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Articles 1 - 23 of 23
Full-Text Articles in Law
Amazon's Pricing Paradox, Rory Van Loo, Nikita Aggarwal
Amazon's Pricing Paradox, Rory Van Loo, Nikita Aggarwal
Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust scholars have widely debated the apparent paradox of Amazon seemingly wielding monopoly power while offering low prices to consumers. A single company’s behavior thereby helped spark an intellectual renaissance as scholars debated why Amazon’s prices were so low, whether antitrust enforcers should intervene, and, eventually, how the field should be reformed for the era of large online platforms. One of the few things that all parties have agreed upon amidst those contentious conversations is that Amazon offers low prices. This Article challenges that assumption by demonstrating that Amazon charges higher prices than commonly understood. More importantly, unraveling the disconnect …
Climate Choice Architecture, Felix Mormann
Climate Choice Architecture, Felix Mormann
Faculty Scholarship
Personal choices drive global warming nearly as much as institutional decisions. Yet, policymakers overwhelmingly target large-scale industrial facilities for reductions in carbon emissions, with individual and household emissions a mere afterthought. Recent advances in behavioral economics, cognitive psychology, and related fields have produced a veritable behavior change revolution. Subtle changes to the choice environment, or nudges, have improved stake-holder decision-making in a wide range of contexts, from healthier food choices to better retirement planning. But the vast potential of choice architecture remains largely untapped for purposes of climate policy and action. This Article explores that untapped potential and makes the …
Price Gouging In A Pandemic, Christopher Buccafusco, Daniel Hemel, Eric L. Talley
Price Gouging In A Pandemic, Christopher Buccafusco, Daniel Hemel, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
The COVID-19 pandemic led to acute supply shortages across the country as well as concerns over price increases amid surging demand. In the process, it reawakened a debate about whether and how to regulate “price gouging” — a controversy that continues as inflation has accelerated even as the pandemic abates. Animating this debate is a longstanding conflict between laissez-faire economics, which champions price fluctuations as a means to allocate scarce goods, and perceived norms of consumer fairness, which are thought to cut strongly against sharp price hikes amid shortages.
This Article provides a new, empirically grounded perspective on the price …
Law And Economics Versus Economic Analysis Of Law, Keith N. Hylton
Law And Economics Versus Economic Analysis Of Law, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
I agree with Calabresi's general distinction between Economic Analysis of Law and Law and Economics. However, these broad categories may obscure important differences between types of law and economics scholarship. I would distinguish positive economic analysis from normative economic analysis, and positivist legal analysis from nonpositivist analysis. The four categories generated by these distinctions provide a more fine-grained map of the styles of reasoning in law and economics, and has implications for the future of law and economics.
Economic Individualism And Preference Formation, Andrzej Rapaczynski
Economic Individualism And Preference Formation, Andrzej Rapaczynski
Faculty Scholarship
This note examines some issues involved in an attempt to go beyond the assumption, long-made by most economists, that people’s preferences are simply to be treated as “given” and that the principle of consumer sovereignty entails a refusal to consider some (or some people’s) revealed preferences as more authoritative than others. The most important break with that assumption has been the development of behavioral economics, which shows that people may not always know what they really want, and that economists have to develop a more critical approach, distinguishing people’s true preferences from those that are merely apparent. While this approach, …
The Corporation As Courthouse, Rory Van Loo
The Corporation As Courthouse, Rory Van Loo
Faculty Scholarship
Despite the considerable attention paid to mandatory arbitration, few consumer disputes ever reach arbitration. By contrast, institutions such as Apple’s customer service department handle hundreds of millions of disputes annually. This Article argues that understanding businesses’ internal dispute processes is crucial to diagnosing consumers’ procedural needs. Moreover, businesses’ internal processes interact with a larger system of private actors. These actors include ratings websites that mete out reputational sanctions. The system also includes other corporations linked to the transaction, such as when American Express adjudicates a contested sale between a shopper and Home Depot. This vast private order offers promise to …
The Psychology Of Patent Protection, Stephanie Plamondon Bair
The Psychology Of Patent Protection, Stephanie Plamondon Bair
Faculty Scholarship
This Article offers the first comprehensive assessment of the major justifications for our patent system using a behavioral psychology framework. Applying insights from the behavioral literature that I argue more accurately account for the realities of human action than previous analytical tools, I critically evaluate each of the major justifications for patents — incentive theory, disclosure theory, prospect theory, commercialization theory, patent racing theory, and non-utilitarian theories. I ask whether our current patent system is an effective regime for meeting the stated goals of these accounts. When the answer to this question is no, I again turn to the behavioral …
Are Individuals Fickle-Minded?, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Are Individuals Fickle-Minded?, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Faculty Scholarship
Game theory has been used to model large-scale social events — such as constitutional law, democratic stability, standard setting, gender roles, social movements, communication, markets, the selection of officials by means of elections, coalition formation, resource allocation, distribution of goods, and war — as the aggregate result of individual choices in interdependent decision-making. Game theory in this way assumes methodological individualism. The widespread observation that game theory predictions do not in general match observation has led to many attempts to repair game theory by creating behavioral game theory, which adds corrective terms to the game theoretic predictions in the hope …
