramer's The People Themselves2 nonetheless join issue in significant ways, and therefore it is illuminating to analyze them as a pair.

To get a handle on the differences between the two Larrys' books, I have concocted the following fanciful hypothetical. Imagine a law school with a faculty that includes Ronald Dworkin: court-centered constitutional theorist extraordinaire and proponent of a liberal moral reading of the American Constitution.3 Further imagine that the faculty includes …

Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, And Progressive Change, Linda C. Mcclain, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

This paper evaluates arguments made in Ran Hirschl's powerful and sobering book, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard, 2004). Studying Canada, Israel, South Africa, and New Zealand, Hirschl aims to dispel what he views as the hollow hopes that constitutionalism and judicial review will bring about progressive change around the world. If Gerald Rosenberg, in his book, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change, focused on the hollow hopes of liberals for social change securing, e.g., racial equality (Brown) and women's reproductive freedom (Roe), Hirschl focuses on hollow hopes for progressive economic change …

The Specificity Of International Arbitration: The Case For Faa Reform, William W. Park

Faculty Scholarship

If a pollster asked a random selection of Americans for a one-line verbal portrait of arbitration, common responses might include the following: (i) private litigation arising for construction and business disputes; (ii) a mechanism to resolve workplace tensions between management and labor; (iii) a process by which finance companies and stock brokers shield themselves from customer complaints; (iv) a way to level the playing field in deciding commercial controversies among companies from different parts of the world; (v) the way big corporations use NAFTA to escape regulation. To some extent all would be correct.'

Unfortunately, these different varieties of arbitration …

A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus And Deference On The Supreme Court, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has struck down federal statutes by a bare majority with unprecedented frequency. This Article shows that five-four decisions regularly overturning acts of Congress are a relatively recent phenomenon, whereas earlier Courts generally exercised judicial review by supermajority voting.

One option is to establish the following rule: The Supreme Court may not declare an act of Congress unconstitutional without a two-thirds majority. The Supreme Court itself could establish this rule internally, just as it has created its nonmajority rules for granting certiorari and holds, or one Justice who would otherwise be the fifth …

Marbury And Judicial Deference: The Shadow Of Whittington V. Polk And The Maryland Judiciary Battle, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

On the 200th anniversary of Whittington and approaching the 200th anniversary of Marbury, this article revisits these two decisions and challenges legal scholars' assumptions that they were such strong precedents for judicial review.⁵ When one takes into account the broader contexts, both decisions were in fact judicial capitulations to aggressive legislatures and executives. The Maryland General Court asserted its judicial supremacy only in dicta, and the court failed to enforce judicial supremacy when it was legally justified. This article picks apart the court's reasoning step by step, using Whittington to illuminate Marbury and Marbury to illuminate Whittington. …

The Natural Rights-Based Justification For Judicial Review, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

On this panel, we are to consider questions such as "What form should constitutional interpretation by courts take in light of our aspirations to a good society?" For example, should courts engage in "moral readings" of the Constitution by elaborating abstract moral principles of liberty and equality or by making moral arguments about fostering human goods or virtues? In his paper, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, Professor Michael Moore defends a sophisticated and powerful version of a moral realist or natural law answer to these questions.2 He confesses that, despite numerous criticisms, his views on the desirability …

The System Worked: Our Schizophrenic Stance On Welfare, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This is a review of Steven M. Teles's book, Whose Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics (University Press of Kansas, 1996), which argues that welfare policy reflects a dynamic of elite dissensus, in which public policy fails to reflect popular opinion. I make two central points in the review: first, there are reasons to believe that welfare policy does, in fact, reflect a deeply conflicted American electorate; and second, such a conflict may reveal a healthy deliberative order struggling to reconcile changing priorities with enduring values.

Choosing Judges The Democratic Way, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

A generation ago, the pressing question in constitutional law was the countermajoritarian difficulty.' Americans insisted their government was a democratic republic and took that to mean rule by a majority of elected representatives in various offices and bodies, federal and local. Yet courts whose members had not won election presumed to override the actions of executive and legislative officers who had. The conventional answer to this apparent paradox was the Constitution, which arguably owed its existence to the people directly. Judicial review was justified, accordingly, when court decisions were rooted firmly in the particular text, structure, or historical backdrop of …

Review Of Red, White, And Blue: A Critical Analysis Of Constitutional Law By Mark Tushnet, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Mark Tushnet's new book offers no such counsel. Mainly a critique of interpretative theories, its conclusions are profoundly skeptical. Tushnet's central claim is that judicial review and constitutional theory cannot possibly perform their assigned functions, and that liberalism is to blame. This review will focus on those facets of the book.

A Preface To Constitutional Theory, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

We have a plethora of theories about judicial review, including theories about theories, but their foundations require stricter scrutiny. This Essay presents some aspects of the problem through an examination of two important and familiar ideas about judicial review.

The controversy over "noninterpretive" review concerns the propriety of courts' deciding constitutional cases by using extraconstitutional norms. But the theoretical framework has not been well developed and appears to raise the wrong questions about judicial review. Thayer's doctrine of extreme judicial deference to the legislature has received much attention, but his reasoning has been given less careful notice. Thayer's rule rests …

The Case For Limiting Judicial Review Of Labor Board Certification Decisions, Michael C. Harper

Faculty Scholarship

Part I of this Article explains in more technical detail the effects of the present system of judicial review of Board certification decisions and how that system developed. Part II argues that this review should be sharply curtailed, suggesting that unless a court is able to rule that the Board has rendered a certification decision for an improper motive, it should reconsider that decision only to the extent it involves a constitutional issue, a narrow jurisdictional issue, or one of a few bounded technical issues. Such a curtailment of review should be embraced by all who remain sympathetic to the …