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Exclusive Dealing Agreements

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The Market Power Model Of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese Feb 2013

The Market Power Model Of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Transaction cost economics ("TCE") has radically altered industrial organization's explanation for so-called "non-standard contracts, "including "exclusionary" agreements that exclude rivals from access to inputs or customers. According to TCE, such integration usually reduces transaction costs without producing anticompetitive harm. TCE has accordingly exercised growing influence over antitrust doctrine, with courts invoking TCE's teachings to justify revision of some doctrines once hostile to such contracts. Still, old habits die hard, even for courts of increasing economic sophistication. This Article critiques one such habit, namely, courts'continuing claim that firms use market or monopoly power to impose exclusionary contracts on unwilling trading partners. …


Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese Oct 2005

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese Jan 2003

Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.