The Burden Of Deciding For Yourself: The Disutility Caused By Out-Of-Pocket Healthcare Spending, Christopher Robertson, David Yokum
The Burden Of Deciding For Yourself: The Disutility Caused By Out-Of-Pocket Healthcare Spending, Christopher Robertson, David Yokum
Faculty Scholarship
As part of a larger "consumer-directed healthcare movement," cost-sharing mechanisms, such as copays and deductibles, cause patients to pay out of pocket for a portion of the costs of the healthcare they consume. Cost sharing is intended to reduce costs by changing consumption behavior, and it has been shown to be an effective though incomplete solution to the problem of unsustainable cost growth. It is controversial nonetheless. This Essay distinguishes three different normative problems with cost sharing (including underinsurance, deterrence of high-value care, and a tax on sickness), which can all be fixed through more precision in the design of …
Value Creation By Business Lawyers In The 21st Century, Ronald J. Gilson
Value Creation By Business Lawyers In The 21st Century, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
It’s a delight to be here. When I started working on Value Creation by Business Lawyers – or when I was in law school – we could have held today’s meeting in a telephone booth. There was nothing even remotely in the curriculum. Victor Brudney and Marvin Chirlestien’s Corporate Finance book was still in mimeograph form – note the dated technology reference. David Herwitz’s Business Planning book had been around for a while, but it was strictly legal. And that exhausted it. What I take the greatest pleasure from is the fact that a number of years later, enough to …
Can We Build Behavioral Game Theory?, Gale M. Lucas, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Can We Build Behavioral Game Theory?, Gale M. Lucas, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Faculty Scholarship
The way economists and other social scientists model how people make interdependent decisions is through the theory of games. Psychologists and behavioral economists, however, have established many deviations from the predictions of game theory. In response to these findings, a broad movement has arisen to salvage the core of game theory. Extant models of interdependent decision-making try to improve their explanatory domain by adding some corrective terms or limits. We will make the argument that this approach is misguided. For this approach to work, the deviations would have to be consistent. Drawing in part on our experimental results, we will …
Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics And Legal Scholarship, Greg Klass, Kathryn Zeiler
Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics And Legal Scholarship, Greg Klass, Kathryn Zeiler
Faculty Scholarship
Endowment theory holds the mere ownership of a thing causes people to assign greater value to it than they otherwise would. The theory entered legal scholarship in the early 1990s and quickly eclipsed other accounts of how ownership affects valuation. Today, appeals to a generic “endowment effect” can be found throughout the legal literature. More recent experimental results, however, suggest that the empirical evidence for endowment theory is weak at best. When the procedures used in laboratory experiments are altered to rule out alternative explanations, the “endowment effect” disappears. This and other recent evidence suggest that mere ownership does not …
The Republic Of Choosing: A Behaviorist Goes To Washington, William H. Simon
The Republic Of Choosing: A Behaviorist Goes To Washington, William H. Simon
Faculty Scholarship
Cass Sunstein’s book Simpler recounts the author’s efforts during his tenure in the first Obama administration to apply the policy tools he helped derive from behavioral economics. In this review, I suggest that, while Sunstein reports some notable achievements, he exaggerates the utility of the behaviorist toolkit. Behaviorist-inspired interventions are marginal to most of the largest policy problems, and they played little role in the Obama administration’s most important initiatives. The book also reflects a misguided political strategy.
The Theory Of Minds Within The Theory Of Games, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller
The Theory Of Minds Within The Theory Of Games, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller
Faculty Scholarship
Classical rationality as accepted by game theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment has consistent preferences and beliefs and that actions result consistently from those preferences and beliefs, and moreover that these preferences, beliefs, and actions remain the same across equal choice moments. Since, as is widely found in prior experiments, subjects do not follow the predictions of classical rationality, behavioral game theorists have assumed consistent deviations from classical rationality by assigning to subjects certain dispositions— risk preference, cognitive abilities, social norms, etc. All of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, making claims about how individual human …
Beyond Individualism In Law And Economics, Robert B. Ahdieh
Beyond Individualism In Law And Economics, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
The study of law and economics was built upon two pillars. The first is the familiar assumption of individual rationality. The second, less familiar, is the principle of methodological individualism. Over the last twenty years, law and economics has largely internalized behavioral critiques of the rationality assumption. By contrast, the field has failed to appreciate the implications of growing challenges to its methodological individualism. Where social norms shape individual choices, network externalities are strong, coordination is the operative goal, or information is a substantial determinant of value, a methodology strongly oriented to the analysis of individuals overlooks at least as …
Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner
Barriers To Effective Risk Management, Michelle M. Harner
Faculty Scholarship
“As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”**
This now infamous quote by Charles Prince, Citigroup’s former Chief Executive Officer, captures the high-risk, high-reward mentality and overconfidence that permeates much of corporate America. These attributes in turn helped to facilitate a global recession and some of the largest economic losses ever experienced in the financial sector. They also represent certain cognitive biases and cultural norms in corporate boardrooms and management suites that make implementing a meaningful risk culture and thereby mitigating the impact of future economic downturns a challenging proposition.
