Law Commons^™

Crypto In Real Estate Finance, R. Wilson Freyermuth, Christopher K. Odinet, Andrea Tosato

Faculty Publications

Blockchain and cryptocurrencies have ushered in a digital gold rush. But all that glitters is not gold. The latest fad is the use of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) to purchase and finance real estate. Typically, crypto real estate transactions begin with the transfer of title for a residential property into a dedicated business entity, such as a limited liability company. Thereafter, an NFT is ‘minted’ and used to represent the ownership interest in that entity. The real property is then marketed online specifying that, to acquire it, one simply purchases the relevant NFT via a blockchain transfer. Crucially, buyers are expected …

Moby-Dick As Corporate Catastrophe: Law, Ethics, And Redemption, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick serves here as a vehicle through which to interrogate core features of American corporate law and excavate some of the deeper lessons about the human soul that lurk behind the pasteboard mask of the law’s black letter. The inquiry yields an illuminating vantage on the ethical consequences of corporate capital structure, the law of corporate purpose, the meaning of voluntarism, the ethical stakes of corporate fiduciary obligations, and the role of lawyers in preventing or facilitating corporate catastrophe. No prior familiarity with the novel or corporate law is required.

Unicorn Stock Options - Golden Goose Or Trojan Horse?, Anat Alon-Beck

Faculty Publications

Large privately held startups valued at $1 billion or more (“unicorns”) are dealing with employees’ conflicts of expectations due to the illiquidity of the shares of stock acquired upon exercise of their options.

Until about eight years ago, many talented workers chose to work for a startup company for a lower cash salary combined with a substantial stock option grant, and the dream of cashing out for a large sum of money after an initial public offering (“IPO”) of the startup’s stock.

Today, unicorns remain private for extended periods of time in part because they are often no longer dependent …

The Social Relations Of Consumption: Corporate Law And The Meaning Of Consumer Culture, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

A mature assessment of the society we are making for ourselves, and the legacy we are leaving to the future, must come to terms with consumer culture. Theoretical discourse, as well as common experience, betray persistent ambiguity about what consumerism means to and says about us. In this Article, I argue that this ambiguity can in part be explained by examining the social relations of consumption in contemporary society. These involve, crucially, the relationship between producer and consumer that is dictated by corporate governance law, and embodied in the decision-making dynamics of the directors who command corporate operations. The enigmatic …

Is Corporate Patriotism A Virtue?, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

American social and political discourse attests to widespread concern about whether domestic corporations can be counted on to serve the national interest. This issue is especially pressing in an era of international corporate operations, in which firms can send jobs and tax revenues overseas, devastating local communities even as they boost the prospects of workers in a foreign land, and the interests of capital spread across the globe. Firms founded in America can also disperse across the border productive resources that could otherwise be nationalized or made available to the homeland in times of crisis or war. Indeed, the shareholder …

Opting Out Of Shareholder Primacy: Is The Public Benefit Corporation Trivial?, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

The central command of corporate governance law is that directors must serve the shareholder interest. Directors may not sacrifice shareholder value in favor of other corporate stakeholders or other interests. In this Article, I examine whether this rule of shareholder primacy is mandatory, or merely a default rule which can be altered through private ordering. I argue that Delaware’s corporate law, the most important corporate law in the United States, should be understood to have long-permitted privately-ordered deviation from shareholder primacy. This assessment, however, is at least complicated by the recent legislative creation of the Public Benefit Corporation (PBC). The …

Corporate Aid To Governmental Authority: History And Analysis Of An Obscure Power In Delaware Corporate Law, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

The Delaware General Corporation Law contains an obscure provision stating that all corporations have the power to “[t]ransact any lawful business which the corporation’s board of directors shall find to be in aid of governmental authority.” 8 DGCL §122(12). This oddly worded provision has never been applied, analyzed, or interpreted by any court. It has received almost no treatment by corporate law scholars. This lack of attention is surprising, given that by its own terms the provision seems to bear on fundamental corporate law themes, such as the purpose of corporations, the scope of directors’ fiduciary obligations and discretion, and …

Consumer Lock-In And The Theory Of The Firm, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