The …
Legal Bargaining Theory's New "Prospecting" Agenda: It May Be Social Science, But Is It News?, Robert J. Condlin
Legal Bargaining Theory's New "Prospecting" Agenda: It May Be Social Science, But Is It News?, Robert J. Condlin
Faculty Scholarship
In the good old days legal bargaining scholarship was based mostly on negotiator war stories exuberantly told. The social-scientific study of the subject did not begin in earnest until the nineteen-seventies. Since then, however, the literature of storytelling has gone into a pronounced eclipse and social-scientific study is now the principal scholarly game in town. This article questions the wisdom of this shift, almost seismic in its proportions, and argues that it is too soon to jump on the social science bandwagon. Discussion focuses on the uses made of the Prospect Theory of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and the …
Belief In A Just World, Blaming The Victim, And Hate Crime Statutes, Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, Richard H. Mcadams
Belief In A Just World, Blaming The Victim, And Hate Crime Statutes, Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, Richard H. Mcadams
Faculty Scholarship
The earliest economic theory of discrimination proposed the subsequently neglected idea of a "vicious circle" of discrimination (Myrdal,1944). We draw on psychological evidence (that people derive utility from believing that the world is just) to propose a behavioral economic model in which the vicious circle envisaged by Myrdal can arise. We demonstrate the power of this approach through an application to the issue of whether and how to justify penalty enhancements for hate crimes against members of disfavored groups. The crucial assumption is that individuals engage in biased inference in order to preserve their Belief in a Just World, thus …
On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, And Contractual Conditions, Eric L. Talley
On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, And Contractual Conditions, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
This article uses the recent Delaware Chancery Court case of Hexion v. Huntsman as a template for motivating thoughts about how contract law should interpret contractual conditions in general – and "material adverse event" provisions in particular – within environments of extreme ambiguity (as opposed to risk). Although ambiguity and aversion there to bear some facial similarities to risk and risk aversion, an optimal contractual allocation of uncertainty does not always track the optimal allocation of risk. After establishing these intuitions as a conceptual proposition, I endeavor to test them empirically, using a unique data set of 528 actual material …
The Promise (And Limits) Of Neuroeconomics, Jedediah S. Purdy
The Promise (And Limits) Of Neuroeconomics, Jedediah S. Purdy
Faculty Scholarship
Neuroeconomics — the study of brain activity in people engaged in tasks of reasoning and choice — looks set to be the next behavioral economics: a set of findings about how people make decisions that casts both light and doubt on widely accepted premises about rationality and social life. This Article explains what is most exciting about the new field and lays out some specific research tasks for it.
"Contracting" For Credit, Ronald J. Mann
"Contracting" For Credit, Ronald J. Mann
Faculty Scholarship
On a recent day, I used my credit cards in connection with a number of minor transactions. I made eight purchases, and I paid two credit card bills. I also discarded (without opening) three solicitations for new cards, balance transfer programs, or other similar offers to extend credit via a credit card. Statistics suggest that I am not atypical. U.S. consumers last year used credit cards in about 100 purchasing transactions per capita, with an average value of about $70. At the end of the year, Americans owed nearly $500 billion dollars, in the range of $1,800 for every man, …
Calabresi And The Intellectual History Of Law And Economics, Keith N. Hylton
Calabresi And The Intellectual History Of Law And Economics, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This essay traces the vein of thought represented by Calabresi's "The Costs of Accidents", both backward in time to examine its sources, and forward to its impact on current scholarship. I focus on three broad topics: positive versus normative law and economics, positivist versus anti-positivist thinking in law, and the assumption of rationality in law and economics.
Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, Jennifer H. Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley
Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, Jennifer H. Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Behavioral economics is an increasingly prominent field within corporate law scholarship. A particularly noteworthy behavioral bias is the "endowment effect" – the observed differential between an individual's willingness to pay to obtain an entitlement and her willingness to accept to part with one. Should endowment effects pervade corporate contexts, they would significantly complicate much common wisdom within business law, such as the presumed optimality of ex ante agreements. Existing research, however, does not adequately address the extent to which people manifest endowment effects within agency relationships. This article presents an experimental test for endowment effects for subjects situated in an …