When shareholders invest in a corporation they become “locked-in” to the prospects of that firm. A shareholder cannot force the firm to buy back her shares, nor can she force it to dissolve and turn over her pro rata share of its assets. She gets nothing for her capital unless the firm profits and pays dividends, or she finds someone else willing to buy her stock. Corporate law scholars have recognized that capital “lock-in” is both a corporate law solution that enables large-scale business to flourish, and a corporate law problem that threatens the growth and proper governance of big …

The Public Choice Problem In Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) that the First Amendment forbids Congress from restricting the political speech of corporations. While corporate theory did little to inform the Court’s thinking in Citizens United, this Article argues that the holding in Citizens United requires us to rethink corporate theory. The shareholder primacy norm in American corporate governance relies on the assumption that corporations can be restrained from influencing external governmental operations. We can enjoy the efficiencies generated by shareholder primacy in corporate governance, mainstream corporate theorists have long argued, because we can rely on external regulation …

Towards A Firm-Based Theory Of Consumption, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

Corporate theory typically construes consumption activity as involving a series of arms-length, atomistic transactions in which consumers exchange money for discrete corporate goods or services. Canonical accounts expect satisfied consumers to engage in repeat transactions, but the transactions themselves are (implicitly or explicitly) assumed to be isolated, fully contained dealings with the firm. Such a view of consumption supports the inference that consumers can readily manage their own interests in corporate operations through serial decisions to “take it,” “leave it,” repeat, or refuse to repeat patronization of a firm. This assessment plays an important part in justifying American corporate governance …

Is Social Enterprise The New Corporate Social Responsibility?, Antony Page, Robert A. Katz

Faculty Publications

Since at least the famous Berle-Dodds debate, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and later its more muscular and structural iteration, progressive corporate law, have been discussed without much progress. The authors consider whether the social enterprise movement, which envisions a new sector of businesses created both to generate profits and pursue social goals, advances this debate. They conclude that it does. Proponents of social enterprise believe that such businesses can combine the dynamism of for-profit firms with the mission-driven zeal more typical of nonprofit organizations. Social enterprise and CSR have much in common: both want businesses to take the interests of …

The Role Of Social Enterprise, Robert A. Katz, Antony Page

Faculty Publications

A social enterprise operates a business in a manner intended to increase social welfare more than conventional businesses in the same sector. This notion of “social enterprise” was pioneered by nonprofit organizations seeking to advance their charitable missions through revenue-generating commercial activity, instead of relying on charitable donations. With increasing frequency the term is applied to for-profit business ventures whose founders seek to both address social problems while also generating acceptable returns for owner-investors. The article examines the notion of for-profit social enterprise, and explains how such entities may better achieve social goals than nonprofits engaged in revenue-generating commercial activity, …

Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law And The Sale Of A Social Enterprise Icon, Antony Page, Robert A. Katz

Faculty Publications

Companies with social missions are frequently bought by larger, more conventional profit-seeking firms and just as frequently accused of “selling out.” Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Inc. is perhaps the leading example: its takeover by international conglomerate Unilever is an oft-repeated cautionary tale of the negative proclivities of the publicly-traded corporate form and profit-maximizing corporate law. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, corporate law did not compel the sale, or sell-out, of Ben & Jerry’s. This familiar account omits a critical part of the narrative -- the company and its founders had established impressive anti-takeover defenses that, when pressed, the board declined …

Consumer Interest In Corporate Law, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of the consumer interest in dominant theories of the corporation and in the fundamental doctrines of corporate law. In so doing, the Article fills a void in contemporary corporate law scholarship, which has failed to give sustained attention to consumers in favor of exploring the interests of other corporate stakeholders, especially shareholders, creditors, and workers. Utilizing insights derived from the law and behavioralism movement, this Article examines, in particular, the limitations of the shareholder primacy norm at the heart of prevailing "nexus of contracts" and "team production" theories of the firm. The Article concludes …

Drifting Down The Dnieper With Prince Potemkin: Some Skeptical Reflections About The Place Of Compliance Programs In Federal Criminal Sentencing (Symposium), Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

This Article explains how the federal organizational sentencing guidelines work and how they have created incentives for businesses to set up compliance programs. It then considers the paucity of evidence that compliance programs actually prevent the occurrence of corporate crime. It also questions whether investments in compliance programs make sense even for companies caught in a federal criminal investigation. There is little evidence that compliance programs have any significant effect on the likelihood that federal prosecutors will file criminal charges in the first instance. Even more surprisingly, examination of U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics reveals that the compliance program movement seems …